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Under the auspices of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights the right 
to freedom of expression is said to be held by everyone and to include the freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority, subject to the limitation clauses outlined in Article 10(2). Whilst the text of 
Article 10 therefore makes no explicit reference to specifically artistic expression, the 
European Court of Human Rights has, in its interpretation of ‘information and ideas’, 
nevertheless accepted that artistic expression does indeed fall within the ambit of Article 
10’s protection of freedom of expression.  
 
However, despite the Court recognising artistic expression as a form of expression within 
the framework of Article 10, conclusions reached in the early case law concerning the issue 
of controversial artworks would appear to suggest the judicial creation of an implicit 
hierarchy of expression under which artistic expression is seen to enjoy a relatively low 
level of protection. Given the non-differentiated articulation of the right to freedom of 
expression enounced in the text of Article 10, the creation of such a hierarchy of expression 
is therefore a cause for doctrinal concern. 
 
In seeking to assess this misnomer the thesis’ analysis of the treatment of artistic expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be distilled in to two 
component parts. Firstly, a theoretical basis will be established from which artistic 
expression may be located within the context of the discourse pertaining to freedom of 
expression more generally. Having confirmed that, whilst of a distinctive, sui generis 
nature, artistic expression may indeed constitute ‘expression’ for the purposes of freedom 
of expression doctrine the second part of the thesis will examine the particular question of 
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It is not surprising…that art should be the enemy marked out by every form of 
oppression. It is not surprising that artists and intellectuals should have been the first 
victims of modem tyrannies, whether of the Left or the Right. Tyrants know there is in the 
work of art an emancipatory force, which is mysterious only to those who do not revere it. 
 
Albert Camus,  

















































a) Background to the thesis 
 
(i) An introduction to the juxtaposing case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights: the emergence of this thesis’ premise 
 
The genesis of this thesis, and my interest in the law concerning freedom of artistic 
expression, may be traced back to an international human rights law seminar on the topic 
of freedom of expression that I attended whilst an undergraduate at the University of 
Sheffield. As part of the background reading for the seminar we were required to read the 
seminal European Court of Human Rights case of Handyside v. UK as well as, amongst 
others, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria. Upon reading these cases a certain perplexity 
began to emerge. On the one hand, the Court’s obiter in Handyside was clear in its 
insistence that the right to freedom of expression applied to expression that ‘offend[s], 
shock[s] or disturb[s] the State or any sector of its population’. Yet, on the other hand, in 
the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut, the State’s confiscation of a film due to be shown at 
an art film house in the Tyrol region of Austria on the basis that it offended the religious 
sensitivities of the local community was deemed to not violate the freedom of expression 
guarantees under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It was 
tentatively noted, therefore, that there was something of a divide between the words 
employed by the Court and its subsequent (in)action in particular instances concerning 
controversial or offensive expression.    
 
My thoughts on the apparent discrepancy between the rhetoric of Handyside and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ subsequent jurisprudence resulting in the Otto-
Preminger-Intsitut judgment lay dormant for a couple of years before resurfacing again 
whilst studying towards an L.L.M. in International Law at the University of Edinburgh. 
During the process of researching cases for an essay discussing the extent to which the 
European Convention on Human Rights contains an implicit right to not be offended, my 
attention continually returned to a selection of particularly apt Article 10 cases in which, 
as was the case with Otto-Preminger-Institut, restrictions on controversial or offensive 
expression were held to not violate Article 10. In particular, and in addition to Handyside 
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and Otto-Preminger-Institut, the basis of the resulting essay was centred on an analysis of 
Wingrove v. UK (which concerned the refusal of the British Board of Film Certification to 
award a short film depicting a nun engaging in suggestive sexual activities with the figure 
of Christ with the required certificate for public distribution) and Müller v. Switzerland (in 
which paintings depicting various sexual scenes were confiscated by the authorities).  
 
Thus, in all of the above-mentioned cases in which controversial expression was restricted 
by the State, the European Court of Human Rights found that there had been no violation 
of Article 10 notwithstanding the Handyside dictum in which it was stipulated that the right 
to freedom of expression, elicited under Article 10, applies as equally to offensive, 
shocking or disturbing expression as it does to expression that is regarded as ‘inoffensive 
or as a matter of indifference.’ Accordingly, whilst the essay’s inquiry in to the purported 
implicit right to not be offended centred on this seeming disparity between the Handyside 
dictum and the Court’s resulting case law concerning offensive expression, little was said 
of the particular form in which the expression in Müller, Otto-Preminger-Institut and 
Wingrove was manifested. Nevertheless, it seemed somewhat curious that the triumvirate 
of cases on which the essay rested should each concern artistic expression; that is to say 
that the expression was made through the artistic media of, namely, film (Otto-Preminger-
Institut, Wingrove) and painting (Müller). The resulting thesis and its investigation of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of artistic expression under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is the result of this initial observation. 
 
(ii) The categorisation of expression: creating a hierarchy of expression 
 
That there is, indeed, significance in the observation that the cases of Müller, Otto-
Preminger-Institut and Wingrove, in which no violation of Article 10 was found, concerned 
artistic expression has been commented upon in Professor Harris et al’s leading textbook 
on the European Convention on Human Rights wherein it has been suggested that the Court 
has proffered varying degrees of protection under Article 10 depending on the type and 
nature of expression at issue.1 Accordingly, the textbook’s analysis of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ Article 10 jurisprudence is sub-divided in to three predominant 
categories of expression: political expression (including civil, or public interest, 
                                                     
1 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed. p. 455 
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expression), artistic expression and commercial expression;2 with each category positioned 
on a sliding scale of judicial protection.3 Thus, an implicit hierarchy of expression has been 
seen to have transpired under the Court’s application of Article 10, with political expression 
at the apex of the Court’s protection, artistic expression enjoying an intermediate degree of 
protection and commercial expression enjoying the lowest level of protection under Article 
10.  
 
However, such a hierarchy of expression, to the extent that it does indeed exist, is curious 
in itself. Turning to the text of Article 10 we find that ‘expression’ is defined in general, 
non-differentiated terms, with no specific reference being made to the various forms – 
political, artistic or commercial, for instance – that expression may take. Accordingly, in 
outlining the right to freedom of expression, the text of Article 10(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights reads:  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.4 
 
Thus, in addition to the discrepancy between the assurances made in Handyside and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ subsequent case law a further discrepancy exists within 
the Court’s application of Article 10 itself. In essence, therefore, there is a supposed 
differentiation of treatment of the various forms of expression that has been seen to have 
emerged from a non-differentiated human right according to which ‘expression’ is defined 
with particular emphasis on the communication of information and ideas.   
 
(iii) Initial thoughts on the thesis’ premise 
 
Given the apparent discrepancies outlined above with regards to the case law and 
categorisation of expression, in preparing to embark upon the research and writing of this 
thesis a working premise began to emerge according to which it was supposed that there 
might be some underlying correlation between the inherent nature of artistic expression and 
its relatively low level of protection under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
                                                     
2 See Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (n 1) at 455-465. Whilst the authors include civil/public interest 
expression as a distinct category, for the purposes of this thesis such expression will be considered 
to be subsumed within political expression. For more, see Chapter Three infra. 
3 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (n 1) at 455-465 
4 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10(1) (emphasis added) 
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Human Rights. Put another way, it was posited that there might be some quality of art and 
artistic expression that contributed to the judicial undermining of artistic expression as a 
valued form of expression for the purposes of freedom of expression law. In part this 
supposition was based on the observation that, as Harris et al suggest, the European Court 
of Human Rights appears to be far more willing to find violations of Article 10 when the 
expression in question is of a political nature.5 As such, an attempt by the State to restrict 
comments made in a newspaper would likely prompt the Court to find that a violation of 
Article 10 had occurred. Yet, in continuing on the theme of the offensiveness of expression, 
it is perfectly conceivable to suppose that political expression may be regarded as offensive; 
to put it crudely, a committed socialist may, one would suspect, take great offence at 
comments made in a conservative-leaning newspaper. Given the non-differentiated 
exposition of the right to freedom of expression in the text of Article 10 it therefore seemed, 
at the onset of this inquiry, somewhat incongruous to suppose that offense stemming from 
artistic expression may be subject to greater limitations than its political counterpart.  
 
That the case law of the European Court of Human Rights would appear to indicate the 
creation of a hierarchy of expression detrimental to specifically artistic expression is 
therefore of profound interest especially when considered in light of the Handyside dictum. 
Whilst my background does not lie in the philosophy of art or art theory, from the 
perspective of a layman with an interest in the arts, it seemed to me that a fundamental 
raison d'être of art and artistic expression is precisely to challenge norms and ‘ask’ the 
difficult questions such that the noted applicability of Article 10 to expression that offends, 
shocks or disturbs in Handyside would appear, on its face, to offer a sympathetic foundation 
aligning with the very essence of artistic expression.  
 
This underlying notion of artistic expression’s essence of challenging norms can be seen 
from two perspectives. Firstly, the development of various art movements would itself 
indicate a perpetual challenging of the prevailing status quo within the artistic realm, with 
each movement offering some sense of departure from the last. For instance, the abstract 
works of Jackson Pollock can be seen as a progression from Picasso’s cubism which, in 
turn, proffered a development on an impressionist movement that had itself diverged from 
the realism movement. Secondly, and of greater significance for the purposes of this thesis, 
an underlying value of art lies in its distinctive capacity to challenge our previously held 
                                                     
5 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (n 1) at 455: “It is firmly established that restrictions on political 
discussion call for stringent review.” (citations omitted) 
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convictions. For performance artist Karen Finley – who was herself the subject of an 
infamous First Amendment case concerning freedom of artistic expression6 – the role of 
the artist is to, “interpret not just the aesthetics of life, but actually to represent or create 
meaning.”7 There exists, as such, a symbiotic relationship between the artist and society 
through which the artist seeks to both reflect, as well as shape, the society in which they 
exist.  
 
With regards to the conveying of information and ideas one can, therefore, with relative 
conceptual ease, consider artistic expression to be expression, for purposes of freedom of 
expression law. Yet there remains something curiously distinctive about the precise nature 
in which artistic expression conveys its ideas. As the artist Keith Haring posited, “[i]f I 
could say it in words there would be no reason to paint.” Moreover, for the French artist 
Georges Braque, “[a]rt is made to disturb. Science reassures. There is only one valuable 
thing in art: the thing you cannot explain.” Taken together, then, the underlying assumption 
informing the development of this thesis’s inquiry was that, whilst artistic expression could 
be considered as expression for the purposes of freedom of expression doctrine, there was 
something unique about the way in which such expression is made that might account for 
the discrepancy between the European Court of Human Rights’ dictum in Handyside and 
the early case law of Müller, Otto-Preminger-Institut and Wingrove.  
 
(iv) The importance of protecting art: From history to the present day 
 
Turning to history, art has been seen to enjoy a precarious position in totalitarian societies. 
The notorious mass book burnings as well as the ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition of 1937, in 
which examples of art considered as not conforming with the Nazi Party ideology were 
displayed and disparaged, proffered something of a death knell for freedom of artistic 
expression in Germany. Indeed, whilst preparing works for exhibitions artists could expect 
unannounced visits from ‘aesthetic officials’ who would proffer ‘advice’ on how the artist 
ought best proceed. By way of example, during one such spot check, the aesthetic official 
stated that the work in question was, “[m]uch too gloomy; let’s have a little more joy in 
your composition. People in Germany no longer have such careworn faces”8; as the 
historian Richard Grunberger has wryly commented: “[t]he two prerequisites for artistic 
                                                     
6 National Endowment for the Arts v. Karen Finley et al, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) 
7 Interview from the Los Angeles Times, available at: http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-
et-jc-karen-finley-banned-books-week-20150929-story.html (accessed 14th December 2016) 
8 Grunberger, R. A Social History of the Third Reich, Penguin, 1974, p. 544  
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success in the Third Reich were meticulousness and receptiveness to official guidance.”9 
For those artists in Nazi Germany who proved unreceptive to the Nazi Party’s artistic 
guidance a range of measures could be imposed such as prohibiting the artist from teaching, 
exhibiting his works or even from engaging in the very act of painting itself. Indeed, to 
enforce the latter sanction, the State would go so far as to place lists of proscribed artists in 
paint shops thereby denying the artist from procuring the requisite materials for his 
endeavour whilst the Gestapo would conduct raids on proscribed artists’ residences 
ensuring that their paintbrushes remained dry.10  
 
The plight of, particularly abstract and expressionist, art in Nazi Germany would appear to 
demonstrate a prima facie unease with which totalitarian regimes – in seeking to undermine 
individual freedom more generally – consider artistic freedom. Conversely, moreover, such 
nervousness might indeed suggest the totalitarian’s recognition of the power and social 
utility of art, a consideration that finds emphasis, in turn, in the efforts placed by such 
regimes in producing art that was considered to reinforce their underlying ideologies. As 
such, Greenberger has noted, those (competent) artists who complied with the Nazi 
regime’s requirements could prosper and achieve notoriety; the regime being more than 
keen to award a range of commissions, prizes and titles to those willing to produce works 
instilling the requisite patriotic fervour.11  
 
Accordingly, the impact of the Nazi regime’s influence on art – by both proscribing 
degenerate art and actively promoting such art that was deemed to inspire Nazi ideology – 
is perhaps most profoundly seen by comparing two works by the sculptor Georg Kolbe. 
Produced in 1927, six years prior to Adolf Hitler’s ascension to Chancellor in 1933, Der 
Einsame (The Lonely One) depicts a solitary nude figure. With his head slumped slightly 
and his arms hanging limply by his side, the sculpture is suggestive of both timidity and 
introversion. The difference between Der Einsame and Kolbe’s 1934 sculpture entitled Der 
junge Streiter (The Young Warrior) is plain. The nude figure depicted in Der junge Streiter 
is more taut and muscular and his head is held high with an air of purpose and assuredness 
that is entirely absent from Kolbe’s earlier work. Whilst it is not the purpose of this thesis 
to suggest that there is a correlation between the proscription of art and the rise of 
totalitarianism the State’s tailoring of ‘acceptable’ art in the context of Nazi Germany 
                                                     
9 Grunberger (n 8) at 544 
10 Grunberger (n 8) at 544-545 
11 Grunberger (n 8) at 543 
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nevertheless provides an ample reminder in extremis of both the potential significance of 
art and artistic expression in society as well the fundamental need to encourage its 
protection.  
 
During the course of researching and writing this thesis controversies surrounding artistic 
expression have never been far from the news headlines. In 2011, Chinese artist and human 
rights activist Ai Weiwei was detained by the Chinese authorities and his studio 
demolished. The following year saw members of Pussy Riot, a punk rock protest group, 
arrested in Russia following an impromptu performance of a song critical of Vladimir Putin 
in a Moscow cathedral. Also in 2012, religious groups in the Philippines attempted to ban 
the pop star Lady Gaga from performing in the country; her song Judas being denounced 
as blasphemous whilst Born This Way was condemned for its pro-homosexual 
connotations.12 In 2013 Index on Censorship, a leading free speech advocacy group, held a 
conference entitled Taking the offensive: Protecting artistic expression in the UK in 
London during which the extent of self-censorship in the creative process and creeping 
legal restraints on artistic expression were but two of a range of issues tabled for 
discussion.13 Since at least 2014, Islamic State have engaged in the destruction of a number 
of sites of archaeological and cultural significance throughout the Middle East bringing 
with it the loss of many irreplaceable examples of ancient art. Closer to home, 2014 also 
saw London Transport refuse to display Antony Micallef’s work Kill Your Idol – in which 
Jesus Christ is depicted in front of a panel of judges reminiscent of television talent contests 
– on the walls of the London Underground alongside other contemporary depictions of the 
Passion of Christ.14 Finally, in the opening days of 2015, discussions about the role of 
artistic expression and its appropriate delineations echoed throughout the world following 
an Al-Qaeda attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical magazine, in which 
eleven people were murdered.  
 
Whilst there has therefore been no shortage of inspiration to draw upon whilst writing this 
thesis there was one development in particular that was especially intriguing. In 2012 the 
                                                     
12 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/music-news/9280733/Lady-Gaga-defies-censors-
to-play-provocative-show-in-the-Philippines.html (accessed 8th November 2015) 
13 The report of the conference can be found at: https://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/taking-the-offensive.pdf (accessed 12th November 2015)  
14 To see the artwork and for a general background, see Mark Brown, Pop Idol painting of Jesus 
fails to get Transport for London's vote, The Guardian, 28th March 2014 available online at 
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/mar/28/pop-idol-painting-jesus-london-tube-
anthony-micallef-kill-your-idol (accessed 8th November 2015) 
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British Board of Film Certification approved Visions of Ecstasy for certification, thereby 
allowing the short film to be distributed to the public more than twenty years after rejecting 
the film from certification on the basis of its blasphemous content. The refusal of the British 
Board of Film Certification to grant the film with a certificate for distribution two decades 
previously had led, ultimately, to the European Court of Human Rights and the case of 
Wingrove v. UK, one of the triumvirate of cases to inform the basis of my Masters essay 
on the implicit right to not be offended under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and prompt my interest in the right to freedom of specifically artistic expression. With the 
abolition of the common law offence of blasphemy by the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act in 2008, the British Board of Film Certification considered there to be no 
continuing legal basis for the censoring of Visions of Ecstasy; its previous refusal being 
based, not on the sexual content of the film per se, but on the basis that the sexual content 
revolved around the sacred figures of St Theresa of Avila and Jesus Christ.15 Accordingly, 
with the impact of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Wingrove firmly 
etched in to the consciousness of European freedom of expression discourse such a 
significant development on the domestic front further emphasised the importance of 
analysing the development of the Strasbourg Court’s doctrinal treatment of artistic 
expression that lies at the heart of this thesis.   
 
b) The underlying aims of the thesis’ inquiry 
 
When compared to the volume of ink that has been spilled over the topic of freedom of 
expression more generally the treatment of specifically artistic expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention has, with a few notable exceptions, received relatively scant 
attention in the academic literature.16 A fundamental purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to 
redress this imbalance and contribute to the wider discourse concerning the right to freedom 
of expression under Article 10 by narrowing the focus to the underrepresented, particular 
issue of artistic expression. Thus, whilst the emphasis of this thesis lies in an investigation 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of art and artistic expression, it is hoped 
that the conclusions reached will resonate more generally than the narrow parameters of 
the thesis’ principal inquiry. For instance, by analysing and critiquing the rationale 
employed in the Court’s determination of cases concerning the particular issue of artistic 
                                                     
15 See http://www.bbfc.co.uk/case-studies/visions-ecstasy (accessed 12th November 2015) 
16 For the exception proving the rule, see Kearns, P. Freedom of Artistic Expression: Essays on 
culture and legal censure, Hart Publishing, 2013 in which over a decade’s worth of research and 
comment on the specific issue of artistic expression has been collated.  
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expression, wider conclusions may be drawn with regards to the Court’s understanding of 
freedom of expression more generally. Accordingly, the extent to which artistic is protected 
and the doctrinal justifications proffered for its protection will be seen to shed light on the 
meaning, scope and value of freedom of expression under Article 10 more generally. Thus, 
by focusing the lens of inquiry on to the particular question of freedom of artistic 
expression it is hoped, therefore, that this thesis will contribute to a more holistic and 
nuanced appreciation of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
 
The relative silence of academic comment on the topic of artistic expression under Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights may, in part, be explained by the paucity 
of case law to have been decided by the Strasbourg Court. Nevertheless, whilst still 
relatively few in number, the case law concerning artistic expression has expanded since 
the Müller/Otto-Preminger-Institut/Wingrove triumvirate of cases, producing with it 
developments in the Court’s jurisprudence.  Given that the case law has developed over the 
course of nearly thirty years since 1988 and the case of Müller – in which the Court 
explicitly recognised that artistic expression indeed fell within the protective ambit of 
Article 10 for the first time – the primary purpose of this thesis, in its contribution to the 
freedom of expression discourse, is to examine the extent to which there still exists a 
hierarchy of expression in the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence according 
to which artistic expression is seen to enjoy a relatively low degree of protection. Moreover, 
and to the extent that there remains in its judgments a hierarchy of expression, an analysis 
will emerge within which the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of artistic 
expression will be critiqued. 
 
c) Thesis outline 
 
In order to successfully analyse the European Court of Human Rights’ case law concerning 
the freedom of artistic expression the opening chapters of this thesis will seek to 
contextualise, from a theoretical perspective, artistic expression within the broader confines 
of the freedom of expression discourse. Given the non-differentiated definition of 
‘expression’ within Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to 
which the right to freedom of expression is enunciated with a particular emphasis on the 
conveyance of information and ideas, contextualising the concept of artistic expression 
within the broader freedom of expression paradigm is of fundamental necessity for the 
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development of the thesis. Accordingly, in order to establish that artistic expression is 
indeed ‘expression’ for the purposes of Article 10 it plainly needs to be established that 
artistic expression has the capacity to convey information and ideas.   
 
To this end, Chapter One begins by providing an overview of the key strands to have 
emerged from philosophical thought concerning the right to freedom of expression. 
Starting with an exposition of Mill’s utilitarian position concerning the importance of 
freedom of expression in the development of collective thought and truth, Chapter One 
then proceeds to critique Scanlon’s autonomy argument for the protection of freedom of 
expression as well as the self-fulfilment rationale before turning its attention to the 
Meiklejohnian argument from democracy in which the importance of freedom of 
expression is seen to lie in allowing the citizenry to self-govern effectively.  
 
Having established the underlying contours of freedom of expression’s philosophical and 
theoretical thought, Chapter Two continues the process of contextualising artistic 
expression within the freedom of expression paradigm by proffering an overview of the 
theory and philosophy of art. Whilst this thesis’ primary concern lies in human rights law 
– and as such does not intend to offer any significant contribution to the realm of art theory 
– it is, nonetheless, essential to incorporate a general appreciation of a selection of 
prominent schools of thought concerning the theory and philosophy of art in order to 
provide a framework within which to analyse the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence on the question of freedom of artistic expression. As such, whilst the 
discussion in Chapter Two focuses quite specifically on the development of thought 
regarding the theories of art that might be referred to, generally, as ‘fine art’ the 
implications to be drawn as to art’s underlying value and distinctive mode of operation, are 
more far-reaching and may be seen to apply to the range of artistic expression that has been 
heard before the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Of fundamental import to the development of this thesis is the recognition that artistic 
expression is capable of conveying information or ideas and, as such contributing to some 
form of public discourse yet, as the overview in Chapter Two demonstrates, that art has 
such a capacity is not immediately clear. For instance, the formalist school would submit 
that the value of art lies within the formal qualities of a given work such as the artist’s use 
of colours and shapes. More encouragingly for the purpose of converging the theories of 
art and freedom of expression, other theories of art – emanating, in particular, from 
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adherents of the expressivist and aesthetic cognitivist schools – would submit that the value 
of art does indeed lie in its communicative qualities. Moreover, and of particular 
significance, it will transpire that artistic expression is seen to communicate in ways distinct 
to other modes of expression, suggesting that artistic expression occupies a curious 
positioning within the freedom of expression paradigm. 
 
Having established a theoretical framework within which it is confirmed that artistic 
expression is indeed expression for the purposes of freedom of expression doctrine in 
general and Article 10 in particular, the discussion in Chapter Three lies in the extrapolation 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to categorising expression. Chapter 
Three opens with an assessment of a theoretical basis according to which the categorisation 
of expression, and subsequent attributing of varying degrees of protection, may be 
rationalised according to the distinction made by Schauer’s between the coverage of the 
right to freedom of expression and the ensuing protection proffered. As such, emphasis will 
be placed on the extent to which a given category of expression is seen to promote the 
underlying values of Article 10. The second part of Chapter Three proceeds to analyse the 
European Court of Human Rights’ approach to the categorisation of expression in light of 
Schauer’s observations. As such, the foundation will be set from which to note that, through 
a lack of scrutiny and judicial oversight, the Court has failed to appreciate the unique ways 
in which artistic expression can contribute to the core values of Article 10. 
 
The culmination of Chapter Four’s analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
treatment of specifically artistic expression seeks to incorporate the various strands of 
inquiry to have emerged in the previous chapters. By analysing the more recent 
developments in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the freedom of artistic expression 
since the early triumvirate of cases relating to Müller, Otto-Preminger-Institut and 
Wingrove, a critique will emerge in which the success with which the Court has recognised 
the particular challenges relating to artistic expression as a form of expression within 



















It has been said that artistic freedom is, “the Cinderella of liberties, seldom in the spotlight, 
and never in the limelight.”17 Before seeking to address this discrepancy and allowing 
artistic expression to make its way to the centre stage of this thesis it is necessary that it 
wait a while longer in the wings whilst we first survey the general nexus of thought 
concerning the philosophy of freedom of expression more generally. The opening half of 
this thesis is, as such, of a largely theoretical nature; its purport, in essence, being to both 
identify and rationalise artistic expression’s location within the broader discourse 
concerning the right to freedom of expression. Only from an understanding of the abstract 
can one fully appreciate and more comprehensively analyse the judicial treatment of artistic 
expression in actual, concrete cases; an analysis of which will follow in Chapter Four of 
this thesis.    
 
As such, by sketching an outline of the literature and underlying thought concerning the 
general theories of the right to freedom of expression, the opening chapter of this thesis 
will provide the contextual foundation from which the ensuing discussion in Chapter Two 
– regarding the theories of art – will seek to connect the dots and, in so doing, illuminate 
the intricate and, at times, inherently fraught nature of artistic expression as a sui generis 
mode of expression within the underlying principles of freedom of expression more 
generally. Thus, having initially located the theoretical basis for artistic expression’s 
inclusion within the broader paradigm of freedom of expression in the opening chapters of 
this thesis,  the second half of will progress on to the more practical, empirical question of 
the success with which the European Court of Human Rights has recognised the doctrinal 
dexterity required when considering questions of artistic expression and the extent to which 
artistic expression has, accordingly, been protected.   
 
                                                     
17 Kearns (n 16) at 150 
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Turning our minds back to the present chapter and the prevailing theories relating to the 
right to freedom of expression, it is fundamentally important to note, from the outset, the 
generally accepted position, as held in academic thought as well as judicial case law, that 
freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapters Three 
and Four of this thesis, the overwhelming majority of case law concerning Article 10 
concerns the interpretation and application of Article 10(2)’s limitation clauses and their 
provision for the legal restriction of freedom of expression.  Thus, whilst there is a broad 
consensus that the right to freedom of expression ought not to be equated with a right to 
express whatever one wants, whenever one wishes, the consensus in judicial and academic 
opinion becomes divided when it comes to the drawing of lines and delineating what 
freedom of expression, in practice, actually entails.  
 
In this regard, whilst the question of the right’s precise extent and coverage will be more 
extensively addressed in Chapter 3’s discussion concerning the categorisation of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by first 
examining the three principal schools of thought concerning freedom of expression – 
namely, the arguments from truth, democracy, and self-fulfilment/autonomy – key themes 
will begin to emerge from which we will, in Chapter Two, be able to locate more precisely 
artistic expression’s theoretical foundation within the freedom of expression paradigm. 
Indeed, the importance of identifying the value(s) that freedom of expression seeks to 
promote cannot be overstated. For, as Redish proclaims, “the answer we give to the 
question what value does free speech serve may well determine the extent of constitutional 
protection to be given to such forms of expression as [inter alia] literature [and] art.”18 
Accordingly, by first tracing the contours of the right to freedom of expression vis-à-vis the 
identification of the broad values held by each school of thought to justify the significance 
of the right in general, not only we will begin to see a bird’s eye view of the landscape of 
freedom of expression, but the location, too, of artistic expression therein.  
 
1. 2 THE ARGUMENT FROM TRUTH 
 
1.2.1  An exposition of John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’ 
 
                                                     
18 Redish, M. The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1981-1982) at 591 
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First published in 1859, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty sets out what has proved to be one 
of the most lyrical and enduring defences of individual liberty in general and freedom of 
expression in particular. Indeed, the collection of essays has been described as “an icon of 
the liberal tradition”19, making it a useful starting point in our examination of the 
philosophical foundations of the right to freedom of expression. No treatment of the subject 
of freedom of expression would be complete without reference to this seminal work yet, 
far from being consigned to the annals of historic thought, the full implications of Mill’s 
defence of freedom of expression remain of academic and jurisprudential interest to this 
day.20 Moreover, the general framework provided by Mill may, it is suggested, proffer a 
useful basis from which to tentatively build the theoretical basis of artistic expression’s 
utility and very existence within the freedom of expression paradigm.  
 
Mill’s defence of freedom of expression, contained in Chapter Two of On Liberty, is most 
commonly referred to as evincing an argument from truth. That is to say that unimpeded 
expression and discussion will, so it is hypothesised, most likely lead to a greater 
understanding or appreciation of truth. In support of this particular thesis Mill proffers three 
principal reasons setting out why discussion ought to be largely unimpeded so as to protect 
even apparently false or controversial expression. Firstly, according to Mill, one cannot be 
absolutely certain that the opinion that is sought to be suppressed is, in fact, false. To claim 
otherwise would be to assume our own infallibility, a position that Mill would not readily 
undertake.21 Secondly, whilst the suppressed opinion may well be false, it is more likely 
than not to contain an element of truth. Moreover, since the prevailing opinion is likewise 
unlikely to contain the whole truth, it is only, so Mill considered, through the, “collision of 
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.”22 
Thirdly, even on the basis that it could be assumed that the prevailing opinion contained 
                                                     
19 Schauer, F. On The Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’, 
39 Capital University Law Review 571 (2011) at 571 
20 For contemporary academic discussion over the implications of the Millian perspective see, for 
instance, the debate between Schauer and Blasi in the 2011 volume of the Capital University Law 
Review at pages 571 and 535 respectively. With regards to the relevance of the Millian defence of 
freedom of expression in judicial thought, the distinction made by Mill between ‘discussion’ and 
‘positive instigation’, outlined in section 1.2.3 below, may be employed in rationalising the 
development of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence regarding its freedom of 
(artistic) expression case law. The Court’s determination of the film in Wingrove as being 
‘gratuitously offensive’ and therefore of no societal value may be broadly aligned with Mill’s 
‘positive instigation’ whereas, the more recent cases of Alinak and Karatas – in which the artistic 
qualities of the works in question were given more credence – may be likened to Mill’s ‘discussion’.  
21 Mill, J. S. On Liberty, Representative Government, and the Subjugation of Women: Three essays 
by John Stuart Mill, Oxford University Press (1960) at 65 
22 Mill (n 21) 65 
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the whole truth; unless it is “vigorously and earnestly” contested it will become a form of 
dogma, based on prejudice rather than reason.23 Given, as we shall see in further detail 
below with regards to the application of his rule-utilitarianism – according to which the 
greatest good is considered to be best achieved through the adoption of general, long-term 
rules or principles rather than through the determination of the utility of specific, individual 
acts24 – the faith held by Mill in man being a progressive being, the potential stagnation of 
thought may be seen as being particularly anathema to Mill. 
 
Accordingly, in order for art and artistic expression to be seen to fall within the scope of 
the Millian conception of freedom of expression it needs to be demonstrated that, as a sui 
generis mode of expression, it has the capacity to engage with and contribute to discourse 
and the ‘collision of adverse opinions’ such that it may, in some way, be seen to contribute 
to the revelation of truth and the prevention of public opinion becoming unquestioningly 
stagnant. Whilst Chapter Two’s assessment of the prevailing schools of thought with 
regards to art theory will demonstrate that artistic expression’s ability to contribute to 
public discourse is by no means uncontested, it will nevertheless be suggested that there 
remains ample scope – especially within the expressivist and aesthetic cognitivist schools 
of thought, with their assertion that art and artistic expression is capable of conveying either 
emotions or ideas25 – to locate artistic expression within the framework of a Millian defence 
of freedom of expression. For, as a corollary to artistic expression’s capacity to convey 
emotions and ideas – and in addition to the challenging of artistic norms, as evinced by the 
development from realism to impressionism to cubism noted in the introduction to this 
thesis – comes a capacity to contribute, it is suggested, to the ‘collision of adverse opinions’ 
necessary to prevent the anathema of a stagnation of thought.  
 
If we therefore accept, at this juncture, that artistic expression is indeed expression for the 
purposes of freedom of expression philosophical discourse – in as much as it is capable of 
communicating something – a prima facie reading of the Millian stance can be seen as 
proffering a particularly attractive framework from which to base artistic expression’s 
protection. With Mill’s assertion that the ‘collision of adverse opinions’ is required in order 
                                                     
23 Mill (n 21) at 65 
24 For a brief overview on the distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism see, for instance, 
Harrison-Barbet, A. Mastering Philosophy, Palgrave, 2nd ed. p. 204. Accordingly, in contrast to the 
act-utilitarian, Mill’s philosophy is not grounded in the question of whether the specific expression 
‘x’ is capable of contributing to the greatest good but, rather, in the assumption that free expression 
in general promotes that underlying goal of the greatest social utility.  
25 See sections 2.3 and 2.4 infra 
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to promote societal progression and avoid the stagnation of thought, the theoretical 
foundation for protecting controversial art might therefore be seen to lie in the very fact 
that it is deemed controversial. 
 
1.2.2 The limitations of the Millian exposition of freedom of expression 
 
Based on essentially consequentialist reasoning, placing the ultimate value of an action on 
its perceived results and outcomes, the most enduring criticism of Mill’s philosophical 
justification for freedom of expression is, perhaps, its substantial reliance on the existence 
of a causal relationship between discussion as the means and truth as the end.26 Whilst a 
detailed examination of the extent to which such a correlation may be said to exist lies out 
with the scope of this thesis, for present purposes, and in terms of attempting to locate 
artistic expression within a broader context, it suffices to say that the Millian approach 
remains a strong defence for the promotion of freedom of (artistic) expression in as much 
as it encourages and supports that expression deemed controversial to the otherwise 
stagnant dogmatic position held by a given majority. Indeed, whilst Mill’s thesis has great 
difficulty in fully explaining, as Barendt points out, exactly why unimpeded expression 
will necessarily lead to truth (or, for that matter, better individual or societal decisions), it 
nevertheless remains particularly applicable to the expression of beliefs concerning 
political, moral, aesthetic and social matters.27  
 
Leaving questions of epistemology and the nature of truth and extent to which unimpeded 
expression is more or less likely to produce it to one side, however, a more profound 
criticism of Mill’s On Liberty is that it is internally incoherent. In particular, it has been 
claimed that there is a degree of tension between his general theory of liberty encapsulated 
in the introductory chapter and the more specific defence of freedom of expression found 
in Chapter Two of On Liberty, especially with regards to the incorporation of purportedly 
harmful expression within Mill’s overall thesis. By seeking to resolve these tensions not 
only will a more nuanced light be shed on our understanding of On Liberty more generally, 
but a basis provided from which (controversial) artistic expression may be seen to prevail. 
                                                     
26 See, for example, Fenwick, H. Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge-Cavendish, 4th ed. 
(2007) at 302 
27 Barendt, E. Freedom of Speech, OUP, 2nd ed (2005) at 9-11 
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In Chapter One of On Liberty, Mill sets as his overarching goal the formulation of ‘one 
very simple principle’ concerning the relationship between society and the individual when 
it comes to matters of compulsion and control.28 The principle is set out thusly: 
 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant.29  
 
This classic liberal position and the exposition of the ‘harm principle’ would, therefore, 
appear to cover what Schauer labels ‘self-regarding conduct’30; whereby, put another way, 
conduct pertaining exclusively to the individual absolutely cannot be subjected to 
proscription. Whilst this can be applied with relative ease to the entirely internal freedom 
of thought or opinion, it is conceptually more difficult to apply to expression, which is, by 
its very nature, the conveyance of one’s thought to others so as to be in essence more 
external than the freedom of thought and thus more akin to Schauer’s ‘other-regarding 
conduct’. Indeed, Mill appears to recognise this phenomenon, noting that, “[t]he liberty of 
expression and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it 
belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people,” only to 
immediately qualify the assertion by stating that, “but, being of almost of as much 
importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is 
practically inseparable from it.”31  
 
Confusingly, therefore, rather than providing ‘one very simple principle’, by asserting that 
freedom of expression is ‘practically inseparable’ from freedom of thought Mill would 
seem to be somewhat muddying the water. In particular, it raises fundamental questions 
concerning the scope and delimitations of freedom of expression when it comes to 
potentially harmful expression; a confusion that is compounded further by the fact that the 
harm principle is not even mentioned in the second chapter’s defence of freedom of 
expression. In particular, for instance, it is not made entirely clear by Mill why harmful 
expression (expression that purportedly causes harm to others) ought to be treated any 
differently from any other act that causes harm. Is it because expression is virtually 
                                                     
28 Mill (n 21) at 14-15 
29 Mill (n 21) at 15 (emphasis added) 
30 Schauer (n 19) at 571 
31 Mill (n 21) at 18 
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synonymous with opinion, or is it because the harm caused is not the type of harm 
recognised by the harm principle?32 At first glance neither explanation, it would seem, is 
fully sufficient.  
 
1.2.3 Blasi’s synthesis  
 
In seeking to iron out Mill’s thesis and provide an internally consistent defence of freedom 
of expression Vincent Blasi has proffered a compelling, and seemingly original, 
interpretation that is consistent with Mill’s assertion that freedom of expression is 
‘practically inseparable’ from the liberty of thought, whilst simultaneously allowing for the 
prohibition of expression in certain circumstances. Accordingly, under Blasi’s 
construction, Mill offers, “both an absolute freedom…from context-independent general 
prohibitions of ideas and also a robust, albeit qualified, freedom from regulations of speech 
that turn on the particular circumstances of dissemination.”33 As such, Blasi’s rendition 
will, it will be demonstrated later, have significant ramifications for the locating of artistic 
expression in the freedom of expression paradigm.   
 
Fundamental to Blasi’s interpretation of On Liberty is the now infamous ‘corn-dealer’ 
example, found within the opening pages of Chapter Three, entitled Of Individuality, As 
One Of The Elements Of Well-Being. Here Mill conceded that: 
 
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even 
opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed 
are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous 
act.34 
 
That there are certain instances whereby expression may be legitimately curtailed is 
exemplified by Mill’s assertion that the opinion that ‘corn-dealers are starvers of the poor’ 
could be subjected to differing levels of protection depending on the context in which they 
were expressed. Thus, the above opinion would, for Mill, enjoy absolute protection when 
circulated in the press but the exact same opinion, when expressed orally to an ‘excited 
mob’ outside the corn-dealer’s house, could be legitimately subjected to restrictions. 
 
                                                     
32 Blasi, V. Shouting ‘Fire!’ In A Theatre and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 Capital University Law 
Review 535 (2011) at 538 
33 Blasi (n 32) at 542 
34 Mill (n 21) at 69 (emphasis added) 
26 
 
It is important to note that Blasi’s understanding of the two different outcomes in the ‘corn-
dealer’ example is to be distinguished on a qualitative, as opposed to a quantitative, basis. 
As such, the distinction is based on a high-levelled principle rather than a simple differing 
in the probability of harm. The principled, qualitative distinction is therefore grounded in 
the distinction made between what Mill terms ‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation.’ Put 
another way, the fundamental difference is that of the social value attributed to the speaker 
in each instance.35  
 
Nonetheless, the distinction made between ‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation’ under 
Blasi’s reading of Mill is successful in aiding our understanding of the relevance of the 
harm principle. Accordingly, the harm principle is not to be considered as a restriction on 
all expression but, rather, only that expression which is considered to be a positive 
instigation to some mischievous act. By way of further explanation, it is only those acts 
which, “without justifiable cause [that] do harm to others” that may be subject to 
restriction.36 In further emphasising this distinction, Blasi points out that Mill did not state 
more broadly that, “acts that do harm to others may be regulated,”37 but rather, only those 
acts that are not sufficiently justified. On such a reading, by creating a distinction between 
the inherent value of expressions made in differing circumstances, the fact that the harm 
principle is unmentioned in Chapter Two of On Liberty becomes less problematic than 
might first be thought on a first reading.  
 
By asserting that ‘discussion’, under Mill’s defence of freedom of expression, is to enjoy 
absolute protection, Mill is appealing to the branch of utilitarianism known as rule-
utilitarianism.38 For reasons outlined above in section 1.2.1, with regards to the principal 
reasons favouring a strong protection of freedom of expression, Mill considers that the long 
term benefits of allowing comprehensive and uninhibited ‘discussion’ will outweigh any 
short- and long-term social costs. Thus, Mill asserted that: 
 
                                                     
35 Blasi (n 32) at 539-540. As a brief aside, and in reference to the general criticism of Mill’s position 
regarding the dependence upon a causal link between expression and the pursuit of truth, it is 
interesting to note that, by placing the focus on the individual speaker, Blasi’s Millian principle 
would appear to lessen the immediacy with which expression, in fact, relates to truth. Indeed, this 
emphasis is subject to particular criticism by Schauer, as we shall see further below  
36 Mill (n 21) at 69 (emphasis added) 
37 Blasi (n 32) at 544 
38 See Section 1.2.1, infra  
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I consider utility as the ultimate appeal to all ethical questions; but it must be utility 
in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive 
being.39 
 
As such, the permanent interests of man as a progressive being require an absolute 
protection of ‘discussion’, given its purportedly inherent tendency towards the truth, even 
when that expression (in the form of ‘discussion’) may be considered, by some, as 
‘harmful’. Conversely, under Blasi’s account, ‘positive instigation’ is seen to be subjected 
to the principles relating to act-utilitarianism,40 which seeks to measure the utility arising 
from an individual set of circumstances. Accordingly, in such circumstances, the harm 
principle to have emerged from the ‘corn dealer’ example is of particular relevance.  
 
In an attempt to clarify his understanding of Mill’s thesis, Blasi goes on to consider a case 
concerning freedom of expression and abortion, heard in respect of the First Amendment 
in the United States of America. The question addressed in Planned Parenthood v. 
American Coalition of Life Activists41 was whether the messages on anti-abortion websites 
and posters were entitled to First Amendment protection. One poster contained the names, 
photographs, and addresses of thirteen doctors who were alleged to have performed 
abortions. The poster accused the doctors of crimes against humanity and offered a $5000 
reward for information leading to their arrest, conviction and revocation of their medical 
licence. Furthermore, one of the websites listed the names of about 200 doctors described 
as ‘abortionists’, with those doctors who had been murdered appearing with their names 
scored out, whilst those who had been injured appeared in a greyed-out font.42  
 
In applying his synthesised understanding of Mill’s defence of freedom of expression Blasi 
first notes that the case would have been easier to adjudge had the messages simply 
contained general arguments against abortion, even to the extent of expressing the opinion 
that doctors who perform abortions are murderers who deserve to die.43 Such expression 
would, Blasi argues, be akin to the publication of the view that ‘corn-dealers are starvers 
of the poor’ in a newspaper. What makes the Planned Parenthood case particularly difficult 
from a Blasi-Millian perspective is the fact that the doctor’s personal details had been 
                                                     
39 Mill (n 21) at 22 
40 For an overview of the distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism see Harrison-Barbet (n 24) 
infra remembering that, in terms of protecting expression, act-utilitarianism is concerned with the 
utility of a specific example of expression. 
41 Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) 
42 Blasi (n 32) at 548-549 
43 Blasi (n 32) at 550 
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released, along with an extra degree of moral condemnation. It is important, however, to 
remember that under Blasi’s construction of the Millian principle, an increase in the 
probability of harm is not enough, in and of itself, to distinguish protected from unprotected 
expression. Rather, it is the, “presence of special circumstances that make the dissemination 
something more than the expression of an opinion, circumstances that make it ‘a positive 
instigation to a mischievous act’.”44 More particularly, for Blasi, it is the intention of the 
speaker that acts as the acid test in determining whether or not the expression falls within 
Mill’s scope of the liberty of thought and discussion.45 
 
On this question, Blasi considers the inclusion of the doctors’ names, pictures and addresses 
to have crossed the threshold as depicted in the corn-dealer example for two reasons. 
Firstly, this additional information, “provides a basis to impute to the speakers the intention 
to cause the killing, harming, or intimidation of the named abortion providers, even if not 
necessarily the intention personally to undertake a violent act.”46 It is this idea of the 
speaker having ‘violence in mind’ that alters the expression from ‘discussion’ to ‘positive 
instigation’ and therefore falling outside of Mill’s absolute protection. Secondly, and 
related to the first point, according to Blasi, the additional information changes the focus 
of the expression, “making it less of an invitation to discussion and reflection and more a 
guide to action.”47 Therefore, because such expression is not facilitative of Mill’s quest for 
achieving truth, it falls out with the absolute protection afforded to ‘discussion’ and may 
therefore be subjected to the harm principle. Given that the publishing of names, pictures, 
and addresses is akin to ‘positive instigation’, such that the harm principle can come in to 
play, the increased likelihood of ensuing harm can therefore, under Blasi’s construction of 
the Millian position, warrant the expression’s restriction.  
 
Whilst it may seem rather peculiar to promote the employment of two different approaches 
to the protection of freedom of expression within a single text, Blasi’s account is 
advantageous in so far as it provides an absolute protection to the type of speech considered 
by Mill to be particularly valuable in achieving progress through knowledge and truth. As 
such, it avoids the temptation of “carv[ing] out specific exceptions to this generalisation 
[ie. of freedom of expression] [that] are likely to result in myopic judgments or social 
                                                     
44 Blasi (n 32) at 551 
45 Blasi (n 32) at 552 
46 Blasi (n 32) at 551 
47 Blasi (n 32) at 554  
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dynamics that undercut the process by which the benefits are generated.”48 Indeed, this 
method of definitional absolutism – under which expression that is seen to promote some 
underlying value is afforded particular protection – can be seen, to varying degrees, in all 
of the positions considered below, irrespective of their underlying views regarding the 
essence of freedom of expression.  
 
Moreover, the distinction to be made between ‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation’ and 
the attributing of differing levels of protection thereafter can be seen to obliquely inform 
the development of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence concerning artistic 
expression under Article 10.49 For instance, as we shall later see, the Court’s determination 
that the short film Visions of Ecstasy’s sexualised depiction of St Theresa and Christ in the 
case of Wingrove was ‘gratuitously offensive’ such that the expression made was of no 
societal value can be seen to align with Mill’s notion of ‘positive instigation’. Accordingly, 
if we continue with Mill’s parlance, the majority’s judgment can be seen to have accepted 
that the expression made in Visions of Ecstasy caused harm (in the form of offence) to 
others without justifiable cause. As such, the Court’s finding that there had been no 
violation of Article 10 can be seen as an approximation of an application of the Millian 
harm principle.  
 
Conversely, the position taken in the case of Wingrove may be contrasted with that held by 
the majority’s judgment in Karatas v. Turkey. There, significance was placed on the fact 
that the unquestionably provocative expression was made in the form of poetry. Thus, when 
considered in the context of poetry – with its distinctive use of, for instance, hyperbole and 
metaphor – statements such as ‘I invite you to ... death’ and ‘blood shall be washed in 
blood’ were considered by the Court to be “an expression of deep distress in the face of a 
difficult political situation,”50 (ie. contributing to a Millian ‘discussion’) rather than as what 
Mill would determine as a ‘positive instigation to some mischievous act’ (ie. a literal call 
to uprising). The extent to which specifically artistic qualities are recognised within a given 
instance of artistic expression can therefore be seen to be of particular significance in 
determining the extent to which controversial artistic expression may be protected. The 
interpretations concerning the role of art and artistic expression, and the extent to which 
artistic expression may be brought within the freedom of expression nexus, which will be 
                                                     
48 Blasi (n 32) at 548 
49 For a more detailed analysis see Chapter Four. 
50 Karatas v. Turkey (1999) (Application no. 23168/94) (HUDOC), para. 52 
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the subject of further attention Chapter Two of this thesis, will therefore be of fundamental 
import. 
 
1.2.4 Schauer’s critique of the Blasi-Millian position 
 
At this juncture it is perhaps worth pointing out a possible criticism of Blasi’s Millian 
principle. Blasi himself acknowledged that the conclusions he reached when applying his 
version of the Millian principle to actual, difficult cases may well be disputed by other 
commentators.51 Underlying this acceptance is the fact that it seems likely that in practice 
it will be rather difficult to draw the line between ‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation’; a 
point that seems all the more relevant with the phenomenal rise of technology in recent 
years. This increased availability of mass communication along with the ease with which 
opinions may be expressed to a potentially vast audience and the instantaneous nature of 
expression through social networking websites is such that expression will often have a 
potentially immediate impact that would seem to blur the distinction between ‘discussion’ 
and ‘positive instigation’ further still.  
 
Whilst Blasi’s interpretation of On Liberty succeeds, in large part, in rendering a coherent 
argument of Mill’s largely rhetoric filled and, facially at least, internally inconsistent, 
thesis, Schauer maintains that this is achieved at the possible expense of understating the 
social consequences of speech and discussion.52 Rather than seeking to argue that Chapter 
Two’s defence of freedom of expression is an instantiation of Chapter One’s consideration 
of liberty in general, Schauer prefers to consider the second chapter as an exception to the 
rest of the text.53 
 
Blasi’s distinction between ‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation’ is also investigated by 
Schauer who notes that under Blasi’s Millian principle: 
 
The advocacy of non-instigating tyrannicide…would be tolerated by Mill, but that 
tolerance, if it is to be distinguished from the corn-dealer example, is premised on 
Mill’s belief that discussing tyrannicide in a non-instigating and non-inflammatory 
environment cannot be considered a net harmful activity.54  
 
                                                     
51 Blasi (n 32) at 568 
52 Schauer (n 19) at 573 
53 Schauer (n 19) at 573 
54 Schauer (n 19) at 586 
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In developing his point, Schauer goes on to cite the dissent of Justice Holmes in the First 
Amendment case of Gitlow v. New York in which he proclaimed that, “every idea is an 
incitement”55; the point that Schauer seeks to assert being that even the soberest of 
expressions may result in the enacting of the consequences they are advocating. The 
advocacy of non-instigating tyrranicide may, after all, lead to tyrannicide.56 Accordingly, 
Schauer disagrees on an empirical level, with Blasi’s Millian belief that whilst non-
instigating expression may well cause harm, those harms will not be net-harms under the 
long term agenda promoted by the rule-utilitarian methodology. Such a stance, according 
to Schauer, depends on either an “unjustified optimism about reason” or the acceptance of 
“such a morally freighted conception of what is to count as harm that Millian net-harms 
and harms simpliciter emerge as not having very much in common.”57 
 
Referring to Mill’s assertion that liberty of expression is ‘practically inseparable’ from that 
of opinion, Schauer stresses that there is little in the way of argument proffered by Mill as 
to why exactly the other-regarding activity of expression ought to be considered any more 
inseparable from the liberty of thought than any other form of other-regarding activity or 
conduct that affects others.58 Whilst the underlying justification for this distinction may be 
absent, Chapter Two of On Liberty, when taken as a whole, may nevertheless provide good 
reason for the rigorous protection of free expression. 
 
Indeed, Schauer’s fundamental criticism of Blasi’s interpretation is that it fails to mention, 
in an appropriate level of detail, the epistemic arguments in favour of freedom of expression 
advanced by Mill in Chapter Two of On Liberty.59 Particularly, Chapter Two of On Liberty 
suggests, quite explicitly, that freedom of expression contributes directly to the discovery 
of truth whereas Blasi’s account seems to consider the identification of truth as a by-product 
of the development of the individual.60 Thus, Schauer points to the fact that Mill talks about 
historic eras possessing or not possessing knowledge, the implication being that knowledge 
is something not only possessed by individuals but by societies at large.61 As such, 
                                                     
55 Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925) at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
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according to Schauer, the relationship between unfettered expression and the advancement 
of social knowledge as posited by Mill is in fact much closer than Blasi’s reading of On 
Liberty – according to which free expression is required in order to develop the human 
character which in turn advances societal knowledge – would suggest. In sum, Schauer 
postulates that, “[i]f Mill were not so concerned about the more directly social than the 
individual character-developing value emanating from the liberty of discussion, it is hard 
to see why he would have devoted so much time to his epistemic arguments.”62 
 
Schauer’s interpretation might, however, lead one to ask the question of where the harm 
principle fits in to such a formulation. On this point it is important to remember that Schauer 
considers the arguments advanced in Chapter Two’s defence of freedom of expression as 
being an exception to that of Chapter One’s general principles concerning the relationship 
between the individual and society. Therefore, Chapter Two concerns the protection of 
potentially harmful conduct despite its harmfulness (and because of the societal, or 
utilitarian, good that free expression promotes) whereas Chapter One argues why socially 
harmless conduct should be free from sanction. Accordingly, this approach too explains 
why there is no need for the harm principle to feature in Chapter Two’s exposition of Mill’s 
philosophy concerning the right to freedom of expression. As such, by considering Chapter 
Two as an exception to Chapter One, a more robust defence of freedom of expression, so 
Schauer suggests, can flourish, since it reinforces the view that even purportedly harmful 
expression is to be protected.63 As such, Schauer’s argument seems to avoid the difficulties, 
appreciated even by Blasi, in trying to distinguish between ‘discussion’ and ‘positive 
instigation.’  
 
The interpretation put forward by Schauer is appealing in as much as it more consistently 
aligns with our intuitions about the basic Millian principle: namely that uninhibited 
expression is, for a number of reasons outlined in section 1.2.1 above, more likely to 
produce societal ‘truth’, however defined. However, Schauer’s criticisms of Blasi’s 
individualistic approach are perhaps less fatal than might first appear. By refocusing the 
importance of free discussion within the domain of the individual, rather than the direct 
social value attributable to free expression, the usual charge that there is no conclusive 
empirical support for the claim that there is a causal link between greater expression and 
the fulfilment of truth is surely diminished. Also, by locating the debate within the domain 
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of the individual a more tangible, individual right may be more easily established from 
which, when coupled with the distinction made between ‘discussion’ and ‘positive 
instigation’ and applied to the distinctive nature of art, outlined in Chapter Two of this 
thesis, may provide a more solid foundation for the protection of artistic expression. From 
a pragmatic viewpoint, therefore, such an approach may be seen to more naturally fit within 
the development of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law concerning artistic 
expression within Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
1.3  THE ARGUMENT(S) FROM INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SELF-
FULFILMENT 
 
1.3.1 Individual autonomy and self-fulfilment: An introductory overview  
 
In contrast to the traditional arguments from truth and democracy – according to which 
freedom of expression’s value is recognised largely, if not necessarily exclusively, in 
consequentialist terms – arguments deriving from notions of autonomy and self-fulfilment 
consider the value of freedom of expression less in terms of the good consequences that 
free expression brings per se and more as a good in and of itself. Thus, in establishing 
autonomy’s intrinsic value, Crocker first defines autonomy as, “making one’s own 
choices,” before going on to assert that, “the autonomous person is one who goes his or her 
own way.”64 Accordingly, “since it contributes to the moral status of individuals, autonomy 
itself must,” under Crocker’s assessment, “be valuable.”65 In essence, therefore, for those 
subscribing to autonomy-based arguments, freedom of expression is considered to be an 
essential condition for ensuring an individual’s autonomy, primarily with regards to its 
importance in informing his decision-making process.66  
 
Similarly, freedom of expression’s intrinsic value may also be regarded in terms of its 
necessity for promoting an individual’s self-fulfilment. The ability to express oneself is, as 
Barendt notes, a defining feature of what it means to be human.67 Thus, as cognitive, 
communicative and social beings, a right to freedom of expression may therefore be 
considered as an essential prerequisite in guaranteeing our humanity. Moreover, it has been 
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suggested that it is through the development of mankind’s ability to, for instance, reason, 
use language and convey emotions or ideas that gives us, as individuals, a sense of meaning 
and place in the world.68  For those who subscribe to the self-fulfilment school of thought, 
the particular significance of the right to freedom of expression can therefore be seen to lie 
in its capacity to establish an environment in which individuals are free to fully realise 
those attributes considered essential for human flourishing.   
 
There is therefore, as Barendt recognises, a certain degree of overlap between those 
arguments seeking to identify the value of freedom of expression in its guaranteeing of 
autonomy and its promotion of individual self-fulfilment.69 Both positions, broadly 
speaking, consider that the suppression of expression impedes or erodes some fundamental 
aspect of an individual’s capacity and being, such that expression ought to be left largely 
unimpeded, thereby allowing individuals to be left free to determine their own formulation 
of the good life. Indeed, permeating throughout much of the discussion concerning the 
intrinsic, individual nature of the right to freedom of expression is a certain confusion with 
regards to the terms that have been employed. Loughlan has, for instance, observed that the 
terms ‘self-expression’, ‘self-development’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘autonomy’ have 
been used, “reasonably interchangeably” in the literature.70 Similarly, Post notes that the 
terms ‘self-fulfilment’ and ‘self-expression’ have been employed in the literature to denote 
the type of autonomy typically associated with the, “Kantian commitment to the equal 
dignity of persons to be governed by their own sense of reason.”71 The confusion 
surrounding the ambiguity with which notions of autonomy and self-fulfilment have been 
applied in the literature is confounded further in light of Redish’s assessment of the thesis 
advanced by Baker ‘autonomy’. Thus, as Redish notes, despite adopting the term ‘liberty’ 
in his free speech principle – a term that is, itself, often used interchangeably with 
‘autonomy’ – it would appear that Baker is, in actuality, referring to the concept of 
individual self-fulfilment.72 As such, we are left in the curious position whereby ‘self-
fulfilment’ has been understood in terms of ‘autonomy’ and, conversely, ‘autonomy’ in 
terms of ‘self-fulfilment’.  
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The root of the somewhat ambiguous relationship between autonomy and self-fulfilment 
becomes clearer upon closer examination of Baker’s thesis, in which it is stipulated that, 
“[t]he emphasis on ‘self’ in self-fulfilment requires the theory to delineate a realm of liberty 
for self-determined processes of self-realization.”73 Put another way, there may be 
supposed to be an inherently symbiotic relationship between autonomy and self-fulfilment. 
For if self-fulfilment supposes that an individual be free to exercise a right to freedom of 
expression in order to advance his personal development, such a process demands that he 
is considered autonomous in the making of the decisions affecting that development. On 
such a view, autonomy may be regarded as playing a fundamental, if not essential, part in 
promoting individual self-fulfilment.  
 
Dworkin, however, is keen to identify a distinction, maintaining that, far from being two 
sides of the same coin, the principles of autonomy and self-fulfilment (especially when 
considered from a consequentialist perspective) are, in fact, antagonistic.74 The antagonism 
Dworkin notes lies in the hypothesis that, in considering the achievement of an individual’s 
self-fulfilment to be contingent on, and equivalent to, an individual realm of autonomy, the 
power that individuals ultimately have with regards to putting in to practice the conditions 
that they consider necessary for their flourishment may, in fact, be reduced.75 Forming the 
crux of Dworkin’s assertion in this regard is the observation that, “[i]f we are concerned 
only with the power of individuals to influence the conditions in which they must try to 
thrive, any theory of self-development that forbids the majority the use of politics and the 
law…is at least prima facie self-defeating.”76  
 
In further eliciting the seemingly counter-intuitive results associated with the conflation of 
the autonomy and self-fulfilment principles, Dworkin invites us to suppose a scenario in 
which freedom of expression is understood in terms of enabling individuals to decide for 
themselves the best conditions for their own personal flourishing, such that the banning of 
pornography would be considered wrong. Such a framework would in fact, Dworkin 
suggests, severely limit the options available to those individuals in the society who 
consider the availability of pornography to have a detrimental effect on the society in which 
they wish to live, even if they formed a majority.77 In such circumstances, the individual 
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self-fulfilment of the majority could not be said to have been given full effect. The answer, 
for Dworkin, then, lies in considering the issue of freedom of expression from the 
perspective of individuals’ ‘moral independence’ acting as a buttress against majoritarian 
preferences, as distinct from notions of advancing one’s self-fulfilment.78  
 
In light of Dworkin’s assertion, the following discussion will begin with an overview of 
the argument from autonomy associated with Scanlon’s influential paper A Theory of 
Freedom Expression – a thesis which indeed shares a degree of similarity with that of 
Dworkin79 – and its short fallings, before shifting the focus of inquiry on to an assessment 
of the principle of self-fulfilment.     
 
1.3.2 An exposition of Scanlon’s A Theory of Freedom of Expression80 
 
In the decades since its publication in 1972, the argument advanced in A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression has confirmed, as Scanlon himself later reflected, his “position in the 
Dantean Inferno of free speech debates.”81 Yet despite retracting and redeveloping his 
position in the intervening years, Scanlon’s account remains an important contribution to 
the freedom of expression discourse. The particular importance of Scanlon’s thesis lies, for 
Barendt, in the light that it sheds on the notion that the suppression of expression is wrong 
precisely because, “it prevents free people from enjoying access to ideas and information 
which they need to make up their own minds.”82 Thus, in identifying freedom of 
expression’s value squarely within the confines of personal autonomy, Scanlon’s theory 
promotes the importance of an individual being able to, “see himself as sovereign in 
deciding what to believe and in weighing competing reasons for action.”83 
 
Whilst Scanlon considered his approach to be a ‘natural extension’ of Mill’s thesis,84 it has 
been suggested that Scanlon’s position shares more in common with the arguments 
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pertaining to the Kantian or Rawlsian notions of rational, autonomous agency.85 Scanlon’s 
intent notwithstanding, by distancing his argument from the largely consequentialist 
reasoning associated with Mill, Scanlon’s thesis can be seen to avoid the customary 
criticism that it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with any degree of accuracy, what 
the long term benefits or consequences of uninhibited expression will actually be.  
 
In establishing the basis for his thesis, Scanlon suggests that our intuitions with regards to 
the  suppression of expression tend to centre on the notion that certain justifications for 
restricting expression are illegitimate, as opposed to the supposition that certain restrictions 
are illegitimate per se.86 For Scanlon, then, illegitimate justifications are those, “which 
appeal to the fact that it would be a bad thing if the view communicated by certain acts of 
expression were to become generally believed,” whereas legitimate justifications, “are 
those that appeal to features of acts of expression (time, place, loudness) other than the 
views they communicate.”87 As such, Scanlon recognises the important distinction to make 
as being: 
 
…between expression which moves others to act by pointing out what they take to 
be good reasons for action and expression which gives rise to action by others in 
other ways, e.g., by providing them with the means to do what they wanted to do 
anyway.88  
 
Scanlon cites, as an example of the former, such expression as, ‘you ought to rob a bank’; 
whilst an example of the latter form of expression might include the provision of detailed 
plans of a bank or the combination to the bank’s safe.89 In this regard, parallels might 
therefore be drawn with the distinction made by Mill between ‘discussion’ (protected 
expression) and ‘positive instigation’ (expression that may be restricted) that is so crucial 
to Blasi’s construction of the Millian position. The distinction for Scanlon – according to 
which expression of the ‘you ought to rob a bank’ variety ought to be protected –  is 
underpinned by an individual’s autonomy, however, and not the supposed benefits that 
unimpeded ‘discussion’ brings for long-term, societal utility, as proposed under Blasi’s 
reading of the Millian position.90   
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That the statement, “you ought to rob a bank,” as well as any supporting arguments as to 
why robbing banks might be a good thing, ought to be protected is explained by Scanlon 
with particular reference to the autonomy of the listener. Thus, according to Scanlon’s 
thesis:  
 
A person who acts on reasons he has acquired from another’s act of expression acts 
on what he has come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient basis for action. 
The contribution to the genesis of his action made by the act of expression is, so to 
speak, superseded by the agent’s [ie. ‘listener’s’] own judgement.91 
 
The essence of Scanlon’s theory, therefore, lies in the suggestion that the causal link 
between the speaker’s expression and the listener’s subsequent action is broken by the 
listener’s autonomy, such that the speaker’s expression cannot be held liable for the ensuing 
actions undertaken by the listener. In contrast, providing the combination to the safe is 
considered to amount to, “something more than merely the communication of persuasive 
reasons for action,” such that the accomplice’s expression – in as much as it is in fact 
‘expression’ – may legitimately be censured.92 
 
At the heart of Scanlon’s thesis, therefore, lies the premise that, “the authority of 
governments to restrict the liberty of citizens in order to prevent certain harms does not 
include authority to prevent these harms by controlling people's sources of information to 
insure [sic] that they will maintain certain beliefs.”93 Accordingly, Scanlon seeks to portray 
his theory of freedom of expression, not as an individual right per se, but rather as a 
limitation on the power that the State has in controlling individuals.94 As such, whilst 
recognising that freedom of expression may well flourish under conditions in which it is 
recognised that, as autonomous beings, individuals ought to be free to make their own 
minds up, Scanlon insists that his thesis ought not be regarded as suggestive of finding a 
violation of the right to freedom of expression, “whenever someone is deprived of 
information necessary for him to make an informed decision on some matter that concerns 
him.”95 Instead, as Moon explains, “freedom of expression,” under Scanlon’s proposal,  
“does not protect a certain class of expressive acts as valuable in themselves, rather it 
excludes certain reasons for restricting expression.”96 
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1.3.3 A critique of the Scanlonian position 
 
Arguably the most ardent criticism of the position advanced in A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression to have emerged since the paper’s publication has come from Scanlon himself. 
It is indeed significant that Scanlon retracted substantial elements of his argument in a later 
article, saying that his initial formulation was too broad and too sweeping to offer a 
plausible, working theory of freedom of expression.97 More recently still, in describing 
himself as, “someone who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy as the centerpiece of 
a theory of freedom of expression,” Scanlon has implored free speech scholars to refrain 
from identifying autonomy as the (sole) basis for freedom of expression’s value.98 
 
Central to much of the criticism levelled at the thesis put forward in A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression is the suggestion that the coherent application of a strong, autonomy-based 
defence of freedom of expression would protect many instances of expression deemed to 
be intuitively, as well as practically, unacceptable with no sufficient theoretical basis for 
their exclusion from a right to freedom of expression. Thus, with regards to theoretical 
basis for certain expression’s exclusion from protection, the approach provided by Scanlon 
has been criticised in light of apparent internal inconsistencies. Under Scanlon’s theory, it 
will be remembered, the ‘speaker’s’ expression, ‘you ought to rob a bank’, in the bank 
robbery example is considered to be protected because his act of expression is said to be 
superseded by the listener’s own rational judgement and decision-making process in light 
of his inherent autonomy. Yet, in another hypothetical example provided by Scanlon, in 
which a formula is given for the manufacturing of nerve gas, the expression was deemed 
to be unprotected.99  
 
As Robert Amdur points out, the distinction between the two instances is not made entirely 
clear by Scanlon. After all, an individual must himself decide to manufacture and use the 
nerve gas just as he decides to rob the bank. As Amdur postulates, “If [the ‘listener’s’] 
decision ‘negatives’ causal connection in one case, why not in the other?”100 According to 
the same logic, it is not clear why defamation (assessed by Scanlon to be unprotected 
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expression101) is any different in principle from statements that lead another to rob the bank, 
or murder a third person.102 For Amdur, “Scanlon seems to be saying that if A makes 
statements that lead B to form an adverse opinion of C the state may interfere – while on 
the other hand, if he ‘merely’ makes statements that lead B to murder C it may not.”103 
From an autonomy point of view, there seems to be little difference in principle between 
these instances. Furthermore, Amdur also notes with interest that in Scanlon’s defamation 
example, he uses the word “cause,” whereas in his other (protected) examples of incitement 
he says, “give rise to” or “result in.”104 A distinction in the directness of causation therefore 
seems to have been made without a sufficient level of justification.  
 
However, a more fundamental criticism than that of the internal inconsistencies highlighted 
in Amdur’s critique lies in the notion that autonomy cannot, at least on its own, provide a 
sufficient basis for a right to freedom of expression. Underlying this pervasive criticism is 
the observation that appeals to autonomy do not, or cannot, sufficiently distinguish 
expression from any other action that an autonomous person may engage in. For if we agree 
with Crocker’s depiction of an autonomous person being a person who goes his own way,105 
it is conceivable to think of a plethora of examples out with the realm of expression that 
would, nonetheless, remain instantiations of an individual’s autonomy. Whilst it is clear 
that those seeking to identify freedom of expression’s value in terms of autonomy do not, 
in fact, seek to claim that every human action ought to be covered by the right, the 
assumption remains, as Moon points out, that autonomy protects communication.106 What 
is not so clear, as Moon goes on to submit, is why the scope of one’s autonomy should be 
limited to acts of communication.107 Thus, in recognising that the value of autonomy is not 
unique to expression, such that it extends also to the actions of individuals, Post asserts that 
notions of autonomy do little to explain the normative scope of the right to freedom of 
expression.108  
 
In addition to general criticisms concerning the breadth of scope with which appeals to 
autonomy would bestow on a right to freedom of expression are concerns that Scanlon’s 
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thesis does not recognise the harms that expression might cause. As Koppelman notes, if it 
is accepted that, “speech cannot be prohibited simply because it results in listeners having 
false beliefs or in listeners coming to believe that they ought to perform harmful actions,” 
the notion of autonomy employed by Scanlon is simply too insensitive to the costs that may 
ensue from expression.109 Indeed, Scanlon later reflected that there are examples in which 
paternalism, in the form of suppressing certain expression, may be justified and for which 
his original hypothesis could not account for: bans on deceptive advertising and cigarette 
advertising on television being two such examples.110 For Barendt, however, the 
proscription of such expression as deceptive advertising may be incorporated in to an 
argument from autonomy with relative ease.111 For since we, as individuals, generally lack 
the ability to make an independent evaluation of the claims made by advertisers, laws 
restricting the use of deceptive marketing actually enhances our ability to make decisions 
and thus promotes our autonomy.  
 
Of even greater concern to the overall soundness of Scanlon’s thesis, therefore, is the 
suggestion that it that rational, autonomous people may agree that certain expression ought 
to be restricted. As Greenwalt points out, in order to protect themselves from expression 
perceived as being in some way harmful, “rational, autonomous people might agree to 
constraints that would inhibit to some degree the extent to which all citizens, including 
themselves, would have available information and advocacy that would maximally serve 
rational and autonomous choice.”112 For instance, it is conceivable to suppose that 
autonomous people might, upon reflection, accept that racist hate speech or pornography 
ought to be regulated by the State, either for fear of the harm to society that such expression 
might engender or, as Barendt suggests, on the basis that they find such expression hard to 
evaluate, much in the same way as consumers are incapable of independently assessing the 
claims made by advertisers.113 Indeed, Scanlon later conceded on this point, saying that, 
“there are in general limits to the sacrifices we are willing to make to enhance our decision-
making capacity. Additional information is sometimes not worth the cost of getting it.”114 
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Moreover, the theory posited in A Theory of Freedom of Expression may be open to 
criticism for its failure to sufficiently address the interests that the speaker has in expressing 
themselves.115 In noting the listener-centric approach adopted by Scanlon, Barendt has, for 
instance, noted the oddity inherent in justifying the protection of unpopular speech in terms 
of the interests that the audience has in such expression (an interest that would presumably 
be negligible), rather than on the supposedly stronger claims that might be made by the 
speaker.116 Further still, and of particular significance in light of the difficulties that 
Scanlon’s position encounters with regards to purportedly harmful expression, Post’s 
recognition that the principle of autonomy, “lacks resources to adjudicate the many 
situations in which the autonomy of speakers and the autonomy of audiences are in 
tension,”117 adds yet another hurdle for adherents of the autonomy principle to surmount.  
 
That tensions between the autonomy of the speaker and that of the listener may derive from, 
and be exacerbated by, the multitude of ways in which autonomy may be construed would 
further emphasise a significant flaw facing autonomy-based arguments for the general 
protection of freedom of expression.118 Which leads us back to the question of terminology 
and the ambiguity with which notions of autonomy and self-fulfilment have been applied 
in the literature. According to Scanlon, one such tension that broad appeals to autonomy 
might instil lies in the juxtaposition between, on the one hand, the speaker’s interest in 
being able to impart their ideas and, on the other, the interest that audiences have in not 
being exposed to a cacophony of noise, thereby enhancing the environment in which they 
are free to make up their own minds.119 Attributing the principle of autonomy to the 
interests of both parties fails, under such circumstances, to further our appreciation of the 
underlying conflict in any meaningful way.120 
 
Thus, whilst arguments from autonomy are appealing in that they place the individual at 
the heart of the equation – a position which, given the notion of the artist being something 
of a ‘free spirit’, at first glance might be considered to offer a natural justification for artistic 
expression’s existence within the freedom of expression paradigm – Scanlon’s thesis, when 
considered in light of the criticisms that the theory has received, has serious inadequacies 
as a comprehensive theory of freedom of expression. Such inadequacies are indeed 
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compounded when one considers that Scanlon’s retraction.121 It would appear that the 
coherent application of a strong, autonomy based defence of freedom of expression would 
protect many instances of expression deemed to be intuitively, as well as practically, 
unacceptable with no sufficient theoretical basis for their exclusion from a right to freedom 
of expression. Given freedom of expression’s qualified nature – such that the law 
concerning the right is largely based on its lawful limitation; a notion that will be further 
explored in Chapter Three of this thesis with regards to the coverage-protection distinction 
promoted by Schauer – attempting to locate artistic expression within the confines of a 
strictly autonomy-based argument would, it is suggested, proffer too weak a justification 
prone to criticism for the very breadth of its proposed coverage.  
 
1.3.4 The self-fulfilment rationale 
 
In common with the argument from autonomy, the self-fulfilment rationale for the 
protection of freedom of expression is, according to Emerson, “justified first of all as the 
right of an individual purely in his capacity as an individual.”122 Moreover, the self-
fulfilment rationale seeks to identify the prescient value of expression’s exercise in its 
being, “an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the 
affirmation of self.”123 Accordingly, in recognising that expression forms a fundamental 
aspect of an individual’s development and flourishing, adherents of the self-fulfilment 
rationale would maintain, as Loughan explains, that to interfere with an individual’s 
expression is, “to interfere with the development and realisation of the self and the 
manifestation of a unique personality.”124 Further still, since the ability to express oneself 
is so fundamentally entwined in an individual’s personality and being, the suppression of 
an individual’s expression equates, so Emerson submits, to an undermining of that 
individual’s dignity.125 Indeed, such sentiments may be traced back to the defence of 
freedom of expression advanced by Milton and the stipulation that restraints on expression 
amount to, “the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be 
put upon him.”126 From the perspective of the self-fulfilment rationale, the right to freedom 
of expression is seen to act as a vital guarantor of our individual humanity; its exercise a 
direct and intrinsic instantiation of what it means to be human. 
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Viewed in such terms, the right to express oneself has therefore been described as a ‘core 
intrinsic individual right,’127 the protection of which is required in order to guarantee a 
fundamental aspect of human behaviour. However, to the extent that the self-fulfilment 
rationale is seen to explain the intrinsic nature of the right to freedom of expression solely 
in terms of its significance for the individual who is expressing himself, there runs a danger 
of overlooking the importance that freedom of expression plays for the audience. For if we 
were to understand Emerson’s suggestion – that freedom of expression forms, “an integral 
part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self”128 – 
in isolation, we might conclude, as Baker indeed does, that, “the values supported or 
functions performed by protected speech result from that speech being a manifestation of 
individual freedom and choice.”129  
 
For Baker, then, only that expression which might be said to be a manifestation of an 
individual’s personal convictions and values ought to be protected, such that commercial 
expression – a form of expression driven ultimately by motivations of profit – would fall 
out with the protection afforded by Baker’s theory.130 Accordingly, whilst recognising the 
instrumental value of freedom of expression – that is to say, the value that expression has 
in developing an individual’s personal and cognitive faculties – the emphasis placed by 
Baker on the motivation of the speaker fails, as Redish explains, to appreciate the 
importance that receiving expression plays in the development of an individual’s 
faculties.131 This limitation to Baker’s thesis, if extrapolated further, may be seen to have 
profound implications for artistic expression. For instance, the fact that an author might 
well write in order to sustain a living rather than to express his personal convictions or 
advance his own self-fulfilment does not, as Redish notes, mean that the work he produces 
is incapable of developing the faculties of the audience who read his book.132 For the value 
artistic expression to be fully appreciated within the self-fulfilment rationale therefore 
requires recognition of the importance of receiving as well as conveying expression.   
 
                                                     
127 Campbell, T. Rationales for Freedom of Communication in Campbell, T. and Sadurski, W. (eds), 
Freedom of Communication, Aldershot (1994) at 33  
128 Emerson (n 68) at 879 
129 Baker, E. Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1976) 
at 3   
130 Baker (n 129) 3   
131 Redish (n 18) at 620-621 (incl. text at fn. 107) 
132 Redish (n 18) at 621 
45 
 
Incorporating the audience’s interests in freedom expression in to the self-fulfilment 
rationale is, however, possible. For instance, Chesterman describes the essence of the self-
fulfilment rationale in terms of the individual being free not only to, “formulate and express 
their own statements on any issue which to them appears important,” but also to, “be 
exposed to the full range of competing arguments.”133 Indeed, having access to the 
expression of others is an important consideration under Emerson’s construction of the self-
fulfilment rationale as well. As such, ensuring effective and equal participation in the 
generation of one’s surrounding culture and society requires, as Emerson contends, that 
individuals have access to knowledge in order to more comprehensively develop their own 
views and thereby aid their own self-fulfilment.134 
 
Following from the premise that the right to freedom of expression lies at the very heart of 
man’s existence, the self-fulfilment rationale identified by Emerson rests also on two 
further assumptions specifically concerning the relationship between the individual and the 
society in which he finds himself.135 In this regard, according to Emerson, for the self-
fulfilment rationale to be fully realised (thereby enabling individuals with the opportunity 
to contribute to the creation of a ‘common culture’) it must be presumed that an overriding 
objective of the state, as a servant of the people, is the promotion of the welfare of its 
individuals and that, secondly, all individuals must be treated equally.136 Accordingly, in 
suggesting that freedom expression be recognised as an intrinsic, individual right, the 
exercise of which is essential for individual growth it follows that its exercise should be 
enjoyed without discrimination. For any retardation of an individual’s ability to formulate 
ideas (an ability which is, as we have noted, dependent upon him having access to the 
freedom of expression output of others), express himself and, in so doing, participate in the 
incremental development of his surrounding culture, is, in essence, an affront to his dignity. 
To suggest otherwise would, as Emerson submits, “elevate society and the state to a 
despotic command and […] reduce the individual to the arbitrary control of others.”137  
 
As such, a more pertinent criticism of the self-fulfilment rationale than that concerning its 
incorporation of audience’s interests may be found in its imbuing freedom of expression 
with a particularly strong, wide-reaching protection. For if, on the one hand, it is accepted 
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that an individual’s being is instantiated through his expression and, on the other, that the 
state is required to promote individual welfare without discrimination, then it must follow 
that virtually any restriction on expression must be regarded as suspect. Furthermore, since 
the value of a given expression is therefore ultimately seen to reside in the assessment made 
by each individual by way of his personal development and exploration, a narrow reading 
of the self-fulfilment principle therefore demands that all expression be considered of equal 
value for the purposes of an individual’s right to freedom of expression.138  
 
A particular concern in this regard lies in the potential scope that arguments deriving from 
the self-fulfilment rationale bestow upon the right to freedom of expression. As Greenwalt 
has pointed out, “[the self-fulfilment rationale] may reach widely and strongly enough to 
some other matters so that alone it would not warrant anything properly identified as a 
distinctive principle of free speech.”139 The point is similarly made by Schauer, who 
suggests that, whilst, “[t]he argument from self-fulfilment can be a powerful argument for 
freedom in a very broad sense…it tells us nothing in particular about freedom of speech.”140 
For Schauer, the breadth of the self-fulfilment rationale’s scope renders it simply as an 
instantiation of a general liberty.141  
 
There is, as such, a fundamental difficulty inherent in the extent to which the self-fulfilment 
rationale is capable of satisfactorily distinguishing the right to freedom of expression from 
broader, autonomy-based arguments concerning any other aspect of individual conduct.142 
For if the self-fulfilment rationale is understood in terms similar to those adopted in 
arguments deriving from autonomy – according to which there is the implication, identified 
by Post and highlighted above, that, “all ideas [are] equal because all ideas equally reflect 
the autonomy of their speakers and because this autonomy deserves equal respect”143 – then 
the basis for expression’s special status must, without further extrapolation, be extended to 
uncomfortable extremes, so as to include any action that purportedly instantiates the 
autonomy qua self-fulfilment of the actor.  
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Thus, if self-fulfilment is to be taken as the guiding principle in explaining the value of 
freedom of expression, some reason must be proffered, as Barendt is keen to emphasise, as 
to why expression is especially significant in attaining an individual’s self-fulfilment.144 
There are, after all, a myriad of other interests – a right to adequate housing or to education 
are but two examples that have been suggested – that could reasonably be interpreted as 
promoting the development of one’s self, and yet do not receive the same degree of 
prominence as that conferred upon the right to freedom of expression.145 What’s more, after 
surmising that the right to freedom of expression is, “essentially a right actively to 
participate in and contribute to the public culture,” Raz has pointed out – albeit in the 
capacity of something approximating a devil’s advocate – that, in practice, relatively few 
people avail themselves of such an opportunity.146 Whilst the rapid developments in 
technology and resulting ease with which expression can now be publicly manifested 
through social media may go some way towards dispelling Raz’s pre-internet musings, it 
remains the case, as Raz indeed went on to reflect, that there are, “many other interests 
most people have [that] are much more valuable to them than their interest in this freedom 
[of expression].”147  
 
From the preceding discussion it would therefore transpire that the self-fulfilment principle 
shares many of inherent difficulties facing the argument from autonomy; most notably that 
it proffers an uncomfortably broad scope of protection on account of its inability to explain 
the particular significance of expression in achieving self-fulfilment in order to distinguish 
expression from other actions that promote self-fulfilment. Yet, whilst it is true that one’s 
actions may be considered to contribute to one’s self-fulfilment, that supposition does not 
necessarily preclude recognition of the fact that, when we seek to protect expression we do 
so because we recognise that ‘expression’, however defined, is valuable because it 
engenders the self-fulfilment of the individual.  
 
In this regard, an overview of Redish’s theory of freedom of expression is particularly 
illuminating. In seeking to proffer a ‘major reassessment’ of free speech doctrine, Redish’s 
primary intention was to return the discourse to first principles.148 In so doing, Redish 
asserts that it is the notion of ‘individual self-realisation’ that forms the basis of the 
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fundamental value that the freedom of expression seeks to serve and from which the other 
rationales for freedom of expression’s protection in fact ultimately derive.149 As such, 
employing the notion of ‘individual self-realisation’ whilst pursuing the identification of 
freedom of expression’s fundamental value is appealing to Redish precisely because of its 
ambiguity and incorporation of strands pertaining to both self-fulfilment and autonomy.150 
Thus, with regards to self-fulfilment, Redish’s thesis recognises the ‘realisation’ of an 
individual’s full potential vis-à-vis his individual development whilst simultaneously, from 
the perspective of autonomy, recognising that by being on control of one’s decision-making 
process, an individual is said to ‘realise’ his life goals.151 As such, Redish’s position clearly 
encapsulates the significance of freedom of expression both for the speaker and for the 
recipients of expression. 
 
Underpinning Redish’s theory and his identification of ‘individual self-realisation’ being 
the core value from which other values associated with freedom of expression’s exercise 
derive is his assertion that, “the moral norms inherent in the choice of our specific form of 
democracy logically imply the broader value, self-realization.”152 The conclusion that 
Redish’s theory invites – through its synthesis of autonomy and self-fulfilment – is that, 
“all forms of expression that further the self-realization value, which justifies the 
democratic system as well as free speech's role in it, are deserving of full constitutional 
protection.”153 Whilst Redish’s principle of individual self-realisation therefore 
presupposes that, “[a]ny external determination that certain expression fosters self-
realization more than any other is itself a violation of the individual's free will,” such that 
all expression must be considered equally valuable for constitutional purposes, it does not 
necessarily follow that all expression must be equally protected.154 For, as Redish explains, 
there is,  “no inconsistency in recognizing that individual self-realization is the sole value 
furthered by free speech and simultaneously acknowledging that, at least in extreme cases, 
full constitutional protection of free expression may be forced to give way to competing 
social concerns.”155 Put another way, whilst competing interests may prove determinative 
in curtailing expression in certain instances, it nevertheless remains the case that the 
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primary reason underlying the significance of expression, lies in its capacity to promote 
self-realisation.  
 
1.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM DEMOCRACY  
 
1.4.1 An exposition of the Meiklejohnian position 
 
Described by Barendt as, “probably the most easily understandable, and certainly most 
fashionable, free speech theory in modern Western democracies,”156 the argument from 
participation in democracy is most closely associated with the works of Meiklejohn.157 At 
its essence, the Meiklejohnian position asserts that freedom of expression is a necessary 
condition required in order to allow citizens to properly engage with the democratic 
process.158 Whilst Meiklejohn was writing in the specific context of the freedom of 
expression guarantees enshrined in the United States of America’s First Amendment his 
arguments remain relevant to us in our task of placing artistic expression within the 
particular nexus of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR, especially given 
that the ECHR’s judgments and underlying philosophy, based on the context from which 
it was established, can be seen as advancing and delimitating the boundaries of democracy 
itself.159 
 
Under the First Amendment it is asserted that: 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
 
In advancing his theory, Meiklejohn disputes the ‘absolutist thesis’, as prominently set out 
by Justice Black, who famously maintained that, “I take no law abridging to mean no law 
abridging.”160 For Black, the First Amendment is clear and easily understood, as opposed 
to the ambiguous wording of, for instance, the 8th Amendment and its reference to 
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‘excessive bail’ and ‘cruel or unusual punishments’.161 However, taking an empirical 
approach, Meiklejohn referred to the case law emanating from the First Amendment that 
clearly demonstrated that expression is not, in fact, absolutely protected.162 In order to 
attribute a principled meaning to the First Amendment, and in refuting the binary position 
set out by Black, Meiklejohn takes a more holistic approach encompassing the Preamble, 
10th Amendment and Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution.163 In so doing, the conclusion 
that Meiklejohn elicits is that: 
 
The First Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to speak’. It protects the freedom 
of those activities of thought and communication by which we ‘govern’. It is 
concerned not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental 
responsibility.164 
 
It is this idea of the importance of ‘self-government’, then, rather than a right to speak per 
se, that lies at the heart of Meiklejohn’s philosophy of freedom of expression. As such, 
expression is ‘free’ only in so far as it can be said to be contributing to the achievement of 
self-governance. From this point of view certain similarities can be made with Mill’s search 
for truth vis freedom of expression – the value of expression being in its capacity to achieve 
some desired end product. Moreover, and of especial importance for present purposes, 
similarities can be found between the Meiklejohnian philosophy and that of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of the underlying value of freedom of expression 
within Article 10. For instance, in the seminal case of Handyside v. UK it was asserted that: 
 
The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the 
principles characterising a ‘democratic society’. Freedom of expression constitutes 
one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for 
its progress and for the development of every man.165 
 
In short, then, whilst there are undoubtedly trans-Atlantic differences in political tradition, 
the ethos inherent in the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of Article 10 can 
nevertheless be seen to parallel Meiklejohn’s understanding of the First Amendment in 
which it is asserted that Congress is forbidden from abridging speech (in addition to the 
press, peaceable assembly, and petition) “whenever those activities are utilized for the 
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governing of the nation.”166 As such, in order to locate specifically artistic expression 
within the Meiklejohnian credo, it needs to be established that art and artistic expression 
does, in fact, have the capacity to contribute to public governance.  
 
1.4.2 Assessing the scope of the Meiklejohnian position 
 
In response to Meiklejohn’s philosophical basis for the right to freedom of expression, it 
may be assumed that such a theory – with its rationale’s basis lying in the achievement of 
good, effective governance – will only extend to the protection of ‘political’ speech. For 
instance, in specifically drawing attention to the perceived limited scope of Meiklejohn’s 
position, Kalven pointed out that: “The people do not need novels or dramas or paintings 
or poems because they will be called on to vote.”167 There is, for Kalven, no necessary link 
between artistic expression and a theory for freedom of expression attributed to the 
realisation of effective government. However, Meiklejohn’s defence of freedom of 
expression is more nuanced and far-reaching than might first be thought. Indeed, for 
Meiklejohn, the casting of a ballot, which might be considered as the external application 
of self-governance, requires citizens to acquire intelligence, integrity and sensitivity; thus 
ensuring a type of internal self-governance.168  
 
Accordingly, Meiklejohn brings artistic expression further to the fore of his philosophy 
than an initial reading might suppose, establishing the link presumed missing by Kalven by 
stipulating that literature and the arts are a crucial component in the encouragement and 
development of qualities such as intelligence, integrity and sensitivity that are deemed so 
important for the meaningful self-government that underpins his general theory of freedom 
of expression.169 Thus, underlying Meiklejohn’s assumption is the belief that: 
 
the novel is at present a powerful determinative of our views of what human beings 
are, how they can be influenced, in what directions they should be influenced by 
many forces, including, especially, their own judgments and appreciations.170 
 
In this regard, with particularly acute reference to the precise manner in which artistic 
expression may be said to form the population’s judgments and appreciations in the context 
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of prompting and ensuring a strong democratic ethos, artistic expression may be found to 
exist within the freedom of expression discourse with relative ease. However, the 
consequentialist value placed by Meiklejohn on freedom of expression, with free 
expression being a means to an end, may still be criticised for failing to fully account for 
the right with specific reference to the individual; a recognition of which, it might be 
supposed, is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of art’s value.   
 
1.4.3 Freedom of expression: a means or an end? 
 
By noting the importance of literature in influencing people’s ‘judgments and 
appreciations’ certain, albeit limited, parallels may be drawn with Scanlon’s notion of 
individual autonomy breaking the chain of causation. Recognising that literature may be 
produced for a number of reasons, including even the ‘tearing down’ of a way of life 
treasure by society, Meiklejohn’s position remains clear in that the First Amendment still 
ought not justify governmental attempts to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ novels.171 
There is a crucial distinction to be made, however, between the reasoning adopted by 
Meiklejohn and Scanlon in reaching that same conclusion. Whereas Scanlon would 
consider such a role by government to infringe upon individual autonomy, Meiklejohn’s 
theory of self-government places greater emphasis on the more limited view that the 
authority of citizens to decide what to write or read or see, has not been delegated to any 
of the subordinate branches of government.172 In short, Meiklejohn’s conception is largely 
consequentialist and, as such, is concerned more with the achievement of an end goal – 
democracy, than with an individual’s right per se.  
 
The distinction between Meiklejohn and Scanlon is further explored by Sir John Laws, in 
an essay entitled Meiklejohn, the First Amendment and Free Speech in English Law,173 in 
which he criticises the essentially consequentialist approach endorsed by Meiklejohn. As 
we have seen demonstrated above, Meiklejohn is concerned, not with the interest of the 
individual per se, but with the collective, or public, interest.174 Laws’ essential premise is 
that, “Free speech is ultimately an imperative put upon us by the destiny of our freedom of 
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thought.”175 For Laws therefore, freedom of expression is an individual right, rather than 
collective. Thus, whilst free speech will often flourish under regimes of democracy and 
self-government, it is simultaneously distinct. As Laws asserts, “it is our freedom that 
demands democracy, and not the converse.”176 Laws’ concerns with Meiklejohn’s 
collective approach are similarly shared by Dworkin. As a tool of constitutional 
implementation, Dworkin puts forward his ‘moral reading’ approach under which, in light 
of the US Bill of Rights, “government must treat all those subject to its dominion as having 
equal moral and political status.”177 Accordingly, the US Constitution is to be understood 
as a set of moral principles, affording protection to individual rights with each individual’s 
expression to be respected on the basis of their equal politico-moral standing. 
 
The relationship between the individual and the state has, of course, been the subject of a 
long-standing debate. Whilst a comprehensive discussion of this relationship lies out with 
the scope of the present thesis’ inquiry, it suffices to say that tensions do emerge from the 
the protection of individual rights that are seen as offending popular will or, put another 
way, ‘democracy’. Yet, without appealing to notions of individual rights, the outcomes of 
cases like the desegregation of schools are difficult to explain. For in such instances the 
Supreme Court is seen to be usurping the will of the majority. As Dworkin points out, the 
segregation of schools was, after all, permitted by law, and would have been admitted by 
the Constitution’s drafters.178 In turning to the question of freedom of expression in 
particular, Barendt’s criticism of Meiklejohn’s position becomes ever more pertinent: 
 
If the maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech, how is one to 
argue against the regulation or suppression of that speech by the democracy acting 
through its elected representatives?179 
 
Dworkin’s response to these constitutional aspects of individual liberty or rights is to 
reframe our current understanding of democracy, and in-so-doing ask whether we ought to 
accept or reject what he calls the ‘majoritarian premise.’180 Lying at the heart of the 
‘majoritarian premise’ of democracy is the question of whether a given decision is 
agreeable to the majority of citizens.181 In rejecting this approach, Dworkin shifts the debate 
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away from the consequentialist understanding of democracy and towards an understanding 
of democracy that seeks to treat individuals with “equal concern and respect.”182 Thus, 
whilst Dworkin’s model relies on the same political institutions and structures as 
proponents of the majoritarian premise, there is a distinct difference in the value or purpose 
that democracy ought to endeavour to achieve. 
 
Dworkin’s approach is given more resonance when one considers the point of view, set out 
by Bollinger, that what Meiklejohn puts forward is not a ‘theory’ of free speech per se but 
is rather a “rhetorical effort to persuade us to become the sort of people [he] would like us 
to be.”183 Accordingly, Meiklejohn is stipulating something more than simply when 
expression may be legitimately curtailed. Instead, the end being sought is more 
appropriately described as a general ‘identity’, such that the First Amendment is seen to 
embody an intellectual life and the pursuit of collective welfare.184 There is, therefore, a 
paradox, which according to Laws has been conflated by Meiklejohn, between democracy 
as an end in itself, and democracy as a means towards man’s realisation of being a free and 
rational person.185 
 
1.4.4 Bringing the argument from democracy within the domain of the 
individual 
 
James Weinstein has attempted to reformulate Meiklejohn’s argument from participatory 
democracy, so as to place the value of freedom of speech in democracy squarely within the 
domain of the individual. In so doing, Weinstein’s formulation would likely appeal more 
to Dworkin in that it alleviates the tension outlined above between considering democracy 
as a means or an end.186 For Weinstein, the argument from participatory democracy, 
“embraces an uncontestable [sic] right of each individual to free and equal participation in 
the political process, including the public discussion by which our society's laws, policies, 
and norms are evaluated."187 In defending this approach, Weinstein maintains that his 
theory is both descriptively powerful (in that it most accurately reflects the jurisprudence 
of the United States’ Supreme Court) and, more importantly for present purposes, that it is 
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most normatively attractive (since it is rooted in a value that it is supposed that everybody 
can accept).188 
 
Weinstein asserts, as is commonly accepted, that not all expression is (or even ought to be) 
protected. With particular reference to the First Amendment he goes on to maintain that, 
rather than protection being ‘all-inclusive’, subject to a limited number of expressions, the 
converse is actually true of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. On this understanding, 
protected speech is seen as the exception, with most forms of expression been subject to 
regulation.189 More specifically, for Weinstein, the expression that is most highly protected 
falls under the category of ‘public discourse’. 
 
From this, Weinstein deduces that since the most rigorous protection found under the First 
Amendment is that of ‘public discourse’, the most relevant core value attributable to that 
protection is democratic self-government. Weinstein asserts this almost through a process 
of elimination, discounting the other theories of freedom of expression as merely eliciting 
(at best) peripheral values. Accordingly, the search for truth cannot be considered a core 
value for Weinstein on the grounds that its premise is rested on the highly contested 
assumption that truth will prevail from unregulated speech and for its consequentialist 
philosophy under which free speech is justified on a collective, rather than individual, 
basis.190 Furthermore, arguments from what Weinstein describes as the, “cluster of norms 
comprising individual autonomy, self-expression, or self-fulfilment,” cannot, so Weinstein 
asserts, be considered as a core value underlying the protection of speech largely because 
such a theory would, as noted in the critique of the Scanlonian position in section 1.3.2 
above, be too broad in its coverage of what most people would consider to be expression 
worthy of protection.191 Indeed, with regards to the autonomy based arguments, Weinstein 
expounds on Scanlon’s retraction of much of his argument found in A Theory of Freedom 
Of Expression, saying that his principle was “too strong and too sweeping to be 
plausible.”192 However, noting Scanlon’s previous assertion that the First Amendment 
forbids regulations “which appeal to the fact that it would be a bad thing if the view 
communicated by certain acts of expression were to become generally believed,”193 
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Weinstein goes on to argue that, whilst certainly too sweeping, it is not necessarily too 
strong provided that it be applied only to ‘public discourse’.194  
 
Fundamental to Weinstein’s position therefore, is the belief that only expression of a certain 
quality (ie. public discourse) is to be protected. Implicit in Weinstein’s partial criticism of 
Scanlon is that basing a defence of freedom of expression on an argument on autonomy 
would expand the scope of protection to such a point as to ultimately dilute that expression 
most in need of immunity from suppression.195 This would appear to be also true under 
Redish’s autonomy-based assertion that “all forms of expression are equally valuable for 
constitutional purposes,” subject to a degree of balancing with competing social norms. 
According to Weinstein, such an approach would endanger the protection of the most 
valuable types of expression, including controversial expression currently immune under 
the First Amendment as well as inviting judicial bias to enter the equation.196   
 
Underpinning Weinstein’s entire thesis, and especially evident in the last point, is the 
question of whether the judiciary ought to be able to invalidate those democratically 
enacted laws that seem to encroach on freedom of expression. The argument from 
participatory democracy can therefore be seen as offering less of a constitutional problem 
than, particularly, arguments from autonomy since, by applying the argument from 
participatory democracy, the judiciary would, in finding certain legislation or executive 
actions to violate freedom of expression, be merely upholding the core value of individual 
participation in the political process that is seen to underlie the entire philosophy of the 
American Bill of Rights. Similarly, the recognition in Handyside that freedom of 
expression constitutes, “one of the essential foundations of [a democratic society], one of 
the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man” can be seen as 
promoting the Weinsteinian philosophy in the context of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ jurisprudence. 
 
Of course, ‘public discourse’ itself would seem to be an ambiguous term. Its limits are not 
clear, though one suspects that Weinstein has in mind quite a narrow conception, limiting 
expression’s protection to that approximating political discourse. Indeed, the definition of 
‘public discourse’ provided by Weinstein – “speech on matters of public concern, or, 
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largely without respect to its subject matter, of expression in settings dedicated or essential 
to democratic self-governance”197 – is, for Baker, too narrow.198 Whilst Weinstein confirms 
that expression in the form of books and films do form a basis of democratic self-
governance, in recognising that his principle has difficulty in being applied to abstract art 
or symphonic music is indicative of Weinstein’s commitment to furthering the protection 
of ‘political’ expression (broadly construed).199 As Scanlon notes, from the frequency with 
which Weinstein refers to ‘democracy’ it might be natural to infer that the underlying value 
attributed to freedom of expression – that is to say, “speech by which we govern 
ourselves,”200 – may be limited to expression pertaining to governance qua democratic 
political institutions.201  
 
To further emphasise the potential limitations of Weinstein’s thesis, Scanlon goes on to 
imagine a scenario in which the state sought to ban the film Brokeback Mountain. Such a 
move would undoubtedly violate the right to freedom of expression but the basis of that 
violation would not, Scanlon suggests, rest solely on the fact that the issues raised in the 
film – gay rights and marriage, for instance – form potential subject matters for legislative 
or constitutional change.202 In other words, the value of Brokeback Mountain’s (artistic) 
expression need not be recognised only in terms of its ability to contribute to ‘political’ 
discourse, as a narrow reading of Weinstein might suppose. Rather, its value as expression 
may better be understood, as Scanlon submits, in terms of our, “interest in participating in 
the process of determining how our informal social mores will evolve and our interest in 
deciding for ourselves how to conduct our private lives.”203  
 
Yet, to the extent that art is recognised as being able to contribute to public discourse, 
Weinstein’s position proffers a strong foundation from which to assess the adequacy of its 
protection. For Post – whose autonomy-based argument from democracy is broadly similar 
to that of Weinstein, differing primarily only on grounds of precisely what constitutes 
participation204 – “[a]rt and other forms of non-cognitive, non-political speech fit 
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comfortably within the scope of public discourse.”205 Thus, for Post, “[p]ublic discourse 
depends upon the maintenance of a public sphere, which is a sociological structure that is 
a prerequisite to the formation of public opinion,”206 hence the strong presumption in favour 
of protecting the expression of, say, newspapers. However, under Post’s construction, even 
expression that is not traditionally considered to relate to ‘public discourse’ is still worthy 
of protection when it, “conveys information or knowledge that is valuable for the formation 
of public opinion.”207 As such, it is art’s, “connection to public opinion formation in a 
democracy,”208 that warrants its protection under Post’s thesis. 
 
Nonetheless, by outlining the position posited by Weinstein, with its emphasis on 
expression’s furthering of democracy and ‘public interest’, it is hoped that a more 
comprehensive framework will have been established from which to explore the European 
Court of Human Rights jurisprudence both in terms of its approach to categorising 
expression (see Chapter Three, infra, in which it will be suggested that the categorisation 
of expression and subsequent levels of protection afforded thereafter is intimately related 
to the proximity to which the expression in question is perceived to relate to Article 10’s 
core value(s)) and its treatment of specifically artistic expression in its Article 10 case law 
(see Chapter Four, infra)  
 
1.5 CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is not the intention of this thesis to advance a novel theory of freedom of expression 
justifying the inclusion of artistic expression. Instead, it is hoped that in recognising the 
distinctive qualities of art as a sui generis form of expression – a position that will be 
explored further in the following chapter – artistic expression may be seen, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to fit within the pre-existing philosophies. Thus, to the extent that the values 
of artistic expression can be seen to align with the principal theories of freedom of 
expression’s identification of the values of freedom of expression in general (and the values 
of Article 10 in particular) then a case may begin to emerge for artistic expression’s greater 
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protection within Article 10.  In order to achieve this, an initial survey of the landscape of 
thought concerning freedom of expression was therefore unavoidable.  
 
From the preceding discussion one might be tempted to agree with Raz’s assertion that, 
“[f]reedom of expression is a liberal puzzle. Liberals are all convinced of its vital 
importance, yet why it deserves this importance is a mystery.”209 The mystery of identifying 
expression’s underlying value is seemingly compounded by the variety of positions 
advocated. As we have seen, expression’s value has been identified in its promotion of 
truth, for guaranteeing autonomy and/or the achievement of self-fulfilment and for its 
significance in the democratic process. It might therefore be supposed, in line with Blasi’s 
assessment of free speech, that, “the commitment to free expression embodie[s] a complex 
of values.”210 Redish would, however, disagree. Indeed, underpinning his thesis is the 
proposition that there is no such complex of values but, rather, one fundamental value – 
that of individual self-realisation – from which all other values derive.211 Nonetheless, to 
the extent that the derivative values – termed ‘sub-values’ under Redish’s analysis – 
promote individual self-realisation, they remain of value and significance in explaining the 
significance of freedom of expression.212 Thus, according to Redish, to the extent that 
argument from truth may be considered as a means of enabling an individual to access the 
information he requires to achieve his self-realisation, Mill’s thesis may be regarded as 
being a sub-value of the core value of individual self-realisation.213 Indeed, as we have 
seen, Blasi’s interpretation of On Liberty promotes just such an approach.   
 
Redish’s thesis is therefore particularly attractive for endowing specifically artistic 
expression with a strong foundation for protection. For intuitively artistic expression would 
seem to be intimately connected with one’s self-realisation, whether in terms of the artist 
producing the work or in the audience’s appreciation of the work. However, whilst 
expression may embody a variety of values, that is not to say that we must identify one sole 
value or reason underlying expression’s significance.214 Indeed, for Emerson, each of the 
traditional principles of expression are insufficient, on their own terms, in fully explaining 
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the value that is attributed to freedom of expression. Thus, whilst each principle proffers a 
distinct value, the principles nevertheless remain interdependent.215  
 
Recognising the relationship between the different values – whether in terms of being 
derivative of Redish’s individual self-realisation or Emerson’s interdependency of the 
principles – will be of vital importance in locating artistic expression’s positioning within 
the broader discourse. In light of the preceding discussion, in order to successfully bring 
artistic expression firmly within the freedom of expression discourse a number of aspects 
will need to be addressed in the following chapter concerning the prevailing schools of 
thought surrounding the theory of art. Primarily, in determining that artistic expression is, 
indeed, expression for the purposes of the right to freedom of expression it will need to be 
adduced that art, both as an individual right and as a collective good, has the specific 
capacity to contribute, in some sense, to general public discourse, whether that be in the 
sense of a Millian interpretation of ‘discussion’ versus ‘positive instigation’ capable of 
denying the stagnation of public thought or the Meiklejohnian-Weinsteinian-Postian 
approach of contributing to effective self-governance. Similarly, the extent to which art is 
seen to promote an individual’s self-realisation, and the relationship this has within a 
democratic society will be of significance. Moreover, in determining the precise nature of 
art and artistic expression and the way in which it may be said to align with these values, 
the nature of the potential harm following from controversial art may, too, be more 
thoroughly assessed. With the context set, the following chapter will begin to shed more 
light on the nature of art and allow us to more comprehensibly locate artistic expression 
within the freedom of expression paradigm.   
 
Just as Cinderella’s fortunes changed so dramatically upon Prince Charming’s realisation 
that the glass slipper perfectly fitted her foot, so too must we establish that artistic 
expression, the ‘Cinderella of liberties’, can be seen to fit within the freedom of expression 
paradigm. As such, the extent to which this is possible may, it is suggested, account for the 
relatively low degree of protection historically afforded to artistic expression under the 
European Convention on Human Rights whilst, conversely, it will be suggested that a 
greater appreciation of the sui generis nature of artistic expression located within the 
framework of established thought on freedom of expression will enable the European Court 
of Human Rights to approach the subject in a more nuanced manner in the future.  
 
                                                     














In order to establish a strong, holistic framework underpinning a theoretical and doctrinal 
justification for artistic expression’s location within the generalised theories pertaining to 
the freedom of expression discourse it is necessary to seek to establish a correlation 
between the predominant themes to have emerged in Chapter One’s survey of the freedom 
of expression literature and the prevailing schools of thought concerning the theory of art. 
Thus, in essence, in addition to establishing that artistic expression promotes one’s self-
fulfilment, it needs to be demonstrated that expression through artistic media does, in fact, 
have the capacity to communicate something and is capable of contributing to something 
akin to public discourse. More specifically, and whilst the practical ramifications of Article 
10’s wording will be further discussed later with regards to the European Court of Human 
Rights’ treatment of artistic expression, it suffices to say, for now at least, that in order to 
locate artistic expression firmly within Article 10’s sphere of potential protection it must 
be established that artistic expression may be said to amount to the conveyance of 
‘information and ideas’.  
 
Moreover, as important as the demonstration of artistic expression’s capacity to engage in 
what may loosely be referred to as a ‘marketplace of ideas’ is, it is the distinct way in which 
artistic expression may be said to make such contributions that is perhaps of an even greater 
and more fundamental import. Indeed, an appreciation of this unique relationship between 
artistic expression, art and society and the inherent tensions that lie therein, may go some 
way towards explaining the relatively low level of protection afforded to artistic expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights that will be discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter Four of this thesis. As such, by attempting to effectively synthesise 
the distinct strands emerging from both the philosophy of freedom of expression and of the 
theory of art, with specific reference being made to the theories pertaining to formalism, 
expressivism and aesthetic cognitivism, a foundation will be established upon which 
artistic expression’s location within freedom of expression discourse is comprehensibly 
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justified and from which a more nuanced analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
case law may be pursued that not only allows for an understanding of artistic expression’s 
historically low level of protection but may also, more constructively, encourage the 
doctrinal strengthening of its position in the future. 
 
2.2 FORMALIST THEORIES OF ART 
 
2.2.1 The emergence of formalism 
 
At their persuasive height in the early 20th century, formalist theories of art may be distilled 
down to the notion that the predominant value of art lies not in the representational content 
depicted in the artwork but, rather, in the artwork’s form; that is to say, for instance, the 
relationship between, and use of, lines and colours. Accordingly, the formalist school of 
thought may be considered as a continuation of the Kantian philosophy and the ensuing 
bohemian and Romantic movements with their basis in the notion of l’art pour l’art or ‘art 
for art’s sake’. 
 
The basis of Kant’s aesthetics rests in his description of beauty being ‘purposivness without 
purpose’. Taking the rose as an example, Kant proffered that whilst the flower does have a 
purpose (namely to reproduce new roses) that is not why we would consider it to be 
beautiful. Instead, the rose’s beauty lies in its colours and textures – its internal harmony – 
the combination of which is said to satisfy our emotions, imagination and intellect, 
prompting us to intuitively know that the object is ‘just right’ and thereby ‘beautiful’. Thus, 
a certain level of disinterestedness is required on the part of the viewer if one is to appreciate 
only the form and design of an object rather than its base purpose. Indeed, taking a 
strawberry as another example, its beauty would be contaminated if one were to be so taken 
by its smell and texture that one decided to eat it for that would be to appreciate its purpose, 
rather than simply is form and design.  
 
For Kant then, beauty is detached from knowledge and purpose – the viewer, when 
contemplating art, having to adopt a stance of ‘disinterestedness’ – such that the beautiful 
is necessarily incapable of conveying ideas. There is, therefore a particular freedom 
involved. As Nahmod highlights, “in freeing art from knowledge and desire, Kant frees the 
artist and viewer from their rules: [Kant] thus asserts that man is most free when creating 
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and contemplating art.”216 Furthermore, the freedom emanating from art is considered to 
be unifying in the sense that, not only is art internally harmonious, but that a subjective 
universality exists whereby all ‘cultivated’ persons may agree upon what is beautiful. Yet, 
whilst promoting a degree of societal harmony, the freedom from knowledge and purpose 
of art entails, simultaneously, an undermining of the impact upon the relationship between 
art and society; a conclusion that may be seen in greater detail with regards to the formalist 
school of thought below.    
 
Kant’s ‘purposiveness without purpose’ may be seen in the expression l’art pour l’art – or 
‘art for art’s sake’ – which acted as an essential mantra of the Romantic and bohemian 
movements of the 19th century. Often traced back to Benjamin Constant’s assertion, in the 
opening years of the 19th century, that “L’art pour l’art without purpose, for all purpose 
perverts art,” the ‘art for art’s sake’ movement considered the value of art to lie solely 
within the work in question. That utility was seen to preclude beauty and art was of 
paramount importance to Theophile Gautier who wrote, in the preface to his work 
Premières poesies, “What end does this book serve? - it serves by being beautiful. In 
general as soon as something becomes useful it ceases to be beautiful”. Writing in 1832, a 
period in French history in which art was constrained by religious, social and political 
forces, Gautier’s attempt to diminish the relationship between art and society is 
understandable. Similarly, Oscar Wilde’s assertion, made in the preface to The Picture of 
Dorian Gray that, “there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well 
written or badly written,” so as to, again, bring the value of the art solely within the work 
itself, has been considered as an attempt to legitimize morally controversial works.217  
 
Possible socio-historic reasons aside, the Kantian tradition of ‘purposiveness without 
purpose’ qua disinterestedness, as developed through the Romantic and bohemian 
movements acknowledging l’art pour l’art, set the basis from which the formalist school 
of thought emerged, in which the sole value of significance of art pertain to the formal 
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2.2.2 Clive Bell’s formalism 
 
It has been noted that the philosophy advanced by Clive Bell in his seminal work Art218 in 
1914 was a reaction to the then contemporary developments in the art world, as opposed to 
a catalyst for such developments.219 In particular, it has been suggested by Nigel Warburton 
that Bell’s intention in writing Art was largely to establish a thesis defending the post-
impressionist works of Paul Cezanne which marked a shift away from the impressionism 
of the 19th century and paved the way for early 20th century cubism.220 Nevertheless, in 
conjunction with Bell’s particularised defence of Cezanne a generalised theory of art 
emerged, according to which the predominant value of art was identified as lying in its 
form.  
 
Whilst Bell’s thesis is today largely out of favour within the realm of art theorists, Art 
remains influential in so far as it aligns with at least some of our intuitions about the nature 
and value of art. Indeed, there are few accounts of the values, definitions or ontology of art 
that fail to refer to Bell’s contribution to the philosophy of art. As such, the extent to which 
Bell’s formalist philosophy may be said to accurately define or represent art, therefore, is 
of considerable import in this thesis’ attempt to locate artistic expression within the 
freedom of expression paradigm. If, as Bell submits, the value of art lies predominantly in 
the relationship between lines and colours it would seem to be facetious, if not conceptually 
impossible, to maintain that artistic expression has the capacity to convey ‘information and 
ideas’ of the type associated with a high level of protection in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Article 10 case law or, similarly, to align itself with the underlying philosophies 
pertaining to freedom of expression as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis. That there 
have been some recent attempts to revive Bell’s formalist philosophy in the early 21st 
century only adds to the significance of our inquiry.   
 
So far, and with reference to the formalist school in general, we have established, somewhat 
crudely, that the key attribute of art for Bell is that of ‘form’ as opposed to, say, 
representation or content. However, such a description is insufficient in its simplicity on 
the grounds that anything and everything may be said to have ‘form’ of some kind. If ‘form’ 
simpliciter were the defining characteristic of art there would, after all, be little to 
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differentiate art from cars, maps or lamps. Put another way, there would be nothing 
distinctive about a still life artwork and the physical, tangible objects depicted therein, when 
our intuitions would surely suggest otherwise. Instead, the ‘form’ underpinning the value 
of art that was advanced by Bell in Art was that of ‘significant form’. For Bell, then, the 
single unifying feature applicable to all art – from the windows of Chartres Cathedral to 
the works of Cezanne – is ‘significant form’, which is further defined as, “lines and colours 
combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms, [that] stir our aesthetic 
emotions.”221 
 
The distinction, then, between form simpliciter and significant form is that, whilst the 
former may well interest or amuse us, the latter has the greater, more highly valued, ability 
to provide the viewer with, what one commentator has described as, a ‘quasimystical 
inkling of ultimate reality.’222 According to Bell’s theory, art – through the successful use 
of significant form – has the capacity to transport us, “from the world of man’s activity to 
a world of aesthetic exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from human interests; our 
anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life.”223 Likening 
the state of mind provided under this significant form induced aesthetic emotion to that of 
a ‘mathematician rapt in his studies’, the formalist theory of art advanced by Bell in Art 
would therefore appear to undermine any notion of artistic expression being expression, 
more commonly understood, for the purposes of freedom of expression discourse. 
Accordingly, whilst art may be said to convey something – in the sense that, as Carol Gould 
has suggested, Bell’s ‘aesthetic emotion’ is, in essence, the pleasurable reaction to a 
perceptual experience224 – it would seem far-fetched to assume that art’s capacity to prompt 
a ‘pleasurable reaction’ could therefore qualify such a transmission as expression for the 
purposes of locating it within the freedom of expression paradigm.  
 
To highlight the spurious nature of the reasoning required to bring Bell’s theory of art 
within the confines of the freedom of expression discourse let us consider the London 
Underground map. As Stephen Grant suggests, when looking at a map of the London 
Underground, one may be struck by a certain admiration for the ingenious way in which a 
complex transport system has been represented but it would, however, be a stretch to 
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suppose that that person had been moved by the map, in the same way as one might be by 
a work of art.225 The reason that we are not moved by the map of the London Underground, 
according to Bell’s thesis, then, is because it lacks significant form. Conversely, however, 
Stephen Grant concedes that it is at least conceivable to imagine a beautiful map that we 
do find aesthetically appealing before stressing that the reason why we find it aesthetically 
beautiful would be because of its aesthetic properties rather than because of its properties 
as a map.226 Something could logically, therefore, be a useless map, riddled with 
inaccuracies but, through its use of lines and colours, be aesthetically appealing, in the 
sense that Bell advances.   
 
Suggesting, therefore, that art has the capacity to convey either information or ideas, of the 
sort recognized as befitting a high degree of protection under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights or contribute to public discourse under the 
Meiklejohnian/Weinstein position, is therefore problematic under Bell’s thesis. Whilst Bell 
concedes that one might look to Cezanne’s landscapes in order to extract information about 
the lay of the land that is not the reason why one would label the landscape as a work of art 
or where one would seek to assert art’s value. Indeed, for Bell, “every sacrifice made to 
representation is something stolen from art,”227 further indicating why we ought not to rely 
on Cezanne’s works if we were to find ourselves lost in the French countryside and 
diminishing the possibility with which one might say that art can convey information and 
ideas. Instead, as highlighted above with reference to the London Underground map, what 
makes a given work ‘art’ is the work’s ability, through the artist’s successful employment 
of significant form, to move us, not merely to inform us.  
 
Moreover, there is, underlying Bell’s thesis, inevitably a degree of detachment between art 
and society that is reminiscent of the Kantian notion of disinterestedness. Thus, in order to 
appreciate significant form, and therefore art, Bell stipulated that, we ‘need bring with us 
nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions.’228 
As Christopher Dowling surmises, “the significance in question [regarding significant 
form] is a significance unrelated to the significance of life.229 Indeed, it is here that the 
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quasi-mysticism of the realm of Bell’s aesthetic emotion, noted by Stecker above, comes 
especially to the fore, with Bell claiming that, “[i]n [the aesthetic] world the emotions of 
life find no place. It is a world with emotions of its own.”230 Establishing a convincing 
corollary between the real world’s, or at least the European Court of Human Rights’, 
implicit preference for expression constituting the conveyance of information and ideas 
and Bell’s aesthetic world, consisting of its own distinct, but ultimately vague, emotions is, 
once more, conceptually difficult, if not impossible.   
 
2.2.3 Criticisms of Bell’s formalist theory of art 
 
As Stecker has noted, Bell’s theory, “hinges on his ability to identify not just form, but 
significant form, and many have questioned whether he is able to do this in a non-circular 
fashion.”231 The circularity stems from the foundation of Bell’s thesis resting on two key 
terms – significant form and aesthetic emotion – both of which are defined purely in terms 
of the other.232 Thus, significant form is the arrangement of lines and colours in such a way 
that evokes an aesthetic emotion; and aesthetic emotion is that state of mind produced by 
the artist’s successful rendering of lines and colours in such a way that establishes 
significant form. Moreover, stemming from the circularity with which Bell’s thesis 
depends, there is credence in Warburton’s assertion that the theory posited in Art does little 
more than seek to elevate Bell’s subjective, individual taste in to an objective ideal.233 For 
instance, suppose that upon observing Picasso’s Guernica I fail to find myself in a state of 
aesthetic ecstasy. The logical conclusion to draw, under Bell’s thesis, would be that 
Guernica is therefore not art, yet such a conclusion would clearly be counter-intuitive. The 
sufficiency of Bell’s formula regarding significant form and aesthetic emotion is, as such, 
wanting.    
 
Yet, even if we were to accept that Bell was successful in identifying and defining 
‘significant form’, the thesis put forward in Art would remain, according to his critics, 
inadequate as a sufficient, overall theory of art. The fundamental problem with Bell’s 
theory, as is the case with formalism more generally, lies in its exclusion of all the other 
properties of art that we might recognize as being of value.234 Specifically, Bell’s insistence 
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on the formal qualities of an artwork overlooks the representational aspects of art and, 
indeed, the knowledge that one might extrapolate from such representation. Moreover, 
Stecker submits that Bell’s dismissal of representation is inadequate for two reasons.235 
Firstly, Bell’s dismissal is based on the notion that the viewer is taking an interest solely in 
the subject that is being depicted. Thus, whilst Stecker accepts that it is unlikely that, when 
looking at a landscape painting, our central interest would lie in the depiction as a source 
of reference, in the way that we might consult a map, we might nevertheless be interested 
in such factors as the choice of subject, the way in which the scene is depicted, as well as 
the attitude expressed towards the subject (or more generally towards nature or humanity), 
all of which concern the representation of the artwork and not simply its form.236 As Stecker 
maintains, “[i]f we can take this sort of interest in a represented scene, and if paintings can 
reward such interest, it is implausible to exclude this from the artistic value of such 
works.”237  
 
Secondly, with reference to Vermeer’s A Woman Weighing Gold, whilst the painting may 
be considered in wholly formal terms, in which the light coming through the window and 
illuminating part of the room may be considered as a division of both the two-dimensional 
surface and the represented space of the painting, this same division is also of symbolic and 
therefore of representational significance.238 Thus, to rely solely on form in the 
identification of artistic value is too restrictive a method that ultimately, according to 
Stecker, runs the counter-intuitive risk of undermining and diminishing the value and 
significance of form.        
 
Accordingly, Bell’s formalist theory of art has, in large part, been dismissed, leading 
Warburton to maintain that Art, “read[s] more like nostalgia for a time when aesthetic 
considerations were central to all works of art, rather than as [a] definition of what art is 
now.”239 In order to account for more recent developments in the art world it would 
therefore appear that a theory outlining the value of art and, by implication, of what we 
mean by artistic expression, must include more than simply the internal lines, shapes and 
colours of a work. That such a theory must be sought is especially important if we are to 
succeed in locating specifically artistic expression within the broader nexus of the 
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philosophy of freedom of expression, requiring, as a minimum, the expression of 
something. 
 




Whilst there is considerable conceptual difficulty in synthesizing the formalist theories of 
art – with their focus on the internal, formal qualities of an artwork – and the underlying 
philosophies concerning freedom of expression, with Article 10’s notions of expression 
conveying ‘information’ or ‘ideas’, by turning to expressivist theories of art we may begin 
to see a more natural relationship emerging. Before turning to the key proponents of the 
theory of expression, however, it is important to first define what we mean by the term ‘art 
as expression.’ A distinction must, for instance, be made between ‘expression’ and 
‘representation’; the former being concerned with the conveyance of moods, emotions or 
attitudes, whilst the latter seeks to represent (or re-present) such things as society, nature 
and the human form.240  
 
As such whilst it is possible for there to be expression and representation present, 
simultaneously, within a work, it is not necessarily so; such that the underlying value of 
art, according to the expressivist theory, lies predominantly in the expressive qualities of a 
given work – that is to say, the success with which an artist might be said to have expressed 
an ‘emotion’. Indeed, one need only think of abstract art or instrumental music to confirm 
the supposition that there can be expression without representation. Moreover, 
expressivism is very widely accepted, such that few would deny that expression is, at the 
very least, one value attributable to art even if others would proffer additional values as 
having greater significance.241 As such, the area of most significant contention regarding 
expressivism centres on how ‘expression’ is best defined. As we shall discover, the 
particular way in which ‘expression’ is so defined will profoundly affect our understanding 
of artistic expression within the freedom of expression paradigm. It is to this exposition 
that we now turn. 
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2.3.2 Outlining Collingwood’s expressivist theory 
 
Perhaps the most enduring and oft-cited definition of the expressivist theory of art emanates 
from R. G. Collingwood’s Principles of Art, first published in 1938.242 Departing from the 
formalists’ insistence on the purely internal qualities of a given artwork, Collingwood’s 
theory instead perceived art and artistic expression in terms more akin to that of a process 
or activity. Indeed, fundamental to Collingwood’s conception of art is the perception that 
artistic expression is not substantively any different from what we might term ‘ordinary 
expression’; a proposition that would evidently, on its face, bring the expressivism theory 
closer to the realm of the freedom of expression discourse outlined in Chapter One of this 
thesis than the formalism school can allow.  
 
In developing upon his basic claim in which it was maintained that there was a continuity 
between the artistic and non-artistic – the two forms of expression being of fundamental 
similarity – Collingwood asserted that: “[e]very utterance and every gesture that each one 
of us makes is a work of art.”243 Underlying Collingwood’s, perhaps somewhat extravagant, 
premise is the belief that the fundamental purpose of expression, whether artistic or non-
artistic, is the seeking or establishment of ‘self-knowledge.’ Indeed, as Ridley surmises, 
‘[o]ne finds out what one thinks or feels by giving expression to it.’244  
 
With specific regards to art, under Collingwood’s construction an artist is therefore, “a 
person who, grappling with the problem of expressing a certain emotion, says, ‘I want to 
make this clear’.”245 The process through which that particularised emotion emerges is 
essentially one of an artist’s self-discovery. Thus, the process begins with the artist 
knowing nothing except an awareness of a ‘perturbation or excitement’ within him, the 
nature of which he is largely unaware; such that he knows that he feels something, yet does 
not know what he feels. From this initial inchoate uncertainty – what Collingwood terms a 
‘helpless and oppressed condition’246 – the artist then seeks to find an answer; the initially 
unspecific emotion is given form and consequently clarified through the process of being 
developed in the artwork. Accordingly, what makes art distinct from the purpose of the 
otherwise indistinguishable ‘ordinary expression’ is that the medium employed – the 
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artwork – constitutes the tangible form that enables the communication of the artist’s 
attempt to clarify the sought after, particularized, expression of emotion.247 As Ridley 
posits: “the fully formed emotion and the expression it receives are indistinguishable from 
one another – indeed, they are one and the same.”248  
 
Thus, there is a particular uniqueness about expression through art, for the particular 
emotion expressed in a given artwork cannot be detached from, or considered in isolation 
to, the artwork in which it is imbued. Accordingly, to paraphrase Ridley, there is no sense, 
under Collingwood’s theory of art, in suggesting that the emotion in question might have 
been put another way or that the emotion could have been instilled through some other 
means, say as a result of taking a specially formulated drug.249 In this sense, therefore, the 
expressivist theory of art advanced by Collingwood can be seen to more readily conform 
with our intuitions concerning the right to freedom of expression. Rather than its value 
lying simply in the formal qualities of an artwork, as Clive Bell’s formalism would contend, 
a framework is instead established within which the underlying value of artistic expression 
is considered in much the same way as expression ordinarily understood – particularly the 
recognition, formulation and, ultimately, expression of an emotion that may, more 
generally be described as the development of ‘self-knowledge’ – whilst simultaneously 
recognizing that the form adopted in artistic expression is, in and of itself, uniquely 
valuable.   
 
Collingwood’s expressivist theory of art goes some way, at least, towards satisfying the 
intuitions elicited in Chapter One of this thesis. For instance, in addition to there being 
something being expressed, for Collingwood, there is in existence an intimate, if not quite 
symbiotic, relationship between the artist and the viewers of the artist’s work. Echoing 
Coleridge’s observation that, “we know a poet by the fact the he makes us poets,” 
Collingwood asserted that: “when someone reads and understands a poem, he is not merely 
understanding the poet’s expression of his, the poet’s, emotions, he is expressing emotions 
of his own in the poets words, which have thus become his own words.”250 As such, the 
process undertaken by the artist in his pursuit of the clarification of an initially inchoate 
emotion goes on to spark a similar process in the viewer. In this regard, then, one may 
reasonably consider Collingwood’s theory of art to align with and promote the 
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Meiklejohnian supposition, outlined in Chapter One, that the arts help to establish a 
citizenry with the necessary all-round intelligence and empathy to participate meaningfully 
in the activity of self-governance.  
 
Moreover, it is conceivable that, under a wide reading of Collingwood’s expressivist theory 
of art, one may too bring artistic expression within the confines of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Whilst freedom of expression under the rubric of 
Article 10 makes no reference to the ‘expression of emotion’, instead framing the right in 
terms of including ‘information and ideas’, Suzanne Langer’s ‘enhanced expression’ theory 
stipulates that, since there is no sharp line distinguishing between ‘emotions’ and ‘ideas’ 
one ought to consider ‘the expression of emotion’ in its broadest sense.251 Indeed, that a 
limited view of ‘emotions’ ought to be avoided at all costs is of further import to Langer 
on the basis that the significance of art lies in its ability to convey to its audience new 
experiences in such ways that are wholly distinct from other media. For instance, when 
Douglas Morgan pondered, “[w]ho among us would exchange the Sistine Ceiling for one 
more monograph, however learned, on Pauline theology?”252 he was surely thinking along 
similar lines; noting something potentially unique about the value of art; there being 
something to be gleaned from, in this case, visual art that one could not ascertain from a 
textbook. To proffer too limited an understanding of ‘emotion’ would, therefore, be to 
neuter the significance of why we value art so greatly.  
 
2.4 AESTHETIC COGNITIVISM THEORY 
 
2.4.1 Aesthetic cognitivism: Introduction 
 
To a certain extent, the essential premise upon which the aesthetic cognitivist school of 
thought is based – essentially, that art is valuable as a source of knowledge – is not vastly 
different to that of the notion, outlined in the previous section, that the value of art lies in 
its ability to express something. Indeed, whilst conceding that R.G. Collingwood’s 
philosophy is most commonly referred to in terms of espousing an expressivist theory of 
art, Robert Stecker has suggested that, “[Collingwood’s] understanding of expression 
makes it look like cognition.”253 Thus, for Stecker, it does not require much of a step from 
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proposing that the artistic process, through which both the artist and the viewer become 
aware of the emotion that is being conveyed, to suggest that such an expression or 
conveyance leads to us knowing that emotion.254 Moreover, that Collingwood himself 
referred to the process as promoting ‘self-knowledge’ would further indicate a degree of 
sympathy towards the notion of art’s value lying, to some extent, in its cognitive capacity. 
However, as we shall discover below, whilst there may be a degree of overlap between 
Collingwood’s theory of expressivism and that of cognitivism, the latter school is more far-
reaching in its scope; taking ‘knowledge’ to mean more than just ‘emotions’.  
 
As a normative philosophy on the subject of the theory of art, the cognitivist school of 
thought began to find widespread favour from the 1970s onwards, with Nelson Goodman’s 
Languages of Art proffering a particularly strong defence of the position.255 However, 
debates concerning the question of whether we can learn from art go back considerably 
further. Thus, going back to the readings of ancient philosophy, in The Republic Plato 
dismissed the possibility of poetry affording its reader knowledge proper on the basis that 
it provided merely a deceptive appearance of knowledge or an imitation of reality; after all, 
only philosophers were considered as having the necessary attributes to discern true 
knowledge.  On the contrary, Aristotle maintained that poetry had the capacity to reveal to 
its audience universal truths. However, establishing that art can act as a source of 
knowledge is but the first challenge needing to be addressed by the cognitivist school in 
contemporary thought. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, it needs to be established that 
this capacity to provide knowledge is itself an aesthetic merit. After all, it is perfectly 
reasonable, under some accounts of the formalist school of thought, to accept that one may 
learn something from an artwork without also accepting that that knowledge has any 
relevance to the aesthetic qualities of that particular artwork.256  
 
Accordingly, in maintaining that, firstly, artistic expression is capable of advancing 
knowledge and, secondly, that such knowledge may be encapsulated within the aesthetic 
qualities of a given work of art, the cognitivist school of thought, it is suggested, offers an 
account of artistic expression that most succinctly and naturally ‘fits’ within the freedom 
of expression paradigm. By talking in terms of knowledge acquiescence, the cognitivist 
school of thought provides a framework within which artistic expression may be seen to 
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fall within both the Millian and (wide-) Meiklejohnian positions regarding freedom of 
expression that, as shall be seen in Chapter Four of this thesis, underpin the general 
rationales employed by the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, that the 
knowledge imbued in artistic expression is also considered as being wrapped up in the 
aesthetic qualities of art, suggests that artistic expression, whilst similar to other forms of 
expression, is nevertheless unique in the way in which the expression is made. This 
suggestion that artistic expression operates within the freedom of expression paradigm, 
whilst in a simultaneously sui generis manner to other, more conventional modes of 
expression, will thereby act as a pivotal foundation for this thesis’ assessment of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of artistic expression. 
 
2.4.2 Aesthetic cognitivism’s foundational premise: Art as knowledge 
 
Turning, firstly, to the epistemic question of whether art can act as source of knowledge it 
is clear from the range of arguments pertaining to the cognitivist school that the knowledge 
attributable to art has been defined in a multitude of ways. For some, artistic expression 
can provide us with a quasi-philosophical knowledge. In particular, it has been argued that 
literature provides us with a more comprehensive understanding of moral issues than it is 
possible to attain from academic treatises on moral philosophy alone. Thus, whilst moral 
philosophy may grant us an ‘outline’ we need literature in order to provide substance to the 
moral requirements of a given situation.257 Related to this position, then, is the view that 
art can give us knowledge of possibilities or, in other words, an appreciation of how 
different scenarios might be interpreted or how a particular situation might feel to someone 
else. For instance, it has been suggested that The Golden Notebook, a novel ostensibly 
regarding Communism in Britain during the mid-20th century, shows us how a certain, 
“moral perplexity might have been felt by one perfectly possible person in a perfectly 
definite period.”258  
 
Taking the notion of the ‘knowledge of possibilities’ further still, others have maintained 
that art is, in fact, capable of providing actual knowledge; an insight into actual, human 
nature. In highlighting the potential for art to shed light on what might be construed as 
‘actual knowledge’, Berys Gaut cites Freud’s remark that many of ideas that went on to 
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form the basis of his psychology may be traced back to the works Sophocles and 
Shakespeare.259 There is, thus, an implication that the same, ultimate ‘knowledge’, may be 
reached through different means, for instance both artistic and scientific.  
 
For some proponents of the cognitivist school, it is art’s power to impart practical 
knowledge, rather than the conceptual and propositional types of knowledge identified in 
the previous paragraphs, that lies at the heart of art’s value.  Within this strand of 
cognitivism there are, in turn, several sub-strands. Thus, for Robinson, art can be said to 
educate us emotionally, in effect teaching us how to feel;260 whilst Putnam has suggested 
that art can improve our practical reasoning.261 Taking a slightly different line Currie 
submits that art promotes us to engage with our imagination, an activity that, in turn, helps 
us to plan our lives and to understand, engage with, and empathise for, others in our 
society.262 Moreover, Goodman contends that that value in looking at a visual work of art 
lies in its ability to make us look at reality in a fresh way, and therefore appreciate aspects 
of the world that we had not previously considered.263  
 
Others still have held, as R.W. Beardsmore submits, that art has the ability to help us make 
sense of previous events in such a way that other forms of expression could not.264 Thus, 
in developing the notion of ‘knowledge of the significance of events’, Beardsmore takes 
John Stuart Mill’s confession that it was through the reading of Wordsworth’s poetry that 
gave his life meaning following a nervous breakdown in his early adulthood as an example 
demonstrative of art’s capacity to help give meaning to something that was previously 
meaningless.265 Related, to a certain degree, to the ‘significance of events’ type of 
knowledge is the notion, submitted by some cognitivists, that art conveys experiential or 
phenomenal knowledge such as, for instance, the knowledge of what it is like to be in love 
or to experience the death of a loved one. As Gaut points out, such knowledge helps to 
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broaden one’s horizons, providing an experience without having to experience it first-
hand.266 
 
Accordingly, it is possible to divine three interlocking bases that can be seen to underpin 
the diverging opinions of the cognitivist school with regards to the precise nature of the 
type of knowledge conveyed by art. Whilst acknowledgment of the conveyance of 
knowledge is necessarily common to all cognitivists, there is dispute as to whether that 
knowledge is of a conceptual, propositional or practical nature, though it is clear from the 
above outline that individual commentators’ opinions need not necessarily be neatly 
pigeon-holed. Thus, whilst different commentators will attribute different emphases upon 
the knowledge that may be gained from art, at the very least it may be said that art teaches 
us something, be it about ourselves, our fellow man, our society, or our world and that, to 
some extent, the implication is that art is in some way unique in the way in which it teaches 
us that something.  
 
2.4.3 Criticisms of the aesthetic cognitivist position 
 
However, despite the intuitive attractiveness with which it is founded – premised, namely, 
on the supposition that art has the capacity to impart knowledge – the cognitivists’ position 
has been criticised for a number of reasons. The success with which the cognitivists can be 
seen to rebuke the criticisms will, as we shall discover in Chapters Three and Four of this 
thesis – have a profound impact on the assessment of artistic expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.   
 
Firstly, it has been suggested that, whilst people may say that they have learned something 
from art, when it comes to articulating precisely what they have learned, it becomes rather 
more vexing. Detractors of the cognitivist’s position would go further still, maintaining that 
even if someone could say what they had learned from an artwork it would likely be an 
articulation so banal as to be virtually worthless. Thus, Stolnitz asks what knowledge or 
truth Pride and Prejudice may be said to impart other than the banal observation that, 
“[s]tubborn pride and ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart.”267 The import of 
such an expression in the grand scheme of freedom of expression would, after all, appear 
somewhat trivial.  
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Yet Gaut dismisses the first of the anti-cognitivists’ charges, noting that not all such 
propositions that may be derived from art are in fact banal; the example proffered by Freud 
with regard to tracing his own theories back to the works of Sophocles and Shakespeare 
being an apt example.268 As Gaut goes on to maintain: “whatever the truth of Freud’s 
theories, banal they are not.”269 Moving on from the more empirical observation that the 
propositions stemming from artworks need not necessarily be banal, Gaut goes on to argue 
that such a claim is fundamentally misguided for, as we have seen above, propositional 
knowledge is not the only type of knowledge considered to emanate from art. Whilst 
propositional knowledge is an important consideration for some, most cognitivists would 
place a greater emphasis on practical or conceptual knowledge associated with the 
appreciation regarding the significance of past events or experiential knowledge.270 Instead, 
with regards to literature, for instance, we see the actual world in light of our understanding 
of the fictional world, in ways that are not necessarily capable of forming a propositional 
statement. To paraphrase Currie: it is possible to know how to ride a bike yet be unable to 
say, precisely how one does, in fact, ride a bicycle.271 
 
The second common criticism of the cognitivists’ position, as highlighted by Gaut, is that 
even if we were to assume that we can learn from art, it does not follow that it can be 
claimed that art contributes to that knowledge in a unique way.272 Thus Stolnitz, in 
comparing art with science, has maintained that, whereas science has a distinctive method 
by which it can achieve scientific truths, there are no truths that only art can reach.273 Some 
cognitivists, as we have seen above with regards to Nussbaum’s assertion that art offers a 
more comprehensive understanding of morality than is possible through moral philosophy 
alone, have attempted to maintain that the anti-cognitivists’ objection is simply unfounded. 
Yet, in order to avoid a conceptual stalemate, a more nuanced approach may be appropriate.  
 
For instance, Gaut contends that ‘uniqueness’ need not be an essential component of the 
cognitivists’ theory of art. There are, as Gaut goes on to argue, no ‘truths’ that can be 
attained  from reading a newspaper that cannot be attained from watching news 
programmes on the television, yet one may prefer to gain one’s knowledge of current 
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affairs through the printed press because of its convenience, thoroughness and 
portability.274 Accordingly, whilst the truths or knowledge that one may gain from art may 
not, in themselves, be unique to art, the manner in which they are reached might be; to 
return to Freud’s assertion, one may prefer to gain an insight in to the human condition 
from reading the plays of Shakespeare than by reading a Freudian text on psychology.  
 
A further criticism of the cognitivists’ theory of art stems, again, from the supposed need 
of propositional statements in order to achieve knowledge. As Diffey has asserted, “[h]ow 
can a work of art be faithful to the facts it would teach if art is not by its nature fact-
stating,”275 the point being that one cannot gain knowledge of the real world if art acts under 
the suspension of actual worldly concerns. The presumption held by the anti-cognitivists, 
then, is that the most an artwork can ‘say’ is, ‘let us imagine x’, rather than, ‘it is asserted 
that y’ such that, in a sense, the only knowledge that art can possibly convey is an 
imaginative knowledge perhaps akin to the deceptive knowledge ascribed to poetry in 
Plato’s The Republic.  
 
Again, however, Gaut submits that the anti-cognitivists’ objection is empirically not 
necessarily the case; portraiture seeks an accurate representation of the subject, landscapes 
will often depict the actual scenery, many films document some actual situation and much 
poetry is derived from the poet’s own, historic experience.276 As such, one may read-in to 
such artworks an implicit ‘it is asserted that y’. What’s more, one may even find, in wholly 
fictional works, both implicit and explicit assertions. Thus, it is explicitly stated in Pride 
and Prejudice that, “[i]t is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession 
of a good fortune must be in want of a good wife,” whilst, Gaunt suggests, one may read, 
in Emma, the more implicit assertion that, “attractive, assertive, and spoiled young ladies 
are often not the best judges of their own motivations and behaviour.”277  
 
Yet, even if we accept that one may find assertions in works of art, the anti-cognitivists 
strongest objection roots itself in the Platonic assertion that knowledge requires a justified, 
true belief. Thus, even if we accept that truths may emanate from art, it remains the case 
that art simply cannot guarantee the requisite justification or reliability needed to form 
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actual knowledge. Thus, according to Stolitz, whilst Charles Dickens’ Bleak House may 
well accurately describe the tardiness of estate litigation in Victorian Britain, the novel 
alone is incapable of assuring a reliable justification for the premise to be regarded as 
knowledge. To acquire knowledge of this state of affairs, under the justified true belief 
mantra, one would need to further consult textbooks on legal history.278 Accordingly, 
supposing that the legal process was in fact ineptly slow in 19th century Britain, my 
knowledge of that truth, if based solely on a reading of Bleak House, would have been 
coincidental; I would simply have stumbled across the truth rather than gained it through 
the process of ensuring a justified, true belief. 
 
However, given the fact that propositional knowledge is not the sole concern of the 
cognitivist, if we accept that the knowledge attained through art need not be unique and 
that, nonetheless, one may still find implicit and express assertions in artworks, the 
cognitivist position remains strong; its comprehensive recognition of the multitude of ways 
in which we may be seen to learn from art weather many of storms put forward by the anti-
cognitivist commentators. Thus, as Gaut contends, even if one were to concede to Stolitz’s 
point regarding art’s inability to provide justified true beliefs, it does not undermine all of 
the types of knowledge that art can be said to convey.279 For instance, the justified true 
belief objection would certainly fail to undermine the arguments that art conveys 
knowledge of possibilities (since they are not claiming to be ‘actual’ knowledge), as well 
as conceptual knowledge (on the basis that new concepts, by their nature, cannot be 
empirically tested).  
 
We can see, therefore, that much of the value pertaining to artistic expression according to 
the cognitivist school of thought lies in its rather peculiar relationship with knowledge. 
Establishing that art can, in some way, contribute to knowledge – either by way of a 
conceptual, practical or propositional manner – is only the first challenge facing the 
cognitivists’ theory of art; the second fundamental challenge being to establish a 
relationship between the cognitive and aesthetic elements of an artwork. Whilst the 
knowledge or truths reached through art may not be unique, for the same truths may be 
arrived at through different means – say, with reference to a psychology textbook or a 
newspaper – the manner in which they are reached is, to a certain extent, distinct.  
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Accordingly, whilst it has been conceded by many cognitivists that art does not (or need 
not) operate within the traditional scientific framework of propositional knowledge, art is 
still perceived to play a uniquely invaluable role. As Dewey submits, art enables people to 
perceive, manipulate, and engage with reality in a distinctive way.280 Furthermore, 
considered as one might consider a language, Goodman goes on to maintain that, by subtly 
enlarging our understanding of the world, through its unique use of symbols and forms, art 
has the capacity to, “transform our perceptions [and] energise us.”281 It is of fundamental 
importance, therefore, to address precisely how the aesthetic qualities of art may be said to 
promote the cognitive value of art in order to, in turn, appreciate the distinctive way in 
which art and artistic expression operates within the freedom of expression paradigm.  
 
2.4.4 The relationship between the cognitive and the aesthetic: a 
synthesised theory of art 
 
It would be a mistake, according to Gaut, to simply infer from the cognitive value of art 
that art is therefore valuable. Instead, “[w]hat a cognitivist has to do is show that the 
cognitive values of art are aesthetically relevant.”282 In seeking to establish this link 
between the cognitive and the aesthetic, Beardsmore has asserted that: “when we learn from 
a work of literature, then what we learn, the content of the work, is essentially bound up 
with the way in which the writer expresses himself, bound up, that is, with the author's 
style.”283 Thus, the aesthetic qualities of a work – the development of characters in a novel 
or a film, the choice of lines and colours in a painting, the lighting and angle of a photograph 
– are, in fact, intrinsically interwoven in to the way in which the cognitive elements of that 
work of art are conveyed. As Gaut stipulates: “it is the way that a work conveys its cognitive 
merits – the mode by which it conveys its insights – that makes them of aesthetic 
relevance.”284 Accordingly, under Beardsley’s assessment, there is a certain synthesis of all 
the theories of art considered in this chapter.  
 
Thus, even formalist principles – if not the premise that one ought to consider art’s value 
only in terms of the formal qualities of an artwork – may be seen to coexist alongside the 
cognitivists’ claim that we can gain understanding through art and the expressivists’ 
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process of advancing self-knowledge and emotional awareness. Art may therefore, for the 
purposes of freedom of expression doctrine, be seen to be simultaneously similar to 
ordinary expression in that it deals in the acquisition of knowledge, whilst proffering a 
distinct methodology in pursuing its ambitions. There is, as such, a nuanced relationship 
both between art and knowledge and the aesthetic means through which that knowledge is 
attained.  
 
For instance, if we consider Macbeth’s soliloquy, in which the protagonist proclaims that: 
 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more. 
 
our primary concern is not with the truth or otherwise of Shakespeare’s portrayal of 
despair285 – we are not concerned with whether or not Shakespeare was correct in 
identifying that life is a walking shadow, but rather whether the despair experienced by 
Macbeth has been aptly portrayed in his expression, through the use of words, syntax and 
metaphor. It is through the successful deployment of such artistic qualities, then, that we 
can be said to learn, and with which we may be said to engage with reality. Indeed, in 
arguing that the purpose of art is to reveal truth through the material world, Hegel 
emphasised that, “Art thus involve[s] a reconciliation of matter and content.” In other 
words, more often than not, in the case of artistic expression, the medium is the message.   
 
2.5 CONCLUSION: SYNTHESISING THE THEORIES OF ART AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  
 
From the above overview of the theories of art, it becomes possible to surmise two broad, 
though related, points. Firstly, art and artistic expression are potentially unique in as much 
as they are capable of simultaneously conveying both cognitive and non-cognitive 
elements, such as to further our understanding of the world and human experience, in ways 
that other modes of expression are perhaps deficient and which may be seen to align quite 
easily with Meiklejohnian approach to freedom of expression underpinning the importance 
of the arts in creating a populace with the required intelligence and sensitivity to effectively 
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engage in public discourse as well as the Millian conception of the importance of 
expression as a means towards truth, however defined. Accordingly, with the emphasis 
laced by Article 10 emphasis on the exchange of ideas, the extent to which artistic 
expression is protected in practice will therefore depend largely on the Court’s recognition 
of the way in which art contributes to such an exchange as distinct from political 
expression.  
 
That art is capable of conveying ‘ideas’ is not necessarily an essential condition of art. As 
we have seen, the Kantian position’s requirement of adopting a position of 
disinterestedness when creating and viewing art precludes the possibility of art 
communicating ideas, whilst the formalist position of the 20th century would maintain that 
the value of an artwork lies exclusively within the internal, formal qualities, such as lines 
and colours, rather than in any experience that may be depicted or knowledge that might 
be gleaned from the work.  
 
However, other theories of art are more accommodating and susceptible to being brought 
within the freedom of expression paradigm: Collingwood’s theory concerning the 
expression of emotion and the aesthetic cognitivism theories would both, for instance, 
suggest that something can be expressed through art. Furthermore, that the expression of 
emotion forms part of a process in which the artist (as well as the viewer) come to realise 
something, to in some way develop, brings artistic expression close to value of freedom of 
expression identified under the self-fulfilment rationale. Moreover, if we take a pluralist 
understanding of the theory of art, one in which the cognitive aspects of art – whether of a 
conceptual, practical or propositional level – are considered to be intertwined with the 
aesthetic, or artistic, qualities of an artwork one can begin to appreciate the need to consider 
art as a sui generis category within the generalised doctrinal considerations pertaining to 
freedom of expression. Thus, whilst artistic expression can be considered as ‘expression’ 
for the purposes of freedom of expression care also needs to be taken to appreciate the 
particular way in which art makes that expression.   
 
Indeed, that art ought to be considered as a sui generis category of expression forms the 
backbone of Kearns’ scholarship concerning the under-protection of artistic expression in 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Article 10 jurisprudence. For Kearns, then, “[a]rt 
has a distinct ontology, and is culturally recognised as a discrete body of value, being 
83 
 
emergent from the creativity of individuals.”286 Therefore, according to Kearns’ thesis, art’s 
autonomy, “should invite the special individual treatment of art by law-makers so that any 
perceived ‘transgressions’ of acceptable moral boundaries by it in a social context are 
understood to be taking place within the artistic order, ie within art’s normal internal canons 
of operation.”287 Accordingly, as Kearns goes on to assert, “[a]rt…simply offers itself and 
invites the appropriate meditative (aesthetic) attitude. [Art] is thus generous not 
constricting, and it is not the exertion of a will that its contemplation results in real-life 
disaccord. Art is an option for its reader or viewer, not an imposition.”288 Thus, “any 
offence for which art is the alleged stimulus is the result of an incorrect psychic approach 
on the part of the reader or viewer.”289 As such, under Kearns’ thesis, artistic expression’s 
under-protection in the case law pertaining to Article 10 stems from the failure of the Court 
to appreciate art’s distinct ontology or the unique way in which it operates as a form of 
expression.  
 
In noting the distinctive way in which art operates, qua the nuanced relationship that art 
enjoys with reality, one is therefore mindful of the formal qualities of the work – that art is 
founded in the shapes, lines and colours employed by the artist as well as in the use of such 
techniques as metaphor and exaggeration. Moreover, the pluralist approach taken by those 
cognitivists that consider the aesthetic qualities of art are, in a sense, part and parcel with 
the cognitive elements imbued in a work of art would also be able to incorporate an 
appreciation of the Kantian notion of the sublime; a feature of art that, for Nahmod, may 
be seen as the underpinning of artistic expression relatively low level of judicial protection.   
 
Accordingly, whilst the underlying nature of the Kantian notion of beauty emphasises unity 
– both internally, in terms of the internal harmony of beautiful art, and externally, in terms 
of the subjective universality with which all cultured persons will concur as to what is 
beautiful – the converse is true of Kant’s notion of the sublime. Whereas, the beauty in a 
work of art, for Kant lies in its mediation between the divide between knowledge on the 
one hand and desire or notions of morality and politics, on the other, the sublime emanates 
precisely because of that gulf.290 Moreover, the sublime, for Burke, may be described as 
that which inspires terror, the fear of pain or death, in a person who is in fact not in danger 
                                                     
286 Kearns (n 16) at 162 
287 Kearns (n 16) at 162 
288 Kearns (n 16) at 29 (emphasis added)   
289 Kearns (n 16) at 28-29 
290 Nahmod (n 216) at 234 
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and, moreover, is knowingly not in danger.291 Going further, the sublime, as construed by 
Nahmod, has the effect of inspiring feelings of dissolution and disintegration, in stark 
contrast to the unity proffered by beauty’s harmony.292 What’s more, after applying this 
distinction – between the beautiful and the sublime – to First Amendment jurisprudence, 
Nahmod notes that it is (or at least was) the Supreme Court’s preference for the unifying 
and cohesive aspects of art over the discord prompted by the sublime that led to the 
undervaluing of artistic expression, rendering its protection dependant on its proximity to 
political expression. Indeed, it might be considered that it is the very nature of the sublime 
and its challenging of the status quo that has led to art and artistic expression being 
considered so subversive and consequently marginalised.  
 
History teaches us of the (arguably) inherently subversive nature of art. Indeed, in noting 
the largely overlooked role played by controversial art in challenging the use of slavery in 
England, Kearns posits that, “morally controversial art plays a crucial role in challenging 
the moral status quo that often then opens a pathway to a new moral order in society.”293 In 
this regard, it has been said that every book or work of art is a response and answer to an 
earlier work, such that art is involved in a, “continual self-revising process of consensual 
reality.”294 Therefore, in as much as art and artistic expression is therefore considered to 
the product of, and contribution to, society’s development, a strong correlation can be found 
with the self-fulfilment and self-realisation rationales for freedom of expression. As 
Doctorow points out, if the political works of Karl Marx are considered to be a product of 
his social context, then the same must be true of the works of William Shakespeare.295 
 
Yet identifying with any precision the position enjoyed by the artist and his artistic 
endeavour within society – especially in terms of identifying artistic expression’s value for 
the purposes of the right to freedom of expression - is not without difficulty, especially 
when the value underlying freedom of expression is identified in the contribution that it 
makes to public discourse. For, as Doctorow muses, “[w]hen a…novelist sits down to write 
a book she does not contemplate the role of art in democracy.”296 However, whilst artists 
are not necessarily political they nevertheless cannot help but draw on their experiences 
                                                     
291 Burke, E. A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime an Beautiful 
(1757) cited in Nahmod (n 216) at 233 
292 Nahmod (n 216) at 233-235 
293 Kearns (n 16) at 10 
294 Doctorow, E. L., Address to the students of the Tisch School for the Arts, in Campbell, M. S. and 
Martin, R. (eds.) Artistic Citizenship: A public voice for the arts, Routledge (2006) at 56 
295 Doctorow (n 294) at 56 
296 Doctorow (n 294) at 51-52 
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and conceptions of the real world such, so Turner posits, that they become a ‘consciousness 
of society.’297 It is in this sense, therefore, that the playwright Arthur Miller considered 
writers and artists to be ‘public figures’;298 their expression being the expression of an 
individual’s attempt to understanding or give meaning to the society in which they found 
themselves. 
 
In his preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray Oscar Wilde made the assertion that, “[t]he 
only excuse for making a useless thing is that one admires it intensely. All art is quite 
useless.”299 Kearns adamantly disagrees, stating that, far from being useless, “it is just that 
art’s usefulness is complicated and refined, rather than simple and banal.”300 From the 
above overview of the theories of art, one would tend to agree with this observation. 
Defining art’s distinctive role in society – its societal utility – is challenging, especially if 
social utility is considered in conjunction with a narrow reading of expression’s 
contribution to public discourse. For whilst artists need not be overtly political, their work 
– through the imaginative “mak[ing] and remak[ing] of the world” in which they find 
themselves301 – bears political connotations (with a small ‘p’). Thus, artistic expression is 
valuable, not only for the artist in the pursuit of their own self-fulfilment, but for that of the 
audience as well. Indeed, to reiterate Kearns’ underlying positon, “[a]rt…cannot impose 
itself. It is passive, ready to be activated only by a reader’s will to read it.”302 Accordingly, 
even art that shocks us has value for, when one considers art in the context of it being art – 
such as to recognise the distinctive qualities pertaining to it as a form of expression – 
“[t]hrough the shock, we begin to understand some truth about our world, including about 
art and about ourselves.”303 Moreover, whilst conceding that, “[n]ot all art is great; very 
little of it is,” Doctorow asserts that even ‘lesser art’ ought to be protected in order to allow 
for an environment from which great art can emerge.304 Indeed, one might well suppose 
that, “there would have been no Shakespeare without the community of Elizabethan 
dramatists and poets, many of whom were second rate.”305 
 
                                                     
297 Turner, E. The Artist in the Amphitheatre, 43 Law and Contemporary Problems 308 (1979) at 
313-315 
298 Cited in Turner (n 297) at 315 
299 Holland, M. (ed) Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, Collins (2003) at 17 (emphasis added) 
300 Kearns (n 16) at 10 
301 Doctorow (n 294) at 53 
302 Kearns (n 16) at 75 
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Yet it is this sense of perpetual agitation, of pushing boundaries – a notion inherently bound 
up with the project of postmodernism, succinctly summed up by the artist Karel Appel 
when she said that ‘art must shock’306 – that might be considered as the basis for artistic 
expression’s unfavourable treatment in judicial settings. For Douzinas, “[t]he law is able to 
appreciate new art only after it becomes a matter of convention, use and habit; in other 
words, when art becomes like law.”307 Similarly, Kearns explains that, “[l]aw is an agent 
of the past and evolves more slowly in its processes than most other social units, such 
as…art and fashion.”308 As such, owing to its inherent conservativism, law is said to, 
“sometimes ha[ve] difficulty in dealing with phenomena that are not neatly a priori […]. 
Of particular concern to a legal system is the threat to order and the continuity of that 
order.”309 
 
The potential for there to be tension between artistic expression and the state qua law is 
therefore abundantly clear. For, as Doctorow posits, “[h]owever beneficent and enlightened 
the society society may be, there is an eternal argument between the accepted, agreed upon 
communal truths and the artist’s act of witness, which must always have a whiff about it of 
the disruptive. […] As such, it is inconceivable that in any society in which the answers 
have already been asserted that free expression and the multiplicity of witnesses [emanating 
from art’s expression] can be anything but a danger to the state, or an affront to God or the 
Fuhrer.”310  
 
It is with this thought in mind that artistic expression’s relevance to the freedom of 
expression discourse becomes most acute. If it is art’s inherently subversive, progressive 
nature that lies at the root of authority’s suspicions, then art’s value ought to be seen to 
align with any and all of the principles underlining why we value the right to freedom of 
expression in general. For art and artistic expression can be seen to reveal, whether 
separately or conjunctively, truth – either the artist’s truth or a truth within ourselves, as 
observer’s and co-creators of art – the promotion of a process of self-realisation and 
fulfilment, that may be seen as a pre-requisite for our functioning in the democratic process. 
Yet, at the same time, artistic expression’s value is seen to lie in the distinctive nature with 
which it operates, leading one commentator to assert that, “artistic expression is more and 
                                                     
306 Quoted in Kearns (n 16) at 67 
307 Douzinas, C. The Aesthetics of Law, in McLean, D. (ed.) The Trials of Art (2007), Ridinghouse, 
p. 66 
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is different than freedom of expression.”311 Accordingly, the extent to which artistic 
expression is in fact protected within Article 10 will be dependent upon the extent to which 
artistic expression is valued as a distinct form of expression, an analysis of which will 
follow in Chapter Four. 
 
 








































                                                     














The discussion to follow in Chapter Three intends to elicit, after an initial theoretical 
overview, the key strands to have emanated from the European Court of Human Rights’ 
general approach to categorising expression in to its various component parts – namely 
political/public interest, artistic, and commercial expression – and the attributing of varying 
levels of protection thereafter. Perhaps as a result of Article 10’s silence on the issue, 
framing the right to freedom of expression in general terms simply as including the 
conveyance of ‘information’ and ‘ideas’312 – the Court’s practice regarding the 
categorisation of expression has in the past often been less than overt. However, with the 
increase in case law has come an increasing number of difficult cases, the determination of 
which have become ever more explicitly based on the Court’s categorisation of expression 
and subsequent attribution of varying degrees of judicial scrutiny and oversight, vis-à-vis 
the application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation, to the multitude of forms that 
expression can be manifested.313 The purpose of the present chapter is therefore firstly to 
proffer a theoretical framework from which to secondly assess the Court’s practice with 
regards to the categorisation of expression. 
 
As we have seen in Chapters One and Two of this thesis, the relationship between artistic 
expression and freedom of expression doctrine is somewhat vexing; it not being universally 
accepted that art does, or even should, have any meaning other than being art for the sake 
of art. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that artistic expression does, at least under 
such theories of art pertaining to the expressivist and aesthetic cognitivist schools, have the 
capacity to communicate something, whether that something be emotions simpliciter or 
knowledge of a type that may be loosely referred to in terms of ‘information and ideas’. 
                                                     
312 For a more detailed discussion on the history of Article 10’s drafting process, including the 
explicit inclusion of artistic expression as a form of expression in its earlier drafts, see Chapter Four.  
313 See, for instance, Case of Mouvement Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland (2012), para. 61: “The 
breadth of such a margin of appreciation varies depending on a number of factors, among which the 
type of speech at issue is of particular importance.” (emphasis added). See also Leigh, p. 57:  
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Accordingly, therefore, there is a theoretical basis from which one may begin to 
acknowledge the alignment between art, artistic expression and freedom of expression 
doctrine. As such, this theoretical framework – noting the sui generis nature in which art 
and artistic expression may be seen to operate within and contribute to the generalised 
philosophy of freedom of expression – will inform the analysis of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ treatment of specifically artistic expression (in Chapter Four) and the 
Court’s categorisation of expression (below).  
 
In light of Article 10’s non-differentiated exposition of the meaning of ‘expression’ – in 
which no reference is made to the various forms that expression might take, such that 
‘expression’ is, instead, defined simply with reference to the receiving and imparting of 
‘information’ and ‘ideas’ – and given the theoretical convergence, established in Chapters 
One and Two infra, between artistic expression and key strands relating to freedom of 
expression doctrine, it is therefore curious that there remains a commonly held assumption 
that artistic expression enjoys a relatively low level of protection under Article 10.314 The 
task of rationalising the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on the matter of 
categorising expression is therefore of fundamental import both in order to explain and 
justify the existing curio of differentiated protection within a non-differentiated human 
right as well as to form a theoretical basis for an analysis of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ treatment of specifically artistic expression and this thesis’ subsequent suggestions 
for the improved protection of artistic expression in the future. 
 
Thus, in proffering the basis from which to address this issue, this chapter begins by placing 
the discussion within the context of the distinction made by Schauer between coverage 
(that expression which is said to be included within freedom of expression guarantees) and 
protection (the extent to which a covered expression is, in fact, actually protected). 
Accordingly, it will be established that the practice of attributing different levels of 
protection to different types of expression is not, from a theoretical perspective at least, a 
controversial practice.  
 
                                                     
314 This assumption is commonly held in academic commentaries of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (see, for instance, Harris et al (n 1) at 455-465) as well as being borne out of a prima 
facie observation of the findings of a non-violation of Article 10 in the European Court of Human 




Following on from these theoretical considerations Chapter Three will then turn to the 
practical application of Schauer’s coverage-protection distinction with particular reference 
to the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of Article 10. In so doing, the 
question of precisely what ‘expression’ means for the purposes of Article 10 will be 
addressed; firstly, with regards the issue of ‘coverage’, in which a brief examination of 
instances in which Article 10’s threshold for ‘expression’ is not considered to have been 
triggered will be outlined before proceeding, secondly, to the matter of ‘protection’ and the 
more substantial body of case law concerning the attribution of differing levels of 
protection within those types of expression recognised as being at least covered by Article 
10. There, the manner and methodology in which the Court has conducted the 
categorisation of expression will be more thoroughly discussed. By establishing the 
rationale employed by the European Court of Human Rights with regards to the practice of 
categorising expression in general the stage will be set for Chapter Four’s analysis of the 
Court’s case law concerning specifically artistic expression.    
 
3.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE 
CATEGORISATION OF EXPRESSION 
 
3.2.1 Introductory remarks 
 
In seeking to address the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of artistic expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights it is necessarily instructive 
to proffer a sound theoretical basis, in abstracto, for the categorisation of expression and 
attribution of differing levels of protection thereafter from which to contextualise an 
analysis of the case law. The notion of distinguishing between different categories of 
expression is, however, by no means novel. By way of example, and citing the now 
infamous example of the Skokie Affair315 in the United States of America – in which an 
ordinance seeking to prohibit a neo-Nazi group from demonstrating in a predominantly 
Jewish neighbourhood was deemed unconstitutional under the protections afforded by the 
First Amendment – Thomas Scanlon has pointed out that categories, “appear to play an 
important role in informal thought about the subject,” before going on to postulate that the 
residents would likely not have been expected to endure the same treatment had the 
expression not been ‘political’.316 Implicit in Scanlon’s assumption, then, is the underlying 
                                                     
315 National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie 432 U.S. 43 (1977) 
316 Scanlon (n 97) at 519-520 
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sense that some expression is deemed to be of greater value, and therefore subject to greater 
safeguards, than others; a position that is recognised in academic opinion on the subject.317  
 
In seeking to proffer a theoretical basis facilitative of the ‘informal thought about the 
subject’ noted by Scanlon, the discussion to follow in the opening half of this Chapter will 
demonstrate that there is ample reason to suppose that expression can, despite the non-
differentiated explication of the right to freedom of expression within Article 10, be 
categorised in to its various component parts and that, furthermore, each category of 
expression can be subject to a varying degree of protection. Moreover, it will be suggested 
that assessing the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence in light of this 
theoretical framework will provide an insight in to the Court’s attitude towards artistic 
expression, as a form of expression, more particularly.  
 
3.2.2 Categorical versus balancing approaches to the protection of 
freedom of expression: An overview 
 
Informing much of First Amendment analysis regarding the right to freedom of 
expression’s interpretation, scope and corresponding protection has been the distinction 
made between ‘categorical’ and ‘balancing’ approaches318; a brief overview of which will 
help to contextualise the following discussion’s emphasis on the importance placed by 
Schauer on the need to recognise the conceptual distinction between the right’s coverage 
and its protection. 
 
According to Kathleen Sullivan, the distinction to be made between categorical and 
balancing approaches can be summed up with the recognition that, “categorisation 
corresponds to rules, balancing to standards.”319 Thus, a strictly categorical approach will 
resolve the issue in a linear manner such that, as Sullivan goes on to explain, “once the 
relevant right and mode of infringement have been described, the outcome follows without 
                                                     
317 See, for instance, Hare, I. Is the privileged position of political expression justified? in Beatson, 
J. and Cripps, Y. (eds) Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: essays in honour of Sir 
David Williams, OUP (2000); Rowbottom, J. To Rant, Vent, and Converse: protecting low level 
digital speech, Cambridge Law Journal 355 (2012) (especially at 369); Wragg, P. Free speech is not 
valued if only valued speech is free: Connolly, consistency and some Article 10 concerns, 15 E.P.L. 
111 (2009)  
318 See, for instance, Blocher, J. Categoricalism and balancing in First and Second Amendment 
analysis 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375 (2009) 
319 Sullivan, K. Post-liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV.  293 (1992) at 293-294  
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any explicit judicial balancing.”320 In other words, once the right has been identified or 
triggered within the relevant legal framework, its protection will follow in a categorical and 
unqualified manner without recourse to any judicial balancing of other competing interests. 
On the other hand, the rule-based, linear structure of categoricalism may be contrasted with 
the methodology inherent in balancing approaches according to which the outcome cannot 
be determined from the beginning. Instead, as Sullivan stipulates, “the judges’ job is to 
place competing rights on a scale and weigh them against each other.”321  
 
Elaborating on the distinction made by Sullivan – and of importance to note in the 
proceeding explication of Schauer’s coverage-protection distinction – Blocher points out 
that whilst both approaches rely on the consideration of underlying constitutional values, 
they do so in different ways.322 Thus, with regards to categorical approaches, reference to 
value is only required at the category’s inception so as to justify a particular category’s 
existence within the scope of the right itself. Thus, once the value of a category of 
expression is recognised as falling within the framework of freedom of expression provided 
by a given constitutional guarantee, the linear judicial application of the right’s protection 
will continue to proceed without further recourse to the expression’s value, as noted by 
Sullivan. On the other hand, for Blocher, the balancing approach requires a more habitual 
consideration of underlying constitutional values: such values acting as a kind of ‘common 
metric’ from which one is able consider the value of a given category of expression in light 
of competing interests. 
 
Whilst it may be conceptually useful to consider the categorical and balancing approaches 
as polar extremes, in reality the two approaches do at times converge. Indeed, the opening 
two Chapters of this thesis, by seeking to locate the right to artistic freedom of expression 
within the broader nexus of freedom of expression more generally, may be regarded as 
promoting the categorical approach as understood by Blocher. Taking, as its initial premise, 
the notion that artistic expression is, in some way, treated detrimentally under the auspices 
of Article 10, the starting point of this thesis was to explicate the value of art and artistic 
expression in such a way as to confirm its existence as a form of expression for the purposes 
of Article 10. To borrow from Blocher’s terminology, Chapters One and Two therefore 
sought to refer to value at the inception of artistic expression’s inclusion within Article 10. 
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This initial categorical position, in so far as it recognises the alignment of artistic expression 
within the underlying values of the freedom of expression discourse, will subsequently 
inform the discussions surrounding the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence in 
which the extent to which the underlying value, recognising artistic expression’s inclusion 
within Article 10 in principle, can be seen to extend in to the Court’s actual practice of 
balancing various interests.  
 
3.2.3 Blocher’s Three Approaches to Categorical Analysis  
 
Accordingly, in discussing the theoretical basis from which the judicial categorisation of 
expression, and the ensuing variability with which categories of expression are seen to be 
protected, may be based, it is instructive first to clarify what exactly is meant by 
‘categorisation’. According to Joseph Blocher’s analysis, one may consider the 
categorisation of expression in three ways: coverage, classification (or sub-categorisation) 
and protection.323 Thus, issues of categorisation may be considered: firstly, in establishing 
those categories that are regarded as triggering Article 10 in the first place; secondly, as to 
whether a given (covered) expression may be sub-categorised so as to warrant (usually 
intermediate) protection; and, finally, with regards to the sub-categorising of covered 
expression, in determining the level of protection to be afforded a given act of expression.324  
 
Therefore, given the non-differentiated articulation of the right to freedom of expression 
within Article 10 – such that the case law is predominantly concerned with the sub-
categorisation of covered expression and the varying levels of protection afforded 
thereafter – of paramount significance for present purposes are Blocher’s second and third 
conceptions of categorisation. For the sake of comprehensiveness, however, and in the 
interest of emphasising the distinction needing to be made between the right to freedom of 
expression’s coverage and its protection, as required under Schauer’s analysis, the ensuing 
discussion shall begin with an outline of Blocher’s first area of categorisation; namely the 
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3.2.4 Freedom of expression as a category of conduct 
 
In line with Blocher’s analysis, expression may, in the first instance, be categorised in terms 
of that which is covered by constitutional guarantees and that which is not. Indeed, with 
particular reference to the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, Schauer has 
pointed out that, “[n]ot every case is a first amendment case.”325 Put another way, Schauer 
implores us to appreciate that not every case concerning speech or expression is rightly 
contained within the free speech paradigm. A somewhat obvious observation, perhaps – 
after all, amongst the various schools of thought on the topic of freedom of expression there 
is a rare consensus in free speech discourse that the right to freedom of expression, properly 
understood, is not, and should not be, unqualified. It will be remembered, from the 
overview provided in Chapter One, for instance, that a distinction is made between 
expression that constitutes ‘discussion’ (which is absolutely protected under the principles 
of rule-utilitarianism) and that which constitutes ‘positive instigation’ (according to which 
the protection of such expression varies according to the principles of act-utilitarianism) 
under the Millian defence of freedom of expression.326 Similarly, even the wide-reaching, 
autonomy-based theory of freedom of expression advanced by Scanlon would seek to 
exclude from protection expression of a type surmised in his ‘nerve gas’ example,327 whilst 
expression’s protection under Meiklejohnian, democracy-based constructs is dependent 
upon its furthering of, and contribution to, the democratic process.328    
 
Moreover, it is important to remember that the right to freedom of expression under Article 
10 is itself a qualified right; the limitation clauses set out in Article 10(2) outline instances 
in which the State may lawfully restrict one’s right to freedom of expression.329 Yet, by 
reminding us that expression protected under the First Amendment (and, by extrapolation, 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights) is itself a category – or, in other 
                                                     
325 Schauer, F. Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265 
(1981) at 267 
326 For an exposition of Mill’s defence of freedom of expression see Chapter One, section 1.2.1 
327 In which it was supposed that providing a recipe for the creation of a nerve gas out of household 
goods ought to be unprotected. For more on Scanlon’s autonomy-based defence of freedom of 
expression see Chapter One, section 1.3 
328 For an exposition of Meiklejohn’s democracy-based defence of freedom of expression see 
Chapter One, section 1.4.1 
329 The (potentially) legal limitations to the right of freedom of expression, identified in Article 10(2) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights are: national security, territorial integrity, public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.   
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words, a category of conduct deemed worthy of protection – Schauer directs our line of 
inquiry beyond the question of ‘What is speech?’ towards the more functionally important 
question of, ‘What is freedom of speech?’ 
 
Whilst this distinction may appear to be a matter merely of tautology, it remains an 
important one to recognise. Turning to the dictionary, were we to limit ourselves solely to 
the foundational question of ‘What is speech?’ we would likely end up with an intolerably 
broad scope of speech or expression warranting protection. For instance, ‘speech’ may be 
defined as, “the expression of or the ability to express thoughts and feelings by articulate 
sounds,” whilst ‘expression’ is described, not dissimilarly, as, “the action of making known 
one’s thoughts or feelings.”330 Clearly, the freedom to make known one’s thoughts – if left 
unchecked – could give rise, to borrow Schauer’s terminology, to ‘many distinctly 
discordant acts of expression’. After all, libel, slander, obscenity and possibly even child 
pornography could, somewhat counter-intuitively, be construed as ‘speech’ or ‘expression’ 
under such broad definitions so as to render any regulation in these areas of potential 
concern from a ‘free speech’ perspective. In order to avoid such a counter-intuitive position 
it is therefore crucial that a distinction be made between ‘speech/expression’ simpliciter 
and the more normatively important question of what we mean by ‘freedom of expression’.  
 
Recognising that not every case concerning speech is a free speech case and refocusing the 
issue towards the determination of what we mean by ‘freedom of speech’ can, to a certain 
extent, be seen to alleviate such problems that might arise from employing a dictionary 
definition of speech or expression.  Indeed, as the overview of the various strands of 
thought with regards to the theory of freedom of expression sought to demonstrate in 
Chapter One an important notion underlying the right to freedom of expression is that of 
the perceived value of the right in a societal context. Thus, for Mill, the value of free 
expression lies in its supposed propensity to achieve societal truth by the challenging of 
dogma, Scanlon’s thesis locates the value of freedom of expression broadly in terms of 
respecting individual autonomy whilst Meiklejohn’s defence of freedom of expression, as 
well as Weinstein’s later formulation, places the value of free expression in terms of its 
relationship to, and advancement of, democracy whereas Redish identifies the value of 
freedom of expression in its capacity to induce self-realisation, the achievement of which 
acts as a precondition for the enjoyment of the other principal rationales. Accordingly, 
whilst the value of freedom of expression is considered by different commentators in 
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different ways, and with differing emphases, freedom of expression doctrine is, at its 
foundation, seen to encompass something more than simply ‘speech’ or ‘expression’ per 
se. As such, if we were to rephrase Benjamin Constant’s assertion, noted in Chapter Two’s 
discussion of the theory of art, we may state that what we are concerned with, when 
investigating freedom of expression, is not speech for the sake of speech.  
 
Underlying this conceptual clarification is Schauer’s plea for us to appreciate that in 
considering ‘freedom of expression’, one is in fact necessarily employing a ‘constitutional 
language’ with distinct meanings from those of everyday usage.331 In essence – though 
running the risk of circularity – under the ‘constitutional language’ advanced by Schauer, 
‘freedom of speech’ may be defined as that area of conduct protected (to whatever degree) 
under a given constituting document. Of course, such a definition is circular and does little, 
in and of itself, to identify what expressive acts are, in fact, to be protected under guarantees 
of freedom of expression. Nonetheless, it remains instructive to remember that at its most 
fundamental level, ‘freedom of expression’ is itself a category of conduct within whose 
parameters a given act of expression enjoys a greater degree of protection than would 
otherwise be afforded.332  
 
The vexing question remains, however, of engaging in the practical, judicial delineation of 
the scope of acts to be included (or at least potentially included) within the coverage of the 
term ‘freedom of expression’, and the subsequent degree of protection to be afforded 
therein. To determine this question, one must engage with, and distil from, the case law 
any given court’s understanding and application of the ‘constitutional language’ pertaining 
to freedom of expression. Moreover, precisely how artistic expression is understood within 
this ‘constitutional language’ – the protection with which artistic expression is considered 
to enjoy with the right to freedom of expression more generally – will be instructive in this 
thesis’ objective of determining and analysing the treatment of specifically artistic 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. By turning next 
to the important distinction to be made between the coverage of a right and the subsequent 
protection of a right, a sound theoretical basis will be proffered from which a variable 
protection of freedom of expression can be employed.  
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In turn, and in remembering Blocher’s assertion that the categorical approach to the 
question of freedom of expression’s protection hinges on the value recognised as being 
imbued in a given category of expression’s inception,333 in recognising the theoretical basis 
for such variable protection one may distil the ‘constitutional language’ employed by the 
European Court of Human Rights in its identification of the underlying value(s) of the right 
to freedom of expression in general and of freedom of artistic expression in particular which 
will inform the discussion, in Chapter Four, of the treatment of artistic expression under 
the Court’s Article 10 jurisprudence. Thus, whilst Article 10 is generally recognised as 
encompassing a broad range of expression within its coverage (including artistic 
expression) it will be suggested that the relatively low level of protection afforded to artistic 
expression may be explained in terms of the Court’s failure, in its jurisprudence, to 
recognise and give effect to the very value that justifies artistic expression’s inclusion 
within Article 10’s coverage in the first place.  
 
3.2.5 Introducing the coverage-protection distinction: the limitations of a 
strictly ‘categorisation as coverage’ approach to freedom of 
expression protection 
 
Early First Amendment jurisprudence is perhaps most clearly indicative of Blocher’s 
‘categorisation as coverage’ approach to the protection of freedom of expression. 
Traditionally, First Amendment jurisprudence centred on the ‘two-level theory’ 
extrapolated from the Chaplinksy case, such that speech was simply categorised in to that 
which is protected and that which is unprotected.334 Accordingly, speech was considered 
to be protected unless it fell within ‘certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech’ (namely the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous, as well as ‘insulting’ or 
‘fighting words’). Categorical and absolutist in its nature, this position’s advancement has 
perhaps most famously been articulated by Justice Black who wrote, extra-judicially, that:  
 
“one of the primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to 
withdraw from the Government all power to act in certain areas – whatever the 
scope of those areas may be.”335  
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As is clear from the qualification offered in italics, Justice Black was not advocating an 
absolute freedom of expression per se (in other words, he was not maintaining a stance of 
speech for the sake of speech) but, rather, an absolute freedom within established 
boundaries. Accordingly, and by way of comparison, parallels may therefore be drawn 
between the theoretical approach taken by Black and that of the Millian notion of 
‘discussion’, a form of expression warranting absolute protection in order to secure the long 
term objective of truth under the modes of rule-utilitarianism, as distinct from that 
expression considered to be a ‘positive instigation’ which is, under the principles of act-
utilitarianism, subject to potentially greater restriction.336 Moreover, whilst not advocating 
an absolute freedom of expression per se, the formulaic approach adopted by Justice Black 
– according to which the recognition of a given expression as being covered by First 
Amendment leads, automatically, to its protection – is symptomatic of Sullivan’s 
articulation of the categorical approach as being rule-based and somewhat linear in its 
methodology noted above.337  
 
Despite the appealing facial simplicity of Black’s position, Schauer has warned of the 
dangers inherent in the absolutist’s mantra. Underlying Schauer’s criticism is the 
observation that the absolutist position has, “collapsed the important distinction between 
coverage and protection,”338 resulting in the supposedly erroneous concluding notion that 
all that is covered is protected. Whilst this position may be explained historically with 
reference to the peculiarities of American political philosophy and a desire to narrow 
judicial discretion,339 such an approach remains untenable for Schauer for two interrelated 
reasons based, predominantly, on notions of first principles. Firstly, defining an area of 
absolute protection is, for Schauer, impossible on account of the fact that it is unlikely, if 
not plainly undesirable, to suppose that any one theory can explain the concept of free 
speech such that, secondly, any attempt to define an absolute theory of speech that 
incorporates all of the required exceptions and qualifications will be so fundamentally 
hampered by our own lack of omniscience as to lose sight of the fundamental values 
associated with protecting speech in the first place.340 That so much ink has indeed been 
spilled over philosophical inquiries in to the nature of freedom of expression, as alluded to 
in the opening chapter’s overview of the right to freedom of expression, would indicate a 
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confirmation of Schauer’s scepticism regarding the possibility of achieving a singular, 
universally accepted theory of freedom of expression. Instead, in the interest of flexibility 
and pragmatism, Schauer proposes that by making the distinction between coverage and 
protection, one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of freedom of expression 
issues that is able, in turn, to react appropriately to unknown future situations and contexts.  
 
Lying at the crux of the issue, therefore, is Schauer’s apprehensive hypothesis that rights 
are simply more likely to be absolute (i.e. protected) if the range or scope of the right’s 
coverage is narrow. Such a hypothesis is imbued with the resultant danger that, “the criteria 
of absolutism exerts an inward pull on the boundaries of coverage,” such that, “the 
boundaries [of protected freedom of expression] may eventually become far narrower than 
the underlying theory.”341 The danger, as Schauer sees it, is aggravated by the doctrinal 
crudity of the categorical-absolutist position, according to which, simply put, expression of 
type x is considered to be protected absolutely whilst expression of type y remains out with 
the sphere of protection altogether. Therein lies the conflation between coverage and 
protection: expression of type x being both covered and protected whereas expression of 
type y is not covered and, therefore, not protected. As such, as a result of the categorical-
absolutist’s tendency to conflate the issues of coverage and protection, a formulaic and 
binary approach to the question of expression’s protection is employed that runs the risk of 
obscuring, if not entirely diminishing, the possibility of engaging in a principled assessment 
of the various forms that expression may take: the concomitant fear being that non-
conventional or doctrinally difficult expression is simply considered to fall out with the 
freedom of expression’s protective sphere altogether.  
 
3.2.6 The coverage-protection distinction: An explication of Schauer’s 
position 
 
Of importance to the extrapolation of Blocher’s ‘sub-categorisation’ and ‘protection’ 
approaches to interpreting the right of freedom of expression, after having noted the risks 
of employing a categorical absolutist position, Schauer maintains that a more nuanced 
approach is required that is both more normatively sound and reflective of judicial 
approaches to freedom of expression cases. By way of analogy, in describing the coverage-
protection distinction Schauer invites us to imagine wearing a suit of armour so that one 
might say, “I am covered by the armour. This will protect me against rocks, but not against 
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artillery fire.”342 There is, as such, an almost inevitable discrepancy between coverage and 
protection. In the same way that being covered by the armour will provide varying levels 
of protection depending on the level of the attack, so too must the coverage of freedom of 
expression – itself a category of protected conduct – enjoy varying levels of protection. 
Thus, rights in general, “may cover certain conduct, by requiring greater persuasive force 
in order to restrict that conduct,” leading, of course, to the inverse proposition; namely that, 
“some reasons may be sufficiently powerful to penetrate the coverage of a right.”343  
 
In that regard, according to Schauer:  
 
The distinction between coverage and protection suggests both the structure and 
the order with which to clarify the concept of free speech. It is necessary first to 
determine what activities are covered, and then determine how and to what extent 
those activities are protected.344  
 
Moreover, in turning to the challenge of marking out the parameters of the coverage of 
freedom of expression, it is instructive to consider Schauer’s remark that, “[d]efinition is 
parasitic on justification.”345 Thus, in deciding both the coverage and subsequent protection 
to be afforded to a given expression, one must look to the first principles justifying the 
inclusion of a particular kind or type of expression with reference to the underlying theory 
or theories of freedom of expression. Put another way, ‘covered speech’ may be identified 
as that speech which promotes the value(s) underpinning the constituting document in 
which the right is found – which, for present purposes, may be considered to be Article 10. 
As Schauer so succinctly puts it:  
 
“Ideally we are looking for a principled definition of the Free Speech Principle, a 
definition that incorporates only those forms of communication that in some way 
relate to those reasons for recognising such a principle in the first place.”346  
 
Furthermore, in remembering Blocher’s assertion that under the balancing approaches of 
‘sub-categorisation’ and ‘protection’ one needs to continually refer to underlying values in 
assessing the degree of protection to be afforded, the level of protection afforded to a given 
expression under Schauer’s theoretical framework is itself dependent upon the proximity 
with which it is perceived to align with the values of the right’s constituting document.  
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That such a theoretical framework is advantageous is confirmed by Sunstein, who argues 
that establishing a sliding-scale of protection for expression, based on the expression’s 
value in light of its centrality, or proximity, to the values of, in Sunstein’s case, the First 
Amendment.347 By emphasising the importance of value in determining the level of 
protection to be afforded to covered speech, Sunstein establishes a constitutional anchor 
from which judges can develop a coherent and overtly reasoned jurisprudence.348  
 
Again, it was with this need to contextualise freedom of expression in terms of underlying 
value in mind that Chapters One and Two of this thesis sought to establish a theoretical 
foundation from which to assess the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. By 
first demonstrating the unique manner by which art and artistic expression can be said to 
communicate and thus convey ‘information’ and ‘ideas’ (an important, though not 
necessarily determinative, consideration in the Court’s application of Article 10), so as to 
establish artistic expression within the freedom of expression paradigm and proffer a 
framework from which to assess the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of artistic 
expression as a sub-category of covered expression.  
 
Before turning our attention to the issue of specifically artistic expression under Article 10, 
the remainder of this chapter seeks to apply Schauer’s theoretical justification for the 
categorisation to practice employed by the European Court of Human Rights in which the 
Court’s definition of ‘expression’ will be explored with reference to the stated scope of the 
right to freedom of expression (ie. its coverage) and the levels of protection afforded to 
expression held to be covered. From this position, and by building on the underlying 
framework proffered in Chapters One and Two, a more thorough and contextualised 
investigation of the treatment of artistic expression will therefore ensue in Chapter Four.  
 
3.3 WHAT IS ‘EXPRESSION’ FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 10? 
  
3.3.1 The threshold question: Introduction 
 
The justification for the coverage-protection distinction advanced by Schauer has so far, 
necessarily, been primarily framed in the context of the United States and the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, it has been established that not every case concerning 
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expression or speech is correctly considered a First Amendment case. Can the same be said 
of the European Convention on Human Rights: is every case concerning expression an 
Article 10 case? In general, the majority of case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights does not, per se, indicate an engagement in a binary, Chaplinksy-type approach to 
the protection of expression that informed First Amendment jurisprudence in the mid-
twentieth century and according to which excluded certain categories of speech – namely, 
the lewd, obscene and fighting words – from the First Amendment’s coverage altogether. 
Instead, the European Court of Human Rights has, as we shall see below, recognised a 
broad range of expression as at least potentially falling within the scope of Article 10’s 
protective sphere, such that the theoretical basis for the variability of protection, recognised 
in the distinction made by Schauer between coverage and protection, in line with the notion 
of ‘sub-categorisation’ advanced by Blocher, becomes particularly acute.  
 
Indeed, with the development of a four-level theory superseding that of its binary 
predecessor, First Amendment jurisprudence has itself evolved since the relatively early 
case of Chaplinksy.349 Accordingly, a tiered approach to the protection of speech has 
emerged under the First Amendment such that within the category of protected speech one 
may elicit three degrees of protection (summarised by Eberle as ‘high’, ‘intermediate’ and 
‘low’) in addition to that speech which remains unprotected.350 The First Amendment free 
speech jurisprudence has, as we shall see below with particular reference to the European 
Convention on Human Rights found itself aligning more considerably with Article 10 
jurisprudence, precisely because of the disentanglement of the coverage-protection 
dichotomy.   
 
That the European Court of Human Rights has approached its Article 10 jurisprudence 
relatively liberally with a catholic appreciation of what constitutes ‘expression’ for the 
purposes of the Article 10, has been confirmed by Voorhoof who has described the 
evolution of the Court’s Article 10 jurisprudence as evincing an ever-increasing scope of 
coverage, as well as protection, of expression.351 Whilst Voorhoof’s observation is, as we 
shall see below, largely correct there remain a small number of cases in which the Court 
has rejected outright applications as being inadmissible primarily on the grounds that the 
                                                     
349 For an overview of this evolution see Eberle, E. The Architecture of First Amendment Free 
Speech, Mich. St. L. Rev. 1191 (2011)  
350 Eberle (n 349) at 1193-1194 
351 Voorhoof, D. Freedom of expression under the European Human Rights System: From Sunday 
Times (No. 1) v. UK (1979) to Hachette Filipacchi Associd's ("Ici Paris") v. France (2009), 2 Inter-
Am. & Eur. Hum. Rts. J. 3 (2009) 
103 
 
expression in question fell out with Article 10’s sphere of coverage altogether. A brief 
survey of such cases concerning the issue of Article 10’s ‘coverage’ is therefore instructive 
in helping to determine, largely by way of negative deduction, the essential question of 
what constitutes ‘expression’ for the purposes of Article 10 before moving on to the Court’s 
practice of categorising and attributing differing levels of protection to expression within 
Article 10 itself. In so doing – and in line with the theses of Blocher, Sunstein and Schauer 
– it is hoped that we might begin to see the value(s) imbued in the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 and so inform the basis of Chapter Four’s analysis of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ case law regarding artistic expression.   
 
3.3.2 The threshold question: an overview of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights’ admissibility 
case law 
 
The Article 10 jurisprudence from both the European Court of Human Rights and the now 
defunct Commission has approached the question of what kind of expression engages – or, 
perhaps more accurately, expression that does not engage – Article 10 from two main 
angles: the internal (with reference to Article 10’s purported intent) and the external (with 
reference to Article 17’s assurances that a Convention right may not be employed to inhibit 
other Convention rights). In each instance, therefore, we may see Schauer’s premise that 
definition is parasitic on justification, such that the expression in question need demonstrate 
the furthering of Convention values, both specifically with regards to Article 10 and, more 
generally, of the Convention as a whole in order to fall within Article 10’s coverage in the 
first place.  
 
By providing a summary of a selection of cases in which Article 10 was considered to be 
inapplicable, so as to necessarily deny a judgment as to the merits of the case, it is hoped 
that the value, deemed worthy of protection inherent in the right to freedom of expression, 
will begin to come to the fore. With, as Schauer asserts, definition being parasitic on 
justification and in line with Sunstein’s thesis regarding a sliding scale of protection 
dependent upon the centrality of the expression in question to the values of the right’s 
constituting document, by outlining the reasoning underpinning the exclusion of certain 
expression from Article 10’s scope a definition of what exactly is meant by ‘expression’, 
for the purposes of Article 10 will begin to emerge. Furthermore, this vantage point, in 
recognising the core values to which Article 10 is seen to aspire, will proceed to inform the 
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analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law concerning artistic expression 
in which, following Schauer and Sunstein’s theses, the level of protection of artistic 
expression under Article 10 will be considered in light of the extent to which the Court can 
be seen to recognise artistic expression’s capacity to further the values perceived to be 
imbued in Article 10.  
 
X v. U.K (1979) 
 
Firstly, then, a given act of expression may be denied Article 10 protection internally, in 
the sense that the ‘expression’ is not of a type recognised as befitting the intended gist of 
Article 10’s protection. Such was the Commission’s stance in two early cases, both of 
which, confusingly, are entitled X v. UK. The first case, decided in 1979, whilst perhaps 
more accurately pertaining to the question of freedom of information than to freedom of 
expression per se, remains instructive in so far as it advances the notion that Article 10 
simply does not recognise certain ideas or information. That certain ideas and information 
are indeed considered to fall out with Article 10 altogether, it is suggested, may go some 
way in explaining the unease felt, through a degree of conflation of the coverage-protection 
distinction, by the European Court of Human Rights when determining the protection of 
controversial expression within Article 10; a state of affairs that, as will become evident in 
Chapter Four, is potentially detrimental to artistic expression.  
 
Turning our attention back to the question of coverage and the perceived scope of Article 
10’s guarantees, the first X v. UK case concerned the refusal to inform the applicant (‘Moors 
Murderer’ Ian Brady) of the names of those persons sitting on a committee charged with 
determining the applicant’s ‘prisoner status’ – a process which, in turn, would affect the 
applicant’s privileges in prison. In declaring the application to be manifestly unfounded 
and, therefore, inadmissible, in X v. UK the Commission maintained that the type of 
information being sought simply did not fall within, “the concept of information within the 
meaning of Article 10…”.352 With reference to the Sunday Times case, heard by European 
Court of Human Rights earlier in 1979, the Commission thus framed the concept of the 
information underpinning Article 10 in terms of the public having the right to receive 
information on matters of public interest.353  
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By making a distinction between the type of information being conveyed in the present 
case and that of the Sunday Times (a case regarding a newspaper’s reporting on the effects 
of the use of thalidomide during pregnancy) the Commission held that the information 
being requested in X v. UK was not of a type or nature recognised as falling within the 
ambit of Article 10, such that the applicant’s Convention rights, naturally, could not be said 
to have been engaged in the first place. Thus, in the parlance of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ jurisprudence, there could not be said to have been an interference with the 
applicant’s Article 10 rights, the result of which necessarily precluded any further 
assessment of either the necessity or proportionality of the State’s refusal to provide the 
information. Whilst one may dispute the Commission’s determination as to the nature of 
expression for the purposes of Article 10, Schauer’s thesis regarding the notion that 
definition be parasitic on justification still holds true: the information sought by the 
applicant was considered to not align with the justification for freedom of expression 
imbued in Article 10. Put another way, some expression is simply not expression for the 
purposes of Article 10 according to the ‘constitutional language’ employed by the 
Commission.    
 
X v. UK (1980) 
 
The second X v. UK case, decided the following year in 1980, concerned the applicant’s 
conviction for the buggery of two (consenting) eighteen-year old males. In addition to his 
complaint under Articles 8 (family and private life) and 14 (discrimination), the applicant 
alleged that his right to freedom of expression had been violated on the grounds that his 
incarceration prevented him from both expressing his views as well as expressing his 
feelings of love to other men. Again, as with the previous X v. UK case, the Commission 
determined that there had been no interference with the applicant’s Article 10 rights, this 
time on the supposed grounds that, “[Article 10] does not encompass any notion of the 
physical expression of feelings in the sense submitted by the applicant.” Instead, the 
Commission asserted that, “the concept of ‘expression’ in Article 10 concerns mainly the 
expression of opinion and receiving and imparting information and ideas,” thus excluding 
the applicant’s ‘physical expression’ of feelings entirely from the protective scope of 
Article 10.  
 
Thus, as with the first of the X v. UK cases, the second instance again demonstrates an 
attempt at locating the type of expression considered to be at the heart of Article 10. 
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Moreover, by setting the ‘physical expression of feelings’ apart from the ‘information’ and 
‘ideas’ of Article 10’s intrinsic purpose and value, one may begin to see, in the distillation 
of the notion of expression underpinning the ‘constitutional language’ of Article 10, a 
definition within which artistic expression may be seen to rest somewhat precariously. One 
must, of course, be careful not to draw too much from the conclusion reached in the 
Commission’s brief extrapolation of expression in the 1980 X v. UK case: as we shall see, 
artistic expression has, since the late 1980s, recognised artistic expression’s inclusion 
within the nexus of Article 10. However, that reference was indeed made to the ‘physical 
expression of feelings’ in determining that the expression was not of a sort conducive to 
the guarantees of Article 10 is interesting, especially in light of Chapter Two’s overview 
of the principal theories of art whereby, it will be remembered, the expressivist school of 
thought – underpinned by Collingwood’s thesis – purported that that the fundamental role 
of art is to elicit and communicate emotions. Whilst a more comprehensive assessment of 
artistic expression under Article 10 will emerge in Chapter Four, it suffices to say, for 
present purposes, that the type of expression in question – and the proximity with which it 
is perceived to be with regards to ‘information’ and ‘ideas’ will necessarily have a profound 
effect, not simply in terms of judicial recognition that the expression is covered by Article 
10 but that it is, moreover, protected by Article 10’s guarantees.  
 
Rujak v. Croatia (2012)354 
 
Similarly, in the more recent case of Rujak v. Croatia the European Court of Human Rights 
confirmed that, notwithstanding the fact that the Article 10 guarantees are said to apply to 
offensive and shocking acts of expression, such principles, “do not exclude a possibility 
that certain categories of expression may not be covered by the protection of Article 10 
[…]”.355 Elaborating, the Court went on to assert that the question to be asked was, 
“whether, in light of the reasons for the protection of freedom of expression, the type of 
communication in issue is covered by the guarantee [of Article 10].”356 Thus, the applicant, 
a serving member of the Croatian army at the material time, could not be said to be covered 
by the protective sphere of Article 10 for saying, during an argument with two recruits, “I 
fuck your baptised mother”, it being “open to question whether there is good reason for 
protecting expression of insults.”357  
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The echoes of Schauer’s submission that definition is parasitic on justification can clearly 
be heard in the European Court of Human Rights’ reasoning in Rujak and the exclusion of 
the expression in question with reference to the reasons for protecting the right freedom of 
expression in general. Yet, owing to what might be described as the internal approach taken 
by the Court – that is the notion that Article 10 is inherently blind to certain types of 
expression – that the applicant had been convicted of ‘tarnishing the reputation of the 
Republic of Croatia’ (which would appear, at least prima facie, to have resulted from the 
applicant’s further comments that, “This is not my State, I am not it’s national, I don’t 
recognise you, your rank or the Croatian Army.”), nor the six month sentence (later 
suspended with a two year probation period) were therefore not open for analysis under the 
proportionality matrix discussed below: Mr Rujak’s expression having been deemed not to 
have met the threshold required to fall within Article 10’s scope and trigger any potential 
protection.  
 
Norwood v. UK (2005)358 
 
The Commission’s peremptory exclusion of protection in cases like X v. UK and Rujak 
which can be considered as being grounded internally in Article 10 and its presumed 
intentions regarding scope vis an assumed ‘free speech’ justification, may be compared 
with the case of Norwood in which the Court refused, at the admissibility stage, to engage 
Article 10 externally by relying on the prohibition of the abuse of Convention rights 
enounced in Article 17.359 Underlying Article 17 is the affirmation that “[n]othing in this 
Convention may be interpreted as implying….any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein […]”, 
such that the ‘expression’ in question – a poster depicting a flaming Twin Towers and the 
symbol of the crescent and star inside a prohibition sign alongside the text, “Islam out of 
Britain” – amounted to a general attack on a specific religious group. As such, the 
attribution of a grave act of terrorism to the religion of Islam in general was considered to 
be diametrically opposed to the values inherent in the Convention, namely those of 
tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination. Accordingly, the specific poster in question 
was, to all intents and purposes, not considered to be ‘expression’ for the purposes of 
Article 10 precisely because of its ‘anti-Convention’ ethos.  
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Garaudy v. France 
 
The position adopted by the Court in Norwood can be more comprehensively explained 
with reference to the earlier case of Garaudy v. France in which the admissibility of 
historical revisionist expression regarding the nature and scope of the Holocaust was 
addressed. The applicant – described as a philosopher, writer and former politician – 
published a book entitled The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics. Given the inclusion of 
such chapters as The Myth of the Nuremberg Trials and The Myth of the Holocaust, criminal 
proceedings were brought against the applicant on the basis of denying crimes against 
humanity, publishing racially defamatory statements and inciting racial or religious hatred 
or violence and the domestic courts subsequently agreed that the arguments maintained in 
The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics amounted to a denial of the ‘Final Solution’ and the 
methods employed by Nazi Party during the Second World War. Accordingly, the applicant 
was fined and awarded a suspended prison sentence.  
 
At the admissibility stages before the European Court of Rights the applicant sought to 
argue that the French authorities had misconstrued the line of argument in his work and 
that the book did not deny the crimes against the Jews perpetrated by the Nazis but, instead, 
had been intended solely as a critique of the policies of the State of Israel such that his 
conviction amounted to an unjustified interference with the exercise of his right to freedom 
of expression. However, in holding the applicant’s claim under Article 10 to be 
inadmissible on the basis that it was manifestly unfounded, the Court can be seen as 
excluding the expression in question from Article 10’s scope with reference to the 
guarantees of Article 17. Thus, the Court accepted that, “[t]here is no doubt that, like any 
other remark directed against the Convention's underlying values ..., the justification of a 
pro-Nazi policy could not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded under Article 10” 
before going on to acknowledge that there is a “category of clearly established historical 
facts – such as the Holocaust – whose negation or revision would be removed from the 
protection of Article 10 by Article 17”360 As such, as with Norwood, the expression in 
Garaudy was considered to fall out with Article 10’s coverage altogether because of its 
irreconcilability with the values underpinning the European Convention on Human Rights 
when taken as a whole. Moreover, the Court, in reaching its decision that the applicant’s 
                                                     
360 Garaudy v. France (HUDOC) English Translation, p. 22, citing Lehideux and Isorni v. France 
(1998) (HUDOC) paras. 53 and 47 
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complaint was manifestly unfounded, went on to elaborate on the relationship between the 
purposes of Article 10 and the underlying purposes of the Convention, arguing that the 
applicant was attempting to “deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real purpose by 
using his right to freedom of expression for ends which are contrary to the text and spirit 
of the Convention.” As such, the position taken in The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics 
was seen, rather than as a genuine historical quest for truth, as an attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ 
the National-Socialist ideology in such a way as to run contrary to the values associated 
with freedom of expression within the framework of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and therefore entirely out with the coverage of Article 10.  
 
By surveying a sample of cases in which the applicants’ allegations of an infringement of 
their right to freedom of expression were denied at the admissibility proceedings (and 
thereby indicating the scope of Article 10’s coverage) it has been demonstrated that there 
are instances in which the European Court of Human Rights will, in essence, consider the 
expression in question not to be expression for the purposes of Article 10. Thus, where the 
expression in question is not considered to align with the ‘concept’ of expression within 
Article 10 or advance the underlying purposes of Article 10 and the European Convention 
on Human Rights as a whole, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to cast the 
expression out with the coverage of Article 10’s sphere of influence. Accordingly, in line 
with Schauer’s summation that definition is parasitic on justification, we may begin to see 
the oblique emergence of an under-riding value pertaining to Article 10’s right to freedom 
of expression that informs the judgments of the Court. By next turning to the categorisation 
of expression within the parameters of Article 10 (i.e. expression covered by Article 10’s 
guarantees) such values will begin to come more to the fore and act as the basis for Chapter 
Four’s analysis of the case law pertaining to specifically artistic expression.    
 
3.3.3 Categories of expression within the ambit of Article 10  
 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned cases, the European Court of Human Rights has been 
credited with recognising a broad range of types of expression as at least potentially falling 
within the parameters of Article 10. Indeed, it was not the form of expression per se in, for 
instance, Norwood (poster) or Rujak (oral statements) that precluded their coverage within 
Article 10 but, rather, the failure of the expression’s content or intended meaning to align 
with either the values of Article 10 specifically or the Convention more generally. 
Moreover, in the literature, there remains the sense that the Court – whether explicitly or 
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implicitly – engages in the categorisation of that expression which is recognised as falling 
within the scope of Article 10 so as to affect the degree of protection afforded thereafter.  
 
Turning to the textbooks on the European Convention on Human Rights, we find that 
freedom of expression is often recognised as comprising of three broad categories: namely, 
political/public interest, artistic and commercial expression.361 Whilst it was not until the 
late 1980s that the potential guarantees of Article 10 were explicitly extended to artistic 
(Müller in 1988) and commercial (Markt Intern in 1989) expression,362 the following 
decades have demonstrated the development of a hierarchy of expression, such that 
political/public interest expression is considered to enjoy greater protection than artistic 
expression which, in turn, enjoys greater protection than commercial expression. Of course, 
as Schauer is at pains to emphasise, such a differential in the levels of protection within the 
underlying category of covered expression is not necessarily unprincipled: the extent to 
which covered expression is protected can vary depending on the extent to which the 
expression may be seen to align with the right to freedom of expression’s underlying 
objectives.   
 
However, there appears to be a lack of judicial scrutiny as to how this differentiated 
approach may be justified and, indeed, implemented consistently. A survey of the key cases 
in this area seeks, therefore, to identify the extent to which Schauer’s methodology – 
according to which definition of expression may be deduced from the right’s underlying 
justification – may be extrapolated from the European Court of Human Rights’ approach 
to categorising expression. Moreover, the developing trends in the Court’s approach to 
categorising expression will, it will be suggested, have consequentially contributed to 
doctrinal difficulties that have emerged in recent case law and, as such, account for the 





                                                     
361 See, for example, Harris et al (n 1) at 455-465 (who include the additional category of ‘civil 
interest’ which I shall subsume within political expression)  
362 Though it should be noted that the now defunct Commission had recognised commercial 
expression’s potential a decade earlier in X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden. 
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3.4 THE VARIABLE PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
UNDER ARTICLE 10: CASE LAW ANALYSIS  
 
3.4.1 The categorisation of expression within Article 10: Introductory 
remarks 
 
It will be remembered that under the analysis provided by the theses of Blocher, Schauer 
and Sunstein there exists a theoretically sound basis for the varying of protection of sub-
categories of expression within the coverage of Article 10’s sphere of influence according 
to which value can be seen as informing, in the first instance, a category of expression’s 
inclusion within the freedom of expression paradigm and, secondly, the extent to which 
covered expression is to be protected. Whilst the previous section sought to bring attention 
to various examples in which the expression in question was not considered ‘expression’ 
for the purposes of Article 10 – such that it was deemed not to be covered by the guarantees 
of Article 10 – the following discussion seeks to provide an overview of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ approach to categorising expression within Article 10, paying 
particularly close attention to the role played by value in so doing.  
 
Accordingly, in developing upon the notion outlined in the previous section – in which it 
was noted that certain expression was conceptually not of the type considered to be of value 
for the purposes of Article 10 – the discussion to follow will explore the underlying values 
perceived to be imbued in Article 10 and the effect that this has had on the protection of 
different categories of expression. With the hierarchy of expression emanating from the 
European Court of Human Rights usually being referred to in terms of political expression 
achieving the greatest degree of protection and commercial expression achieving the lowest 
degree of protection (such that artistic expression falls somewhere in between) the 
following discussion, and its extrapolation of the Court’s approach to the question of 
categorising expression, will therefore focus predominantly on the question of political and 
commercial expression, from which a basis will be established to more thoroughly assess 
the Court’s treatment of specifically artistic expression in the following Chapter.   
 
Crucial to the development of a hierarchy of expression within its Article 10 jurisprudence 
is the Court’s application of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, according to which 
member States and their courts are conceded, as Barendt explains, “some discretion in 
determining whether it is appropriate to limit the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the 
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ECHR.”363 As such, the level of discretion afforded to member States profoundly affects 
the intensity of scrutiny with which the European Court of Human Rights is able (or 
willing) to discern whether a given interference with a convention right was proportionate. 
Before proceeding to distil the core values from which Article 10 is seen to operate, it is 
therefore instructive first to provide an overview of the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
its impact on the Court’s assessment of gauging the proportionality of a State’s interference 
with freedom of expression in light of the light of the limitation clauses of Article 10(2). 
 
3.4.2 The margin of appreciation doctrine, proportionality and the structure 
of Article 10(2) 
 
In order for an interference with expression not to violate Article 10 it is necessary for the 
State to adduce that the interference was ‘prescribed by law,’364 genuinely pursued a 
legitimate aim365 and was ‘necessary in a democratic society.’366 The degree of scrutiny 
with which the Court makes its assessment of the State’s interference is, however, inversely 
proportionate to the degree of discretion afforded to the State under the principle known as 
‘the margin of appreciation’ doctrine. Put another way, the level of protection afforded to 
expression under Article 10 is largely dependent upon the scope of discretion bestowed on 
the State with regards to the fulfilment of its Convention obligations.  
 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is therefore, as Barendt notes, one of the most 
distinctive features of the Court’s approach to interpreting and enforcing the rights 
enshrined in the Convention.367 Whilst the doctrine is often referred to and relied upon in 
the Court’s case law, the margin of appreciation remains notoriously difficult to define with 
any degree of clarity. Morrisson has even gone so far as to contend that the doctrine is, “not 
                                                     
363 Barendt (n 27) at 44 
364 In defining the phrase ‘prescribed by law’, the judgment in The Sunday Times case (n 353) at 
para. 49, stipulates that the law pertaining to the expression’s interference must be ‘adequately 
accessible’ and ‘formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct.’  
365 The Sunday Times case (n 353) at para. 57. Under Article 10(2) the legitimate aims are: in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
366 For the interference to be considered necessary in a democratic society it must correspond to a 
‘pressing social need’, be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and the reasons adduced by 
the State must be ‘relevant and sufficient.’ See Handyside, paras. 48-50; The Sunday Times, para. 
62 
367 Barendt (n 27) at 66 
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capable of precise formulation,”368 whilst Lester has remarked that, “the concept of the 
margin of appreciation has become as slippery and elusive as an eel.”369 It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that through the application of this ‘elusive’ doctrine the Court has produced a 
series of judgments concerning not only freedom of expression in general, but the freedom 
of artistic expression in particular, that are poorly reasoned at best and contradictory at 
worst.  
 
Key to the concept of the margin of appreciation is the idea of subsidiarity or deference and 
as such it is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between the Court and the 
national authorities.370 Indeed, Marks has described this relationship as being one of the 
hallmarks of the model of democracy envisaged by the Convention’s drafters.371 Moreover, 
that the Court should be sympathetic towards a practice of deference finds some basis in 
Article 1 of the Convention itself which stipulates that, “[t]he High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in…this 
Convention.”372 As will become clear in the following discussion of the Court’s case law, 
the Court has thus recognised that it is for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of whether its actions complied with its obligations under the ECHR, albeit 
whilst simultaneously acknowledging that this deference goes hand in hand with European 
supervision.373  
 
In this respect, for O’Donnell, the margin of appreciation doctrine is a form of judicial 
review, in effect governing the degree to which the Court will scrutinise the practice of a 
State.374 Under such a view, the margin of appreciation may therefore be considered as a 
doctrine of judicial self-restraint.375 As Hutchinson confirms, “[t]he margin of appreciation 
then is more a matter of who takes the decisions, rather than what those decisions might 
be.”376 It will be argued, moreover, that the manner in which the Court has employed the 
                                                     
368 Morrisson, C. Margin of appreciation in human rights law 6 Human Rights Journal 263 (1973) 
at 284 
369 Lester, A. Universality versus subsidiarity: A reply, (1998) EHRLR 73 at 75  
370 Letsas, G. A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (2007) 80-
98. See also, Barendt (n 27) at 66, who argues that the doctrine emerged from the fact that the ECtHR 
is a supra-national court.  
371 Letsas (n 370) at 2-3 
372 Art. 1 ECHR (1950) 
373 See, for example, Handyside, paras 48-49 (emphasis added) 
374 O’Donnell, T. The margin of appreciation doctrine: Standards in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (1982) HRQ 474 at 475 
375 Morrisson (n 368) at 275 
376 Hutchinson, M. The margin of appreciation doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights 
(1999) 48 ICLQ 638 at 640 (emphasis added) 
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margin of appreciation inherently weakens European supervision to the point where 
majoritarian values are given precedence over and above the individual’s right to freedom 
of (artistic) expression, without a proper analysis grounded in the liberal and egalitarian 
values that the Convention rights may be seen to promote. Given art’s tendency to provoke 
and instil agitation of social norms, the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation 
may therefore be considered to be an underlying factor contributing to artistic expression’s 
relatively under-protected protected status within Article 10.   
 
The application of the margin of appreciation as a tool for deference first emerged in the 
Court’s case law concerning derogations from the Convention in times of emergency under 
Article 15.377 Subsequently, the concept was transferred to cases in which it was considered 
that there was no consensus between member states on the issue at hand.378 Accordingly, 
as Letsas has summarised, “the Court’s standard approach…has been that the less 
consensus there is among Contracting States on the human rights issue raised by the 
applicant, the better placed the national authorities are to decide on it and the more 
deferential the Court should be towards them in its final judgement.”379 In other words, the 
margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities is variable depending on the 
(perceived) extent of European consensus regarding the issue at hand.  
 
Hutchinson suggests that the margin of appreciation, therefore, ought to be considered as 
an area of compliance.380 This position contrasts with that put forward by Mahoney, who 
maintains that the Convention standards act as a base or lower threshold, with the margin 
of appreciation being the area above that base in which the State is able to exercise 
discretion.381 Mahoney’s model does not, however, neatly correlate with the Court’s 
practice.382 Indeed, if the Court were to actually engage in determining a minimum, base-
level, it ought to be fairly clear – if not in the abstract then at least in specific cases – what 
that minimum level of protection actually is.383 Instead, as may be gleaned from the 
                                                     
377 For a survey of the margin of appreciation doctrine’s early development see Yourow, H.C. The 
Margin of Appreciation in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (1996) esp. at 15-24 
378 See Yourow (n 377) ar 30-31, where it is noted that the ‘consensus standard’ first appeared in the 
(non-Article 10) Belgian Linguistic case of 1968.   
379 Letsas (n 370) at 120-121 
380 Hutchinson (n 376) at 644 
381 Mahoney, P. Universality versus subsidiarity in the Strasbourg case law on free speech: 
Explaining some recent judgements (1997) EHRLR 364 at 369 
382 Hutchinson (n 376) at 642 
383 Hutchinson (n 376) at 643 
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following case law overview, the Court usually proffers, as Hutchinson observes,  vague 
and general insights in to the situation put before it.384  
 
Furthermore, Hutchinson contends that the ‘base-model’ proposed by Mahoney is further 
flawed by the fact that, as has been noted above, the Court usually employs the margin of 
appreciation to defer judgement; in effect leaving it to the national authorities (rather than 
the Court per se) to determine what the minimum standard of human rights protection in a 
given case actually is.385 It is, then, the very variability of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation as applied by the Court that necessarily rules out Mahoney’s ‘base-model’ as 
an accurate portrayal of the Court’s practice. As Hutchinson indeed points out in summary, 
“[t]here would be little point in the Court affording a particularly wide margin in some 
particular case, if the actual borderline between breach and compliance was fixed.”386 
 
Under Hutchinson’s preferred model, then, there is a central norm surrounded by the area 
of compliance within which the State enjoys a certain discretion in how it interprets and 
applies its Convention obligations. This model, whilst resembling more closely the actual 
practice of the Court, does suffer from one significant setback, namely that the central norm 
must necessarily remain unarticulated.387 Otherwise, it is argued, through its judgements, 
the Court might inadvertently indicate a ‘best practice’ that differs from the actual course 
of action taken by the national authority. The seeking to avoid such discrepancies therefore 
goes some way to explaining the Court’s preference of couching its judgements in wide 
and general terms.388 As we shall later see, this is especially evident in the Court’s reasoning 
in cases concerning artistic expression. For instance, in Otto-Preminger-Institut and 
Wingrove, in deferring judgement to the national authorities, the Court offered no reference 
as to what the expected standard actually was, instead stipulating only that the action taken 
was within the authority’s margin of appreciation or discretion. There is, running 
throughout its judgments, little sense of the Court attempting to delineate the actual 
boundaries of that margin. It is perhaps, therefore, with this in mind that Lester has 
consequently denounced the margin of appreciation as a ‘standardless doctrine.’389   
 
                                                     
384 Hutchinson (n 376) at 643 
385 Hutchinson (n 376) at 643 
386 Hutchinson (n 376) at 643 
387 Hutchinson (n 376) at 645 
388 Hutchinson (n 376) at 645 
389 Lester (n 369) at 75-76 
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Disparities within the discussions as to the precise, practical definition of the doctrine 
notwithstanding, it is clear that the margin of appreciation is variable in it application. More 
specifically, in noting that the margin of appreciation’s scope is affected by the degree of 
consensus existing on the issue at hand, it is possible to surmise that, as suggested by 
Robertson and Merrills’ analysis, the Court has granted a wider margin of appreciation 
(thus limiting the extent of its scrutiny) in relation to the protection of morals than in 
relation to the other limitation clauses found in Article 10(2).390 Whilst this suggestion will 
be explored in further detail below in the analysis of the Court’s case law concerning 
specifically artistic expression, for present purposes the idea that the margin of appreciation 
varies depending on the limitation clause relied upon by the State may be exemplified by 
comparing Handyside with The Sunday Times case. 391  
 
The Handyside case concerned a book aimed at adolescents that contained sections on sex 
and drugs that were deemed obscene by the national authorities under the relevant 
obscenity laws. Of particular significance in its finding that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 was the Court’s acceptance that, “it is not possible to find in the domestic law of 
the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals.”392 Consequently, 
the State authorities were deemed better placed than an international judge to determine the 
necessary requirements. A wide margin of appreciation was thus afforded to the national 
authorities to determine the best route to compliance with its Convention obligation which, 
incidentally, they were found to have not exceeded.  
 
By comparison, in The Sunday Times case it was found that, unlike in cases concerning 
morals, there was, “a fairly substantial measure of common ground” with regards the 
maintenance of the authority of the judiciary.393 Here, there was felt to be a far greater 
degree of objectivity as to the obligations required of the State due to the supposedly greater 
European consensus on the issue. The margin of appreciation was thus construed as being 
narrower than in Handyside and, as such, the Court felt confident in finding that the national 
authorities had overstepped its margin of appreciation, thereby paving the way to the 
Court’s conclusion that there had been a violation of Article 10. Accordingly, by comparing 
Handyside with The Sunday Times case, the margin of appreciation can be seen to fit 
                                                     
390 Robertson, A. and Merrills, J. Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1993) at 152  
391 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245 
392 Handyside, para 48 
393 Sunday Times, para 59 
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Hutchinson’s model of the doctrine as a variable area of compliance that is either expanded 
or contracted depending on the purported consensus regarding the matter at hand in light 
of the limitation clause relied on by the State. Moreover, as will become apparent below, 
that the variability of the margin of appreciation implicitly obscures the expected standard 
required by the Court for freedom of expression’s protection may be seen to inform much 
of the criticism of the Court’s Article 10 jurisprudence in general, the effect of which has 
led to specifically artistic expression’s precarious positioning within Article 10.  
 
Key to appreciating the limited scrutiny associated with the application of a wide margin 
of appreciation and artistic expression’s subsequently precarious status within the hierarchy 
of expression that has emerged from the Court’s Article 10 jurisprudence, is an 
understanding of the impact that the margin of appreciation has on the Court’s 
considerations regarding the necessity and proportionality of the interference. The doctrine 
of proportionality has been described as, “the other side of the margin of appreciation,”394 
such that its application is necessarily affected by the width of the margin of appreciation 
granted to the State in any given case. In other words, the Court’s deference to a State’s 
decision following the employment of a wide margin of appreciation necessarily precludes 
the Court from engaging in a meaningful assessment of the proportionality of the State’s 
interference. More specifically, when determining whether a given interference with 
Article 10 was, indeed, ‘necessary in a democratic society’, the implementation of a wide 
margin of appreciation prevents the Court from incorporating within its analysis adequate 
reference the liberal values inherent in the Convention, to the detriment of artistic 
expression.395  
 
That there is a correlation between the breadth of the margin of appreciation and the 
adequacy of the Court’s assessment of the interference’s necessity and proportionality is 
clear with reference to the case law. Whereas, under Fenwick and Phillipson’s analysis, in 
the Sunday Times case – in which a narrow margin of appreciation was applied – the Court 
directed itself along the lines of whether the interference was something akin to being 
‘absolutely necessary’, under the wide margin of appreciation found in Müller, the Court 
simply asked whether the Swiss courts were ‘entitled’ to believe that the interference was 
                                                     
394 Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR cited in Letsas (n 370) at 86 
395 See, for example, Letsas (n 370) at 17 
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necessary.396 As Fenwick and Phillipson go on to point out, the question asked in Müller is 
markedly different to that asked in Sunday Times.397  
 
It is evident, therefore, that the application of a wide margin of appreciation has significant 
ramifications for the protection of expression vis-à-vis the degree of scrutiny with which 
the Court will approach its determination of whether the interference was ultimately 
necessary in a democratic society. Moreover, it is suggested that the ramifications of the 
margin of appreciation’s expansion in instances concerning morality is of acute concern 
for specifically artistic expression. In as much as artists consider themselves to be, as 
Turner posits, something of a ‘consciousness of society’398 their works will (perhaps 
inevitably) have moral implications. As such, under the Court’s application of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, artistic expression suffers an implicit and indirect disadvantage 
precisely because of art’s inherent value. It is therefore important to attempt to distil, from 
its jurisprudence, the core values pertaining to the Court’s appreciation of Article 10. In so 
doing, not only will artistic expression’s precarious protection within Article 10 be further 
emphasised but a foundation will be established from which to advocate for art and artistic 
expression’s greater protection in future cases.  
 
3.4.3 Distilling the core values of Article 10: Political Expression 
 
That political expression can be seen to lie at the apex of the European Court of Human 
Rights can be seen throughout its case law, dating back to at least 1986 and the seminal 
case of Lingens v. Austria. The case of Lingens concerned the publication of two articles 
entitled ‘The Peter Case’ and ‘Reconciliation with the Nazis, but how?’ both of which 
featured in the political magazine Profil. 399 The articles were published against the 
backdrop of a recent general election, which had led to talks being held between Mr Peter 
(President of the Austrian Liberal Party) and Mr Kreisky (Chancellor and President of the 
Austrian Socialist Party) over the possible formation of a coalition government. The former 
article made particular emphasis of Mr Peter’s membership of the first SS infantry brigade 
during the Second World War, pointing out that whilst Mr Peter must be allowed the 
presumption of innocence, the particular SS brigade in question had been involved in 
                                                     
396 See Fenwick, H. and Phillipson, G. Media freedom under the Human Rights Act, OUP (2006) at 
58 
397 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 396) at 58 
398 Turner (n 297) at 314 
399 Lingens v. Austria 8 EHRR 103 (1986), paras 12-19 
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several massacres of civilians behind the German lines in Russia.400 Accordingly, in the 
opinion of Mr Lingens, Mr Peter was unsuited to be an Austrian politician.401 Furthermore, 
the article went on to criticise Mr Kreisky, accusing him of protecting Mr Peter, as well as 
other former members of the SS for political purposes.402 
 
The second article, Reconciliation with the Nazis, but how?, again criticised Mr Kreisky 
for his support of Mr Peter in addition to his accommodating attitude towards former Nazis 
in Austrian politics more generally.403 The article went on to make general arguments 
concerning Austria’s history and relationship with the Nazism.404 In particular, comment 
was made on Austria’s, collective inability to come to terms with its past, such that the 
possibility remained open of falling into a fascist movement in the future.405 Moreover, 
according to the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment, “In the author’s opinion, by 
sheltering behind the philosophic alternative between collective guilt and collective 
innocence the Austrians had avoided facing up to a real, discernible and assessable guilt.”406 
Additionally, the point was stressed that one had to volunteer to join the special units of the 
SS, in contrast to the regular forces of army.407 The implication presumably being that Mr 
Peter was in some way more morally responsible for the atrocities committed by the Nazis 
than others, and therefore unsuited for public life. Finally, the article commented on 
Austrian political parties more generally, criticising them for the presence of Nazis in the 
high echelons of their parties.408 That the articles may be regarded as broadly political, both 
in terms of their content and the medium through which the expression was made, is 
therefore clear.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, it was Mr Kreisky and not Mr Peter who brought the private 
prosecution in the present case, claiming certain passages of Mr Lingens’ articles to be 
defamatory. In the domestic courts it was found that the expressions accusing Mr Kreisky 
of, “the basest opportunism” in addition to being “immoral” and “undignified” were 
defamatory within the meaning of the relevant domestic legislation.409 In so finding, it was 
                                                     
400 Lingens (n 399) at paras 9 and 12 (It is important to stress that Mr Peter vehemently denied 
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402 Lingens (n 399) at para. 12 
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stressed that Mr Lingens had not produced any evidence to ascertain the truth of these 
expressions and in so doing, failed to take account of Mr Lingens’ argument that those 
expressions were value-judgments incapable of being verified in the normal sense.410 
 
In a statement highly reminiscent of Meiklejohn’s underlying theory of freedom of 
expression,411 the Court pronounced that, “Freedom of the press furthermore affords the 
public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and 
attitudes of political leaders.”412 Furthermore, and of particular relevance for the present 
purposes of distilling the underlying values of freedom of expression to inform the 
European Court of Human Rights’ application of Article 10, the judgment went on to assert 
that, “freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society 
which prevails throughout the Convention.”413 Thus, the infamous Handyside dictum, and 
its guarantees for offensive, shocking and disturbing expression, was said to be of 
particular importance to the freedom of the press.414  
  
By articulating the core value of Article 10 – within the context of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ commitment to democracy more generally – in terms of the ‘freedom of 
political debate’ the European Court of Human Rights proceeded with a de facto reduction 
in the margin of appreciation considered to be applicable to the State in such instances, 
thereby enabling a greater scrutiny and thus protection of Mr Lingens’ expression. 
Accordingly, the Court went on to assert that whilst the protection of the ‘reputation of 
others’ found within the limitation clauses of Article 10(2) certainly extended to politicians, 
those in the public eye had to be more tolerant of criticism than private individuals, such 
that the former’s right to protection of their reputation had to be weighed against the 
interests of free public debate.415  
 
                                                     
410 Lingens (n 399) at para. 26 
411 See, for example, Meiklejohn, A. The First Amendment Is An Absolute (1961) Sup. Ct. Rev. 245  
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Accordingly, Mr Lingens’ criticisms of Mr Kreisky were subject to the limitations of 
Article 10(2) and it was for the Court to engage in an assessment of whether the criminal 
conviction was a proportionate response given the circumstances. In finding the conviction 
to be unnecessary in a democratic society the Court disagreed with the assessment made 
by the domestic courts that, since there were numerous ways in which one might interpret 
Mr Kreisky’s behaviour, to assert one possible interpretation to the exclusion of others was 
illogical, such that the statements amounted to defamation.416 In essence, the government 
sought to argue that Mr Lingens had failed to establish proof that his ‘interpretation’ was 
the only objective conclusion that could be reached.  
 
Instead, however, the European Court of Human Rights maintained that, “a careful 
distinction needs to be made between facts and value-judgments,” before going on to 
explain that, “The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value-
judgments is not susceptible of proof.”417 Since the facts from which Mr Lingens derived 
his conclusion were undisputed and the article written in good faith, the Court considered 
that Mr Lingens had not exceeded the protective scope of Article 10.418 Moreover, the Court 
stressed that the domestic legislation that formed the basis of the applicant’s conviction, 
which by its very nature required an onus of truth was inherently in tension with the right 
to freedom of thought, which in turn is a fundamental component of Article 10.419  
 
The Court’s judgement in the Lingens case can therefore be seen to give particularly strong 
protection to freedom of expression, especially on matters of public interest, in which the 
underlying, preeminent value associated with Article 10’s freedom of expression is seen to 
lie in the contribution to be made to a public discourse on matters of public interest. The 
strength of the protection is all the more striking given the fact that the decision was 
unanimous, with a bench consisting of eighteen judges. Moreover, in line with the 
theoretical framework for the variability of protecting expression derived from the theses 
of Blocher, Schauer and Sunstein, the rationale employed by the Court in Lingens will be 
seen to have had a significant impact on the categorisation of expression more generally, 
as clearly indicated by the development of its case law concerning commercial expression 
in which the proximity with which the expression is seen to contribute to the notion of 
public discourse is of considerable import.   
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Thorgier Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992)420 
 
That political expression is seen to be of particular significance as a category of expression 
for the purposes of Article 10 is further evinced by the case of Thorgier Thorgeirson v. 
Iceland. In Thorgeirson the applicant, described in the judgment as a writer, wrote two 
articles for a daily newspaper on the subject of police brutality – following a number of 
allegations made in the press and the conviction of a police officer – in which he described 
the police, inter alia, as ‘wild beasts in uniform’ and ‘brutes and sadists’, for which he was 
subsequently convicted on the basis of defaming members of the police force.421 During 
the period in question, the subject of the police’s behaviour was, as such, a topic of 
considerable public interest and discussion. 
 
In its submissions, the government sought to argue that Mr Thorgeirson’s expression could 
not be described as falling within the ‘category of political discussion’ warranting an 
especially high level of protection before going on to proffer that ‘political discussion’ be 
described as the “direct or indirect participation by citizens in the decision-making process 
in a democratic society.”422 As such, comparisons may be drawn between the argument 
advanced by the Icelandic government and a narrow reading of the Meikljohnian position 
outlined in Chapter One, locating the value of freedom of expression in its contribution to 
the democratic process.423  
 
In refusing to accept the government’s assertions, the European Court of Human Rights 
instead placed considerable emphasis on the form and medium through which the 
expression was made, noting that, “[r]egard must…be had to the pre-eminent role of the 
press in a State governed by the rule of law.”424 Moreover, the Court asserted that the 
government had erred in its argument that a distinction be drawn between political 
discussion and other types of discussion, stipulating that, “there is no warrant in [the] case 
                                                     
420 Thorgier Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) (HUDOC) 
421 Thorgeirson, paras. 7-28 
422 Thorgeirson, para. 61 
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law for distinguishing, in the manner suggested by the government, between political 
discussion and discussion of other matters of public concern.”425 
 
That the European Court of Human Rights refused to be drawn on the Icelandic 
government’s attempts to attribute a lower degree of protection to Mr Thorgeirson’s 
expression on account of distinguishing it from the category of political expression proper, 
is therefore of some significance for the present purposes of distilling the Court’s 
methodology regarding the categorisation of expression more generally. Whilst the Court’s 
rationale should not be confused with a refusal to distinguish between different types of 
expression per se it remains indicative of the importance of expression’s contribution to a 
discussion of matters of public concern that will become especially apparent in the 
discussion to follow regarding commercial expression. Accordingly, given the ‘pre-
eminent role’ played by the press in a democratic society and the subject matter addressed 
in the articles being of “serious public concern” the Court concluded, vis-à-vis a close 
analysis of the State interference’s proportionality and necessity, that there had been a 
violation of Article 10.426 
 
Ceylan v. Turkey (1999)427 
 
The applicant in the case of Ceylan – the president of the petroleum workers’ union – wrote 
an article that was subsequently published in the weekly newspaper New Land in July of 
1991.428 The article – entitled The time has come for workers to speak out – tomorrow it 
will be too late – set out Mr Ceylan’s position concerning the plight of the Kurdish 
community both domestically, with regard to the “steadily intensifying State terrorism” of 
the Turkish government, as well as internationally at the hands of Saddam Hussein and ‘US 
imperialism’.429 In particular, Mr Ceylan sought to criticise the intention and application of 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, legislation that he contended, “is aimed at crushing not 
only the struggle of the Kurdish people, but the struggle of the whole working class and 
proletariat for subsistence, for freedom and for democracy.”430 In that connection, and in 
response to the State’s aim of “gag[ging] and suffocate[ing]” the Kurdish people, Mr 
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Ceylon concluded his article by, “calling on all our people and all the forces of democracy 
to take an active part in this struggle.”431 
 
Following the publication of the article, Mr Ceylan was convicted by the Istanbul National 
Security Court of the offence of “incit[ing]…people to hatred or hostility on the basis of 
distinction between social classes, races, religions, denominations or regions”, a charge that 
brought with it heightened sanctions on account of it having been made by means of mass 
communication.432 In reaching the conclusion that the applicant had incited the population 
to hatred and hostility by making distinctions based on ethnic or regional origin or social 
class the court made particular note of those passages in the article which it interpreted as 
suggesting that, “…genocide [was] being carried out against the Kurds in Turkey…” and 
that an attempt was being made to, “…gag and suffocate the Kurdish people,” a conclusion 
that the appeal court upheld.433 As a result, Mr Ceylan served a prison sentence of one year 
and eight months, in addition to being fined 100,000 Turkish liras.434 Moreover, as result 
of the conviction, Mr Ceylan was legally unable to remain in office as a union president as 
well as losing certain civil and political rights, including the right to establish 
‘associations’, trade unions or political parties or indeed even join a political party, in 
addition to being unable to stand for election to Parliament.435 
 
By an overwhelming majority of sixteen votes to one, the Court, sitting as a Grand 
Chamber, held there to have been a violation of Mr Ceylan’s right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In its assessment of the 
necessity of the interference as a means to ensuring the legitimate aims relied on by the 
State, the Court noted that, “The article in issue took the form of a political speech, both in 
its content and in the kind of terms employed.”436 In this regard, the applicant’s use of 
“words with Marxist connotations,” was interpreted by the Court as an attempted 
explanation of the upsurge in violence in certain areas of Turkey, with the main thrust of 
Mr Ceylan’s argument being construed as imploring the Kurdish movement to join “a 
general struggle for freedom and democracy being waged by the Turkish working class and 
its economic and democratic organisations.”437  
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Whilst the style of the article was acknowledged as being ‘virulent’ and ‘acerbic’ – in 
particular with regard to the references to “bloody massacres” and “State terrorism” – the 
Court nonetheless stressed that, “there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention 
for restrictions on political speech or on debate of public interest.”438 Furthermore, after 
recognising that, “the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the 
government than in relation to a private citizen or even politician”, the Court went on to 
remark that, “[i]n a democratic system the actions or omissions of the government must be 
subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of 
public opinion.”439 Accordingly, whilst the State is charged with the responsibility of 
guaranteeing public order, such that it enjoys a wider margin of appreciation in instances 
of incitation to violence, and whilst the Court acknowledged the particular challenges 
facing Turkey at the time (as evinced by the sheer volume of cases presented to the Court 
emanating from Turkey at the material time), it remained unconvinced that the actions 
taken were proportionate to aims pursued.440  
 
Thus, with regard to the limited scope available to the State with regards to placing 
restrictions on political expression, the Court placed particular emphasis on Mr Ceylan’s 
status as a union-leader, a position in which he was a, “player on the Turkish political 
scene” as well as the observation that, although virulent in tone, the article fell short of 
encouraging the use of violence or armed resistance or insurrection.441 Furthermore, the 
nature and severity of the penalties imposed on Mr Ceylan led the court to conclude that 
the conviction was disproportionate to the aims pursued and thus was not necessary in a 
democratic society.442 
 
Although agreeing with the Court’s conclusion that there had indeed been a breach of 
Article 10, Judges Palm, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Greve reached the conclusion 
by different means, subscribing instead to the methodology proposed by Judge Palm in her 
partial dissent in the case of Surek v. Turkey (No. 1). Accordingly, for the concurring 
judges, too great a weight was ascribed to, “the form of words used in the publication and 
insufficient attention [paid] to the general context in which the words were used and their 
                                                     
438 Ceylan, op cit, paras. 33-34 (Citing Wingrove v. UK, para. 58) 
439 Ceylan, op cit, para. 34 
440 Ceylan, op cit, para. 34-38 
441 Ceylan, op cit, para. 36 
442 Ceylan, op cit, para. 38 
126 
 
likely impact.”443 Thus, “An approach which is more in keeping with the wide protection 
afforded to political speech in the Court’s case-law is to focus less on the inflammatory 
nature of the words employed and more on the different elements of the contextual setting 
in which the speech was uttered.”444 In this regard and in the contextual assessment of a 
given expression, it was proposed that a more nuanced analysis of various factors, including 
the speaker’s intentions regarding the incitement of violence; speaker’s status, the impact 
of the medium, and proximity to violence (akin to Mill’s corn dealer example) is required 
in order to distinguish the merely offensive and shocking language that is protected under 
Article 10 and that expression which is not.445 
 
3.4.4 Overview of the primacy of political expression 
 
The brief overview of case law concerning political expression above sought to emphasis 
the primacy with which political expression is considered within the European Court of 
Human Rights’ interpretation of Article 10. Accordingly, whilst the Court cannot be said 
to have developed a position approximating that of a categorical-absolutist position – 
according to which the recognition of a given expression as ‘political’ would automatically 
guarantee its protection – political expression nevertheless can be seen to enjoy a privileged 
position within the framework of Article 10. Thus, political expression is considered to lie 
at the core of the values imbued in Article 10 which in turn works to reduce the margin of 
appreciation open to State authorities in the limitation of an individual’s right to freedom 
of expression vis-à-vis the ‘limited scope…for restrictions on political speech or on debate 
on matters of public interest mantra; the concomitant result being a thorough judicial 
examination of the interference at hand and a de facto high level of protection for political 
expression.  
 
In order to place the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to categorising expression 
and the attribution of varying degrees of protection in a more comprehensive context, in 
which the significance of the primacy placed on political expression is acutely seen, it is 
instructive to consider the case law concerning commercial expression. By noting the 
extent to which a given example of commercial expression can be regarded as aligning with 
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Article 10 core values of contributing to public discourse on matters of public interest the 
theoretical approach underpinning the European Court of Human Rights doctrine on 
categorising expression will, accordingly, be seen to accord substantially with the these 
provided by Blocher, Schauer and Sunstein.  
 
3.4.5 Distilling the core values of Article 10: Commercial Expression 
 
X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden (1979)446 
 
Whilst commercial expression was not explicitly recognised as falling within Article 10’s 
ambit until the landmark case of Markt Intern in 1989, two earlier decisions – one 
pertaining to the now defunct Commission, the other a judgment of the Court itself – are 
particularly worthy of note. Indeed, the inclusion of X. and Church of Scientology and 
Barthold in the survey of the Court’s case law is critical, for the sentiments enounced 
therein can be heard reverberating throughout the Court’s subsequent case law.  
 
Some eight years prior to the Court’s decision in Markt Intern – in which the European 
Court of Human Rights first confirmed commercial expression’s existence within the 
contours of Article 10 – the Commission had occasion to consider the novel issue of 
commercial expression and its relationship to freedom of expression within Article 10 more 
generally in the case of X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden. There, following 
complaints to the Consumer Ombudsman, an injunction was obtained prohibiting the 
applicants (a pastor of the Church of Scientology and the Church of Scientology itself) 
from using ‘certain passages’ in an advertisement contained within a periodical of the 
Church of Scientology which was circulated among the Church’s members.447 The 
advertisement in question was for an ‘E-meter’ – a device said to indicate whether or not 
the user has been ‘relieved of the spiritual impediment of his sins’448 – and read as follows: 
 
Scientology technology of today demands that you have your own E-meter. The 
E-meter (Hubbard Electrometer) is an electronic instrument for measuring the 
mental state of an individual and changes of the state. There exists no way to clear 
without an E-meter. Price: 850 CR. For international members 20% discount: 780 
CR. 
 
                                                     
446 X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden (1979) (HUDOC) 
447 X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden, p. 2 
448 X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden, p. 2 
128 
 
Fundamental in its reaching the conclusion that the State’s interference with the applicant’s 
right to freedom of expression was not disproportionate – the concomitant result being that 
the application was declared inadmissible – was the Commission’s willingness to endorse 
a lower level of scrutiny with regards to whether or not the interference was necessary in a 
democratic society. In particular the Commission sought to justify this lower level of 
scrutiny on two grounds. Firstly, the Commission stipulated that ‘significance’ be attached 
to the fact that the ‘ideas’ expressed in the present case were communicated in the context 
of a commercial advertisement.449 As such, whilst the Commission accepted that the 
commercial context of the expression did not preclude Article 10 protection per se, the 
level of protection to be afforded to such expression was nevertheless explicitly considered 
to be less than that afforded to political expression. In particular, the Commission asserted 
that:  
 
[T]he level of protection must be less than that accorded to the expression of 
‘political’ ideas, in the broadest sense, with which the values underpinning the 
concept of freedom of expression in the Convention are chiefly concerned.450 
 
Thus, the lower protection of commercial expression is justified by Commission, in 
accordance to the thesis outlined by Blocher, Schauer and Sunstein, with reference to the 
proximity of the expression to the core values of Article 10, identified here as being the 
promotion of ‘political ideas’, albeit broadly construed.  
 
Secondly, in addition to doctrinal considerations of the proximity of commercial expression 
to the values of freedom of expression more generally, the Commission proffered an 
institutional argument in justification of the lower level of scrutiny to be applied with 
regards to interferences with commercial expression in this particular case. Accordingly, a 
lower level of judicial scrutiny of the domestic courts’ rationale was considered apt given 
the empirical observation that there existed in most European countries legislation allowing 
for the restriction of the free flow of commercial ideas in the interest of protecting 
consumers from ‘misleading or deceptive practices.’451 In other words, the State’s margin 
of appreciation was considered to be relatively wide. 
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Therefore, given both the nature of the expression and the level of pan-European uniformity 
on the specific issue of misleading and deceptive advertising, the level of scrutiny which 
the Commission was willing to employ was tempered by its attributing ‘considerable 
weight’ to the analysis and findings of the domestic court.452 Thus, since the domestic court 
had justified the granting of the injunction on various and, presumably, relevant grounds – 
including the protection of consumers (especially in the religious context in which the 
consumer was considered to be “particularly susceptible to selling arguments”) from 
misleading advertising453 – the Commission was reluctant to question the necessity of the 
interference. Indeed, this reluctance was further strengthened by the acknowledgment that 
the domestic court had pursued a measure that was, in the circumstances, the least 
restrictive to freedom of expression open to it. In this regard, the Commission noted that 
the applicants had not been prohibited from advertising the E-meter per se, the injunction 
merely stipulating that ‘certain passages’ be proscribed, as well as the fact that the 
injunction had not been accompanied by a fine.454 
 
Accordingly, whilst the rationale employed by the Commission in X. and Church of 
Scientology v. Sweden can be seen to evince the variability of protection in accordance with 
the theoretical framework ascribed by the likes of Blocher, Schauer and Sunstein, there 
remains a degree of confusion in which the distinction between the right’s coverage and its 
protection appears to have been somewhat blurred. Whilst the Commission’s analysis was 
indeed framed within the theoretical basis outlined above – such that the expression was 
not deemed to be unprotected per se albeit subject to a lesser degree of protection than 
political expression – the Commission’s refusal to actively engage in an assessment of the 
necessity and proportionality of the State’s interference with the applicant’s freedom of 
expression vis-à-vis the emplacement of a wide margin of appreciation, may be regarded 
as a de facto refusal to accept commercial expression as expression for the purposes of 
Article 10.   
 
Barthold v. Germany (1985)455 
 
Following the Commission’s decision that the Article 10 application in X. and Church of 
Scientology v. Sweden was manifestly ill-founded, the first opportunity for the Court to 
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address the issue of commercial expression came with the case of Barthold. Predating 
Markt Intern by some four years, the approach taken by the Court in Barthold remains 
instructive in going some way to explaining the treatment of commercial expression in 
Strasbourg. Accordingly, the value placed on the expression’s capacity to contribute to 
public discourse, absent in X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden above, will be seen to 
be instructive in prompting greater judicial scrutiny by the European Court of Human 
Rights and a concomitant increase in level of protection.  
 
The applicant, Dr Barthold, was a veterinary surgeon whose practice, in contrast to most 
other veterinary practices in the Hamburg area, offered a twenty-four-hour emergency 
service. In his capacity as a member of the Hamburg Veterinary Surgeons’ Council, the 
applicant had long campaigned for a compulsory, regular round-the-clock emergency 
service based on a rota system among all the practices in Hamburg, but to no avail.456 A 
journalist from a local daily newspaper wrote an article outlining the problem of seeking 
emergency veterinary treatment after normal working hours as well as noting proposals to 
introduce new legislation regulating night time veterinary services. The general issue was 
highlighted with reference to the plight of Shalen the cat whose owner, distressed after 
several unsuccessful attempts of finding a vet willing to treat Shalen after hours, ‘struck 
lucky’ in finding Dr Barthold. The article continued with the printing of portions of an 
interview with Dr Barthold in which he expressed his belief that there ought to be a regular 
veterinary service out with normal hours, as well as suggesting that there is a demand for 
such a service given that his clinic received between two and twelve calls per night.457 
 
Following complaints from local veterinary surgeons, proceedings were initiated against 
Dr Barthold under unfair competition legislation, it being claimed that the article in 
question gave favourable publicity to Dr Barthold’s clinic at the expense of other veterinary 
surgeries in the area. An injunction preventing Dr Barthold from reasserting passages from 
the impugned article was then subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
 
In its assessment of the applicability of Article 10 to the facts of Barthold, the Court was 
confident in concluding that the present case fell within the scope of Article 10 without 
needing to ascertain whether or not commercial advertising per se was indeed covered by 
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freedom of expression guarantees.458 In its submissions to the Court, the government had 
argued that at least some elements of Dr Barthold’s interview could not be said to concern 
the exchange of ideas of the sort protected by Article 10.459 Nonetheless, the Court reasoned 
that, whilst there were indeed ‘various components’ to the article, including ‘certain factual 
data and assertions regarding…[Dr Barthold]…and the running of his clinic,’ it was not 
possible to dissociate those elements considered by the domestic courts as having a 
publicity-like or advertising effect from those in which Dr Barthold’s ‘opinion’ or ‘ideas’ 
were being conveyed. In short, all the components comprised in the article made a whole, 
the underlying gist of which was described by the Court as, “the expression of ‘opinions’ 
and the imparting of ‘information’ on a topic of general interest.”460  
 
Moreover, that the expression in question fell on the side of expression of opinions on a 
matter of general interest, and thus within the accepted confines of Article 10, was further 
evinced, for the Court, by the fact that the expression was contained in the form of a 
newspaper article, written by a journalist, and not a commercial advertisement per se.461 
Accordingly, whilst the case of Barthold is therefore not, strictly speaking a case of 
commercial expression, the Court’s approach in its determination of the applicability of 
Article 10 is interesting in as much that it may be seen as decisive, or at least influential, in 
the Court’s subsequent reasoning concerning the more substantive aspects of the case.  
 
Moving on to the substantive question of whether there had been a breach of Article 10 – 
it being confirmed that there was an interference, 462 that the interference was prescribed 
by law,463 and that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others464 – the Court held, by a majority of five votes to two that the interference in question 
was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and thus not necessary in a democratic 
society.465 Underlying the Court’s reasoning in reaching its decision was the development 
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of its position, first set out in its consideration of the applicability of Article 10, with regards 
to the inherent nature or quality of the expression at issue.  
 
Thus, whilst the Court appreciated that Dr Barthold had not been prohibited from publicly 
expressing his opinion on the issue at hand per se, the injunction nevertheless did seek to 
prevent him from drawing on his own professional experiences in order to highlight his 
concerns; the publicity gained from doing so was considered to be only incidental to the 
primary content and nature of the article such that the domestic courts were held to have 
failed to strike a fair balance between the two interests at stake.466 Moreover, and at a more 
fundamental level, the Court was critical of the strict requirements concerning the 
advertising of the liberal professions, stipulating that they were, “not consonant with 
freedom of expression.”467 In particular, the Court noted that the status quo would tend to 
discourage professionals’ contribution to public debate in addition to hampering the press 
in its role as ‘purveyor of information’ and as public watchdog. Again, it may reasonably 
be inferred that a given expression’s contribution (or perceived capacity to contribute) to 
public discourse is considered a fundamental prerequisite in prompting a greater judicial 
scrutiny of the interference and thus greater protection for freedom of expression. 
 
In considering the Court’s approach to the categorisation of expression Barthold is, then, 
of keen interest. The reasoning employed by the Court is crucial for understanding the 
Court’s subsequent approach to commercial expression precisely, although somewhat 
paradoxically, because of its reluctance to consider the case through the lens of 
‘commercial expression’. Indeed, aware that the Court would be forced to address the issue 
of commercial expression more directly in the future, Judge Pettiti’s insightful concurring 
opinion is obliquely critical of the Court’s reasoning, expressing his regret that the Court 
had not been more explicit on the issue. Affirming that commercial expression is ‘directly 
connected’ to freedom of expression, understood as the right to receive and impart 
information, Judge Pettiti went on to assert that: 
 
The great issues of freedom of information, of a free market in broadcasting, of the 
use of communication satellites cannot be resolved without taking account of the 
phenomenon of advertising; for a total prohibition of advertising would amount to 
a prohibition of private broadcasting, by depriving the latter of its financial 
backing.468 
                                                     
466 Barthold, op cit, para. 58 
467 Barthold, op cit, para. 58 




Thus, whilst conceding that regulation of commercial expression is indeed appropriate and, 
moreover, that it may be “afforded a different degree of protection to that granted in respect 
of the press”, Judge Pettiti nevertheless maintained that such expression still falls within 
the protection of Article 10. Accordingly, any restrictions on commercial expression, in 
line with the general Article 10 jurisprudence, ought to still be required to meet a ‘pressing 
social need’ and not be merely expedient.  
 
Notwithstanding the divergence of methodology inherent in the positions taken by the 
majority in Barthold and of Judge Pettiti’s concurring opinion, the case of Barthold remains 
demonstrative of a broad convergence with the theoretical framework provided with 
reference to the theses of Blocher, Schauer and Sunstein: namely that the level of an 
expression’s protection will largely depend on its perceived correlation with the underlying 
values of Article 10. From the preceding discussion of the cases of X. and Church of 
Scientology v. Sweden and Barthold we may begin to surmise that the values inherent in 
Article 10, to which expression must be considered to align, can broadly be interpreted in 
line with the Meiklejohnian and Weinsteinian conception of freedom of expression as 
contribution to public discourse.  
 
Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klauss Beermann v. Germany (1989)469 
 
With Judge Pettiti’s suggested rationale in mind – according to which commercial 
expression is said to relate directly with freedom of expression – it is time now to consider 
the seminal case of Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klauss Beermann v. Germany. Like 
Barthold, unfair competition legislation prompted the granting of an injunction against 
Markt Intern, an organisation which, amongst other activities aimed at promoting the 
interests of small and medium sized retail businesses, published weekly news-sheets 
concerning specialised commercial sectors and general consumer information.  
 
One such news-sheet contained a short article in which a named cosmetic beauty mail-
order company was criticised after a customer, dissatisfied with the service she had 
received having returned an item, had brought the issue to the attention of Mark Intern. The 
article concluded with an appeal for any similar examples concerning the company in 
question to be reported to Mark Intern, noting that, “[t]he question of whether or not this 
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incident is an isolated case or one of many is crucial for assessing the [mail-order 
company’s] policy.”470 
 
The mail-order company duly brought proceedings against Markt Intern under unfair 
competition laws, with the Federal Court ruling that Markt Intern refrain from the future 
publication of the statements made in the complained of article, with a failure to comply 
resulting in a fine or period of imprisonment. In reaching this decision, and in overturning 
the lower court’s previous decision, the Federal Court reasoned that, by working to promote 
the interests of a certain commercial sector, Markt Intern had sought to undermine the 
interests of the appellant mail-order company such that it had not simply been acting as an 
organ of the press and that the unfair competition laws could therefore be said to apply.471 
 
Notwithstanding the Government’s argument that the nature of Markt Intern’s activities 
placed the content of the impugned expression “at the extreme limit of Article 10’s…field 
of application,” the Court accepted that the article, whose content was recognised as being 
commercial in its nature, could not be said to be excluded from the scope of Article 10.472 
Despite the article being addressed only to a limited, specialised audience and not the 
general public per se, Article 10 was still considered to be applicable, owing to the fact that 
its protective coverage, “does not apply solely to certain types of information or ideas or 
forms of expression.”473  
 
Having established, for the first time, that Article 10 was indeed applicable in the context 
of commercial expression, the bulk of the remaining reasoning centred on whether the 
interference was necessary in a democratic society. In so doing, the Court adopted what 
has been described as the ‘non-substitution principle’,474 under which the Court defers to, 
and refuses to engage with, the domestic courts’ judgment. In particular, in Markt Intern, 
the Court exercised the non-substitution principle by way of the margin of appreciation, 
which it described as being, “essential in commercial matters and, in particular, in an area 
as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition.”475 Therefore, the Court surmised 
that it, “must confine its review to the question [of] whether the measures taken on the 
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national level are justifiable in principle and proportionate,” and not engage in a “re-
examination of the facts and…circumstances of each case.476  
 
As such, and with regards to the proportionality of the interference, the key requirement 
stipulated by the Court was, uncontroversially, that both the interests of protecting the 
reputation and rights of others as well as the interest of publishing the information in 
question be weighed.477 Notwithstanding the importance of the specialised press in 
providing a channel of information to its clientele and in ensuring transparency in the realm 
of commercial and business undertakings, the Court went on to note that, “even the 
publication of items which are true and describe real events may under certain 
circumstances be prohibited.”478 Thus, in this regard, privacy, confidentiality, the inclusion 
of value judgments or insinuations and the hasty generalisation of a state of affairs from an 
individual set of circumstances were all considered to be factors of relevance in the 
balancing exercise required in the assessment of proportionality, in the ‘commercial 
context’.479 Such considerations are not controversial and are not unique to the commercial 
context. However, in line with the non-substitution principle outlined above, the Court 
acceded that, “it is primarily for the national courts to decide which statements are 
permissible and which are not.”480 Accordingly, since the Court accepted that the national 
courts had indeed considered such factors in the weighing of the competing interests (such 
that the domestic court’s decision could not be said to be unjustifiable in principle) the 
Court was satisfied – by a remarkably slim majority, in which the casting vote was placed 
by the President of the Court – in finding there to have been no violation of Article 10.481 
Despite locating commercial expression within the parameters of Article 10, by applying a 
wide margin of appreciation with its accompanying demonstration of institutional 
deference in which the Court bound itself to a lax level of review, commercial expression 
was found to enjoy a relatively low de facto protection. 
 
That the Court was so divided is perhaps not surprising given the relative novelty of the 
issues presented before it. Conversely, the extent of the division suggests that the dissenting 
opinions – which broadly concurred with one another – are of considerable weight, if not 
for their authority than for their persuasiveness. With regards to the necessity of the 
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interference in a democratic society, the joint dissent, which included Judge Pettiti, aligned 
itself with Pettiti’s Barthold opinion by criticising the majority’s failure to convincingly 
establish the necessity of the injunction; the test being, for the dissenting judges, that of 
demonstrating a ‘relevant and sufficient’ justification for the interference and not merely 
that the  interference was reasonable, as acceded by the Court’s application of the non-
substitution principle.  
 
Furthermore, from a more theoretical perspective, the importance of commercial 
expression as a facet of freedom of expression more generally is stressed in the joint 
dissenting opinion, it being maintained that commercial expression is equally as important 
as political expression in that it can be seen to serve the general interest: that the expression 
at issue defended a given interest, economic or otherwise, was not considered sufficient 
reason to deprive it of the benefits accrued under Article 10. In this regard, freedom of 
expression in the commercial context was considered, in the dissent, to be an ‘invaluable 
tool’ in the protection of consumers and retailers, in addition to ensuring the openness of 
business activities.  
 
Moreover, the joint dissenting opinion describes the majority’s application of the margin 
of appreciation as “a cause for serious concern” owing to the ‘considerable’ restrictive 
effect it was seen to have on freedom of commercial expression in addition to its application 
precluding the Court from discharging its function of European supervision. Such a failing, 
in the present case at least, may well be considered as especially worrying given that, for 
the dissenting judges, the domestic courts had in fact failed to consider the interests of the 
applicant during the balancing process. Affording a wide margin of appreciation thus 
rendered the Court powerless to inquire in to this claim. Indeed, Judge Pettiti develops the 
argument further in his individual dissenting opinion, asserting that to allow a wide margin 
of appreciation in the area of competition law because of the areas’ complexities is to offer 
the State the possibility of defending a specific interest: a state of affairs antithetical to the 
values underlying freedom of expression. Furthermore, such a position is all the more 
concerning given the immense economic pressure that commercial groups can yield, 
potentially degrading truth as well as even being harmful to public health.  
 
Identifying the importance of commercial expression within the general freedom of 
expression nexus is further developed in the separate dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, 
as approved by Judge Macdonald. Particular attention is directed to the fundamental tension 
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between unfair competition legislation and freedom of expression, noting the dangers of 
attributing a blanket lower level of protection to commercial expression. At the procedural 
level, Judges Martens and Macdonald, for instance, note that the laws of unfair competition 
and freedom of expression are fundamentally incompatible with each other. Unfair 
competition laws, as Judge Martens points out, start from the assumption that competitors 
seek only to serve their own interests at the expense of others in the market, such that there 
is a presumption in favour of prohibiting criticism with the onus lying on the person making 
the criticism to prove that there are sufficient grounds to allow the criticism. On the other 
hand (and conversely) it is said that freedom of expression presumes that a given expression 
is made in the general interest, the result being that it is for an individual (qua the State) to 
adduce that the expression in question was not acceptable. Accordingly, for Judges Martens 
and Macdonald, the Court in a sense misdirected itself in accepting that the proper approach 
was simply to weigh the interests of the two ‘competitors’. Instead, the balance should have 
been between the general interest ensuing from the expression and the interest of the 
individual company. As such, according to Judges Martens and Macdonald, the Court 
should have started from the premise that there had been a significant defect in the 
reasoning of the domestic courts which would, in turn, have severely limited the 
applicability of the margin of appreciation, rather than limiting itself from the outset the 
introduction of a narrow margin of appreciation. 
 
Casado Coca v. Spain (1994)482 
 
In the case of Casado Coca, the applicant, a practising lawyer, was subjected to disciplinary 
proceedings by the Barcelona Bar Council following his placement of advertisements 
offering his services in several newspapers, contrary to a ban on professional advertising. 
The series of advertisements contained only the applicant’s name, profession, address, and 
telephone number.483 After an unsuccessful appeal against the Bar Council’s penalties, 
which included two reprimands and two warnings, to the National Bar Council, the 
applicant sought redress through the national courts, with a similar degree of success, with 
the Constitutional Court rejecting as inadmissible Mr Casado Coca’s appeal. There, the 
court reasoned that the ban on professional advertising did not infringe the right to freedom 
of expression since advertising “directly or indirectly promot[es] the conclusion of 
contracts relating to movable or immovable property, services, rights or obligations” 
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whereas, in contrast, freedom of expression sought to guarantee citizens to “form their 
beliefs by weighing different or even diametrically opposed opinions and thus taking part 
in the discussion of public affairs.”484   
 
Building on the disparity, as perceived by the Spanish constitutional court, between 
advertising and the sort of information covered by freedom of expression guarantees, the 
government sought, simply, to argue that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. 
In particular, the government sought to argue that advertising did not fall under the ambit 
of Article 10, primarily on the grounds that advertising does not seek to serve the public 
interest but, rather, the interests of individuals through the obtaining of more clients and 
contracts.485 Indeed, the government went so far as to assert that: “Applying the guarantees 
of Article 10…to advertising would be tantamount to altering the scope of that Article…”486 
 
In light of Markt Intern, however, the Court was not persuaded by the Government’s 
contentions. In developing the position that Article 10 is indeed applicable in the context 
of commercial expression, the Court reasoned that Article 10 was explicitly applicable to 
everyone such that, “[n]o distinction is made [in Article 10] … according to whether the 
type of aim pursued is profit-making or not.”487 Moreover, the Court added that, “a 
difference in treatment in this sphere might fall foul of Article 14…” and its guarantees 
regarding non-discrimination in the application of Convention rights.488  
 
Accordingly, the Court noted the assertion made in Markt Intern that freedom of expression 
is not limited to certain ideas and types or forms of expression before adding the further 
assertion, absent in Markt Intern, that this was especially so with regards to those 
expressions of a political nature.489 In line with Markt Intern, whilst the insertion of the 
preference for political expression is perhaps indicative of a general unease with affording 
commercial expression the same degree of protection as political expression, it remains 
accepted that commercial expression nevertheless falls within Article 10’s parameters. That 
this was so with regard to the facts presented to the Court was further justified by the 
Court’s acknowledgment that, whilst Mr Casdado Coca’s notices were, “clearly published 
with the aim of advertising, […] they provided persons requiring legal assistance with 
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information that was of definite use and likely to facilitate their access to justice.”490 Thus, 
since the advertisements satisfied the low threshold seemingly required for entry in to 
Article 10’s protective sphere, in line with the Markt Intern judgment, the Court was 
satisfied that Article 10 was indeed applicable.  
 
Notwithstanding the low threshold required to gain entry to the benefits accrued in Article 
10, the government’s plea of a large margin of appreciation in the context of commercial 
expression was successful, with the Court holding by a majority of five votes to two that 
there had been no violation of Article 10. Citing the Court’s previous assertions regarding 
the margin of appreciation in Markt Intern, the Court reasoned that the wide margin 
afforded to national authorities in the realm of unfair competition legislation applied, 
mutatis mutandis, to the regulation of advertising.491 Thus, the Court confined itself, again, 
to the task of, “ascertaining whether the measures taken at [the] national level are justifiable 
in principle and proportionate.”492 
 
After noting the qualifications implicitly inherent in commercial expression (with the 
rejoinder of the ‘close scrutiny’ of any restrictions thereafter) the Court paid close attention 
to the state of flux across Europe with regards to the regulation of professional advertising, 
especially that of lawyers, such that, at the material time, the national authorities could not 
have been said to have transgressed the bounds of their (considerable) margin of 
appreciation – the Bar Council recognised as being best placed to strike an appropriate 
balance between the various interests at play given their direct and continuous contact with 
their members.493 Indeed, it was precisely this variable and organic state of flux in the area 
of lawyer’s advertisements that added, in the majority’s mind, to the ‘complexity’ of the 
issue, and as such worked to expand the national authorities’ margin of appreciation. As 
such, the ban on advertising (itself not being absolute) was not considered to be 
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Jacubowski v. Germany (1994)494 
 
Decided in the same year as the factually similar case of Casado Coca, the case of 
Jacubowski concerned the applicant’s circulation of press cuttings and additional 
comments critical of his former employer to a number of newspaper publishers and 
television, radio and newspaper journalists who were clients of the former employer’s news 
agency from whom the applicant had recently been dismissed on grounds of alleged 
financial incompetency. In so doing, the applicant had sought to defend himself against the 
allegations made in a press release published by his former employer in which Mr 
Jacubowski’s professional competence was called to question, as well as indirectly 
outlining his intention to establish a new news agency. Subsequently, the former employer 
succeeded in obtaining an injunction preventing Mr Jacubowski from re-distributing the 
circular under unfair competition legislation, the domestic court accepting that, whilst there 
was an element of providing a counter-argument to his dismissal, the primary intention had 
been that of ‘poaching’ the clients of the applicant’s former employer. 
 
In recalling the assertion made four months previously in Casado Coca that Article 10 
applies to everyone, the Court went further, explicitly affirming that: 
 
[t]he fact that, in a given case, … freedom [of expression] is exercised other than 
in the discussion of matters of public interest does not deprive it of the protection 
of Article 10[…]495 
 
Whilst ‘non-public interest’ expression is not to be considered as falling out with the scope 
of Article 10’s protection per se, its protection – or perhaps more accurately, its level or 
degree of protection – is subject to the qualification inherent in the application of the 
margin of appreciation. Thus, citing Markt Intern, the Court went on to reassert the 
importance of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the commercial context, 
especially given the complex and fluctuating nature of unfair competition laws such that, 
once more, “[t]he Court must confine its review to the question whether the measures taken 
at national level are justifiable in principle and proportionate.”496 
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Accordingly, in light of the lax level of review considered appropriate in the present 
instance, the Court had little difficulty in finding there to have been no violation of Article 
10. Since the domestic courts were considered to have attributed sufficient weight to the 
applicant’s situation and interests, and since the injunction was limited in so far as it did 
not prohibit the applicant from criticising his former employer per se, the national 
authorities could not have been said to have acted disproportionately in pursuing the 
legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others.497 
 
Once again, the majority’s application of the margin of appreciation was a cause for 
consternation in the dissenting opinion of Judges Walsh, Macdonald, and Wildhaber. By 
limiting itself to a lax review under the auspices of an overreliance on the margin of 
appreciation the majority, according to the dissenting voices, overlooked the ‘guiding light’ 
of the principles pertaining to freedom of expression. The Court’s failure to ensure that 
exceptions to the fundamental right be construed narrowly, in line with the principles 
espoused in the Sunday Times case (concerning a newspaper’s investigation in to the effects 
of thalidomide), coinciding with the unduly deferential stance taken by the Court with 
regard to the judgments of the national courts, was tantamount, according to the dissent’s 
fears, to conceding that the principles of freedom of expression had been reduced to the 
exception whilst unfair competition laws become that of the norm.  
 
With regard to the facts of Jacubowski, and bearing in mind its position concerning the 
proper application of the margin of appreciation, the dissent considered there to be nothing 
untoward in the applicant’s expression, either in terms of its content or form. That the 
circular was distributed in response to criticisms of his professional capabilities, so that the 
applicant was seen to be protecting both his reputation as well as future prospects of 
pursuing similar employment, were considered by the dissenting judges to be legitimate 
motives that were so intertwined as to make it impossible to separate the advertising or 
competitive element from the ‘pure’ expression of opinion. Since the applicant had merely 
reproduced newspaper cuttings, in addition to making some minor comments, Mr 
Jacubowski could not be said to have acted excessively of improperly. Indeed, to suggest 
otherwise, as both the national courts and the Court in fact did, would seem to have the 
logically perverse effect of rendering unfair competition legislation with the capacity of 
making unlawful the distribution of lawful newspaper articles. This effect, in which the 
Court’s acceptance of the national authorities’ preponderance for the competitive element 
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of the circumstances so as to reduce the principle of freedom of expression to the level of 
an exception, whilst elevating the unfair competition legislation to the level of a rule, 
cannot, so the dissenting judges surmise, be said to be demonstrative of a proper European 
supervision. 
 
Hertel v. Switzerland (1998)498 
 
Following his research in to the effects of microwave cooking on human health, Mr Hertel’s 
paper – in which the safety of microwaves was questioned on the grounds of an apparent 
link between their use and the initial stages of cancer – was published in a periodical as 
part of an issue devoted to the safety of microwaves. Acting on complaints from microwave 
producers, the Swiss Association of Manufacturers and Suppliers of Household Electrical 
Appliances (MHEA) successfully obtained an injunction under unfair competition 
legislation preventing the applicant from reiterating certain of the comments made in the 
publication.  
 
In finding that the injunction amounted to a violation of Article 10 the majority were keen 
to distinguish Hertel from the previous cases of Mark Intern and Jacubowski. 
Notwithstanding the necessarily broad margin of appreciation in the commercial context in 
addition to the assertion made in Jacubowski itself that an expression’s lacking of an 
element of public interest did not preclude Article 10’s protection, the Court in Hertel 
sought to narrow the margin in the present case, maintaining that: 
 
what is at stake is not a given individual’s purely “commercial” statements, but his 
participation in a debate affecting the general interest, for example, over public 
health; in the instant case, it cannot be denied that such a debate existed.499 
 
With the margin of appreciation having been calibrated accordingly, the Court went on to 
assert that it would ‘carefully examine’ the proportionality of the interference in pursuing 
the legitimate interest enshrined in Article 10(2) of protecting the rights of others.500 As 
such, in balancing the conflicting interests at stake, the Court noted that the applicant had 
done no more than submit a scientific paper for publication in a periodical, the published 
form in which the article took, along with its images and headlines, being beyond the 
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applicant’s control. What’s more, it was recognised that the content of the paper was largely 
written in a non-affirmative tone, so that many of the applicant’s assertions were worded 
conditionally, such that Mr Hertel’s findings merely indicated that microwave cooking 
‘might’ correspond to the initial stages of cancerous developments before indicating that 
research in the area was worthy of further attention.501  
 
Furthermore, and in-keeping with the scope attributed to the margin of appreciation in the 
present case, the Court was considerably more willing to ‘review’ the decisions of the 
national courts than it had previously demonstrated. In particular the Court noted that it had 
not been sufficiently established that the publication of Mr Hertel’s paper had had any 
significant impact on the interests of members of the MHEA such that there was considered 
to be a disparity between the legitimate aim pursued and the measures taken against the 
applicant.502 Therefore, and in light of the potentially significant punishment attached to 
the non-compliance of the injunction’s terms, the Court was comfortable in challenging the 
State’s view as to the necessity of the interference, leading to the finding that the injunction 
was disproportionate and thus incompatible with Article 10.  
 
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (2001)503 
 
Despite the assurances made in Jacubowski that a lack of public interest attributable to a 
given expression would not render it out with Article 10’s protective sphere, the case of 
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland would seem to indicate the contrary, in 
line with Barthold and Hertel. In response to a number of television commercials fronted 
by the meat industry, the applicant association – whose stated aim is the protection of 
animals, especially in the context of animal experimentation and industrial meat production 
– sought to broadcast its own television commercial.504 The proposed commercial 
comprised of two scenes. Set in a forest, the first scene showed a sow building a shelter for 
her piglets, the overdubbed voice commenting on the sense of family pertaining to sows 
whilst, in stark contrast, the second scene of the minute long advertisement depicted, “a 
noisy hall with pigs in small pens, gnawing nervously at the iron bars,” with the 
accompanying voice asserting that the pigs were ‘pumped full of medicaments’ and that 
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the rearing of pigs in such circumstances was akin to the treatment of those in concentration 
camps. The advertisement ended with the statement, “Eat less meat, for the sake of your 
health, the animals and the environment.”505 The request to have the advertisement aired 
on the only national, commercial television company in Switzerland was refused on the 
grounds of its ‘clear political character’ contrary to domestic legislation as well as the 
television company’s terms and conditions.506  
 
The case of VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland is interesting as much for the 
strategies adopted by the parties to the dispute as for the actual decision reached by the 
Court. Again, at the crux of the issue was the question of how the expression in question 
was to be defined, categorised and calibrated in terms of the appropriate level of protection 
to be afforded. Given the legislative framework within which the applicant association was 
engaged it is perhaps not surprising that it sought to distance the advertisement from any 
sense of ‘politicalness’ that may have been alluded to it, arguing simply that the 
advertisement in question was not ‘political’.507 The advertisement, according to the 
applicant, merely conveyed information, in particular by comparing how pigs behave in 
natural settings with how they are treated by humans for mass consumption. That there 
were possible political consequences emanating from such information was not sufficient, 
so the applicant argued, to label it as ‘political advertising’.508 By attempting to distance 
the commercial from any political connotations, the applicant’s strategy does, in this 
regard, seem rather at odds with the intuitions and observations outlined in the preceding 
discussions: namely, that political expression enjoys something of a privileged position.  
 
The conclusion reached by a unanimous, seven-member bench and, more importantly, the 
rationale employed in reaching it, returns us to more familiar territory. In setting out the 
framework within which its subsequent analysis would be based, the Court was keen – 
despite the applicant’s protestations to the contrary – to highlight the political nature of the 
expression in question. Firstly, during the initial stages of determining whether the State 
could even be considered potentially liable509 the Court, answering in the affirmative, set 
the scene for later analysis by stating that, “In effect, political speech by the applicant 
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association was prohibited.”510 Secondly, and more pertinently for present purposes, in 
calibrating the scope of the margin of appreciation, the Court noted that, whilst the margin 
of appreciation was ‘particularly essential’ in the realm of ‘commercial matters’, in the 
present case the expression, “fell outside the regular commercial context [of] inciting the 
public to purchase a particular product.”511 Instead, the advertisement was considered to 
have portrayed, “controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in general.”512 Indeed, 
the fact that that the Swiss authorities themselves had considered the commercial’s content 
as being ‘political’ (and thus justifying the prohibition of its broadcast in light of the general 
ban on political advertisements) seems to have given the Court further impetus to affirm 
that the commercial sought to contribute to a debate of common public interest.513 
Accordingly, since the interest at stake was that of participation in a debate affecting public 
interest and not mere individual, commercial interests, the margin of appreciation was 
reduced.514 
 
Having established a ‘reduced’ margin of appreciation, the Court paved the way for finding 
a violation of Article 10, announcing that it would, as was also the case in Hertel, “examine 
carefully” the proportionality of the interference.515 Fundamental to the Court’s careful 
examination was its assessment of whether the general reasons for the prohibition on 
political advertising could be considered relevant and sufficient when applied to the specific 
facts of the present case. It was not questioned that there may well exist good reason for 
the prohibition of political advertisements – indeed, many member states do so to varying 
degrees – what was at issue, rather, was whether those reasons justified this particular 
prohibition. In justifying the general prohibition of political advertisements on television, 
the Swiss government appealed to the notions of protecting public opinion both from 
financially powerful groups and undue commercial influence, the promotion of equality of 
opportunity amongst various groups, and the independence of broadcasters.516 Such 
justifications, when considered in light of the instant circumstances, were not considered 
by the Court to be relevant and sufficient. There was no indication put forward by the 
government that any of the justifications for the general prohibition on political 
advertisements could be said to apply in the present circumstances. Indeed, for the Court, 
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“all the applicant association intended to do with its commercial was to participate in an 
ongoing general debate on animal protection and the rearing of animals.”517 As such, this 
particular prohibition of a ‘political’ commercial could not be said to be necessary in a 
democratic society and a violation of Article 10 found.518 
 
Stambuk v. Germany (2002)519 
 
In Stambuk the Court once again had to consider the question of commercial expression in 
the context of unfair competition legislation, this time in light of the applicant’s 
contribution to a newspaper article on the use of laser eye surgery. The article, which was 
accompanied by a photograph of the applicant – an ophthalmologist specialising in the 
practice of laser eye surgery – referred to Dr Stambuk having treated over 400 patients with 
a 100 per cent success rate, the effect of which was ascertained by the national courts as 
going beyond the expression of merely objective information on a medical operation and 
was, instead, more akin to publicity, with the applicant said to have, “deliberately acted so 
as to give prominence to his own person.”520  
 
Given the similarities between Stambuk and Barthold it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Court held, this time unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 10. However, 
Stambuk remains important in so much as the Court further developed its position on the 
appropriate treatment of commercial expression within the confines of Article 10. Indeed, 
in setting out the general principles to be applied to the present case, the Court outlined the 
importance of commercial expression in general, “recall[ing] that, for the citizen, 
advertising is a means of discovering the characteristics of services and goods offered to 
him.”521 Whilst acknowledging that certain circumstances may require restrictions on such 
speech, the Court went on to assert that, “[a]ny such restrictions must, however, be closely 
scrutinised by the Court.”522 Under this ‘close scrutiny’ the Court sought to distinguish the 
present case from the comparable case of Casado Coca primarily on the grounds that, 
whilst there was little in the way of pan-European consensus on the regulation of 
professional legal activities, the same was not comparably true of the medical profession.523 
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In so doing, the Court effectively paved the way for a finding of a violation of Article 10 
by reducing the scope of the margin of appreciation and thus enabling itself to actively 
engage in an assessment of the complained of measure. Furthermore, that significance was 
attached to the, “essential function fulfilled by the press in a democratic society” is of 
interest in as much as it may prove to be indicative of the bolstering of the Court’s 
underlying theory of freedom of expression more generally, with specific impact on the 
issues surrounding the categorisation of expression. There is, as we shall see, a seemingly 
underlying notion in Stambuk – as indeed there was with Barthold and Hertel – of the 
Court’s consideration of the case as being concerned with public interest rather than 
commercial expression per se.  
 
Whilst the Court acknowledged that the reasons adduced by the government in pursuing 
the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression were relevant, they were 
deemed to be insufficient. Fundamental to the Court’s reasoning in finding there to have 
been a violation of Article 10 was the supposed impossibility, again, of differentiating the 
various elements that made up the whole of the expression in question. Again, as in 
Barthold, any publicity like effect that the article may have had was considered secondary 
to the underlying point of the article, which concerned, “a new laser operation technique to 
correct the defective vision of patients and was thus informing the public on a matter of 
general medical interest.”524 Under the ‘close scrutiny’ afforded to the Court in the current 
case, the facts were considered such as to tip the balance of proportionality in the 
applicant’s favour. Accordingly a number of factors were considered – including, inter alia, 
that the article was written by a journalist, acting on her own initiative; that the article was 
generally written in such a way as to indicate, as its underlying purpose, the informing of 
the public on the specific issue of new techniques in eye surgery; that references to Dr 
Stambuk’s success rate were an integral part to the article – his experience being an 
important factor in the presentation of a new operation; similarly, the photograph of the 
applicant, taken in a ‘professional context’ was considered as being ‘closely related’ to the 
contents of the article; and, finally, the possibility of a fine – all of which, in an unanimous 
decision, led the Court to find that the restrictions imposed on Dr Stambuk were 
disproportionate with regard to pursuing the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others.525 Moreover, at a more conceptual level and echoing the dissenting opinions in 
Jacubowski, the Court was again critical of the overzealous rigour with which unfair 
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competition legislation was being applied in the context of the medical profession, in terms 
of its impact on freedom of expression.526 
 
Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG v. Austria (No. 3) (2003)527 
 
The Court’s case law, as developed from Barthold to Stambuk, would seem to indicate that, 
whilst coming within the parameters of Article 10, unless it can be sufficiently 
demonstrated that it contains a sufficient degree of ‘public interest-ness’, commercial 
expression remains subjected to a relatively lower level of protection vis-à-vis the widening 
of the margin of appreciation and a concomitantly lax degree of judicial scrutiny. Thus, to 
summarise, the expressions conveyed in Barthold, Hertel, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken 
and Stambuk, were all protected owing in large part to their capacity to contribute to a 
matter of public interest; whereas, conversely, in those cases in which there was deemed to 
be little in the way of such a contribution – such as Markt Intern, Casado Coca and 
Jacubowski – no violation of Article 10 was found. However, the case of Krone Verlag, 
decided only a year after Stambuk, offers something of an anomaly. 
 
In Krone Verlag, the applicant company – owner of the newspaper Neue Kronenzeitung – 
published an advertisement in its newspaper, the content of which compared its 
subscription rates to those of another newspaper – the Salzburger Nachrichten – in addition 
to describing Neue Kronenzeitung as ‘the best’ local newspaper.528 The Salzburger 
Nachrichten was subsequently successful in obtaining an injunction that stipulated, inter 
alia, that Neue Kronenzeitung refrain from further publication of similar advertisements 
comparing the prices of newspapers without also referring to the differences between those 
papers in terms of their respective reporting styles with regard to the coverage of domestic 
and foreign affairs, economics, culture, science, environmental issues and so on.  
 
Therefore, whilst accepting that the newspapers were in competition with each other, one 
of the fundamental aspects of the injunction was to ensure that the differences between the 
newspapers be made sufficiently clear. Underlying this notion was the acceptance, by the 
national courts, that the advertisement was, in a sense misleading, in as much as the 
Salzburger Nachrichten, in contrast to the Neue Kronenzeitung, was considered to be a 
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‘quality’ paper such that comparing the prices of the newspapers, without reference to such 
aspects of the newspapers’ content and style, was considered unfair.  
 
In a unanimous decision of seven judges, the Court held that the injunction (or at least that 
part of the injunction complained of) violated Article 10. Noting the domestic courts’ 
emphasis on the differential quality of the two newspapers concerned, the Court highlighted 
a certain, logical contradiction in their reasoning. In particular it does seem somewhat 
confusing to suggest that it was misleading to compare the prices of the two newspapers 
on account of their incomparable quality whilst simultaneously accepting that the two 
newspapers were in the same market competing for the same customers.529 Moreover, the 
Court – concerned with the potential ‘quite far-reaching consequences’ – described the 
injunction as being ‘far too broad’.530 In particular the Court was concerned that the 
injunction’s ‘highly difficult’ requirements of spelling out the differences between the 
newspapers placed too great an onus on the applicant. This burden placed on the applicant, 
in light of the not inconsiderable penalty for failure to comply, led the Court to affirm that 
the national authorities had overstepped its margin of appreciation, despite its width in the 
realm of unfair competition and advertising, to the extent that it could not be said that the 
injunction met a pressing social need and was necessary in a democratic society.531 
 
Given that – notwithstanding the width of the margin of appreciation in the commercial 
context, and the fact that the specific expression was not deemed to be contributing to a 
discussion of public interest – the Court still felt comfortable in engaging with the domestic 
courts’ decision with regards to the proportionality and necessity of the interference, Krone 
Verlag may well mark the beginnings of ‘pure’532 commercial expression’s strengthened 
position within the Article 10 framework. Given its surrounding jurisprudence, noted 
above, it remains too early, however, to fully account for the extent to which Krone Verlag 
(No. 3) will impact on the Court’s approach to the categorisation and the subsequent 
attribution of varying levels of protection to the various types of expression in future, 
factually similar cases.  
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Swiss Raelian Movement v. Switzerland (2012)533 
 
That Krone Verlag (No. 3) is something of an anomaly in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ approach to categorising and protecting the various types of expression is 
seemingly confirmed in the Swiss Raelian Movement case, though it must be born in mind 
that the facts differ significantly from Krone Verlag (No. 3). Indeed, one may question 
whether the Swiss Raelian case actually concerns commercial expression at all. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s approach in this recent case remains instructive in aiding our 
understanding of its approach to categorising expression. 
 
In seeking to conduct a localised poster campaign, the applicant association requested 
permission from the relevant authorities to display their poster on public billboards for a 
specified duration. Permission to display the poster was subsequently denied by the 
authorities. The Raelian Movement, of which the applicant association was a national 
branch, is modern in origin and premised on the doctrine espoused by its self-professed 
leader Claude Vorilhon (known as ‘Rael’ to his followers) vis-à-vis his alleged contact with 
extraterrestrials. Fundamental to the Raelian movement’s credo is the belief that life on 
earth, including many of its traditional religions, was created by extraterrestrials with 
knowledge of ‘advanced technology’.534  
 
The poster in question was, in and of itself, neither unlawful nor gratuitously or 
provocatively offensive.535 It’s text simply stated, ‘The Message from Extraterrestrials’ and 
‘Science at last replaces religion’ in addition to including the website address and phone 
number of the organisation. Accompanying the text were the equally innocuous pictures of 
extraterrestrials, a pyramid and a flying saucer.536 Despite the seemingly placid, albeit 
alternative, nature of the poster the domestic courts were consistent in upholding the 
prohibition on the primary grounds of respect for morals and public (and/or legal) order. In 
particular, the domestic courts’ reasons for upholding the prohibition were threefold. 
Firstly, it had been observed that the website to which the poster intended to direct people 
to itself contained a link to Clonaid’s website, a company said to offer ‘cloning-related 
services to the general public,’ a practice made illegal by Swiss law537; second, was the 
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question of possible sexual abuse of children owing to the fact that ‘numerous’ members 
of the association had been investigated in this regard and; thirdly, the association’s 
promotion of geniocracy – a political philosophy under which it is maintained that power 
ought to rest only in the hands of those citizens whose mental capacities demonstrate above 
average IQ – was said to be ‘likely to undermine the maintaining of public order, safety 
and morality’.538 It is interesting to note, therefore, that the case brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights, whilst under the auspices of Article 10, did not actually 
concern the specific expression in question: that of pictures of aliens and predominantly 
inoffensive text. More interesting still, however, is the approach taken by the Court itself 
in affirming that there had been no violation of Article 10, one in which the categorisation 
of expression can be seen as having profound effects. 
 
In setting the field with regards to its assessment of the necessity of the interference in 
question, the Court noted, once more, that the margin of appreciation is variable, its width 
in any given case being dependant on various factors, though, of ‘particular importance’, 
is the type of speech concerned.539 In this regard it was noticed by the Court that, “Whilst 
there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions on political 
speech…a wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States 
when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate 
personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion…Similarly, States 
have a broad margin of appreciation in the regulation of speech in commercial matters or 
advertising.”540  
 
Given that the type of expression in question is of ‘particular importance’ in determining 
the requisite scope of the margin of appreciation, an examination of the conditions 
considered relevant in leading the Court in its determination of the classification of a given 
expression in concreto is crucial. In summary, the Court deduced that the expression in 
question, whilst neither political nor commercial per se, nevertheless was ‘closer’ to 
commercial expression than its political counterpart. A number of factors led a slim 
majority of the Court to reach this conclusion, with the concomitant result being that the 
margin of appreciation was duly widened. The Court’s reasoning, contained in a single 
paragraph, runs as follows:  
                                                     
538 Swiss Raelian Movement, op cit, para. 21 
539 Swiss Raelian Movement, op cit, para. 61 




Since the poster’s primary function was to draw people’s attention to the ideas and 
activities of the organisation, the website therefore ‘refers only incidentally to 
social or political ideas.’541  
 
Moreover, the Court asserted that the expression could not be considered ‘political’ 
because, “the main aim of the website…is to draw people to the cause of the applicant 
association and not to address matters of political debate…”542  
 
Conversely, the expression could not be said to be purely commercial on the grounds that, 
“there [was] no inducement to buy a particular product.”543 Nevertheless, the expression 
was considered to remain closer to commercial expression owing to its ‘certain 
proselytising function’.544  
 
With the margin of appreciation widened, the Court surmised that, “only serious reasons 
could lead it to substitute its own assessment for that of the national authorities.”545 In this 
regard, the Court distinguished the present case from that of Tuzel546 in which the 
prohibition of a (political) poster campaign was considered to be a breach of Article 10 
primarily on account of the lack of strict judicial scrutiny at the domestic level.547 The same 
could not be said, according to the Court, in the present case: detailed reasons were given 
by the local authorities, with the lower courts’ reasoning with regards to the three principle 
justifications having been sufficiently examined by the Federal Court which, in addition 
was also deemed to have considered, to a sufficient level, Article 10 considerations.548 
Thus, by defining and categorising the expression in such a way as to diminish any notion 
of the expression’s capacity to contribute to a discussion of public interest, and by locating 
the particular expression within close proximity to commercial expression and its generally 
wider margin of appreciation, the majority of the Court concluded that there had been no 
violation of Article 10. 
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3.4.6 Overview of the case law analysis 
 
Divining a lucent rationale from the Court’s case law with regards to the issue of 
categorising expression is an inherently fraught task, made all the more difficult because 
of the non-differentiated exposition of the right to freedom of expression contained within 
the text of Article 10. Nonetheless, the underlying and commonly held assumption – born 
out in the overview of the case law provided above – is that, whilst what constitutes 
‘expression’ for the purposes of Article 10(1) is construed quite broadly, incorporating a 
wide range of expression within the coverage of Article 10, a hierarchy has emerged from 
the application of Article 10(2) so as to afford differing levels of de facto protection 
(essentially by widening or narrowing the so-called margin of appreciation doctrine) of the 
different types of expression. In applying Schauer’s proposition that definition be parasitic 
on justification in conjunction with Sunstein’s thesis that expression’s protection be subject 
to the proximity with which it is considered to lie with Article 10’s underlying values, the 
preceding discussion of the prominent case law concerning the categorisation of expression 
would appear to indicate the recognition of the primacy of political expression and 
contribution to public discourse. As such, in defining the value of expression for the 
purposes of Article 10, significance is placed on the expression’s capacity to contribute to 
public discourse on matters of a broadly ‘political’ nature. 
 
In light of the case law analysis above, the variability of protection afforded to the different 
categories of expression is intricately related to the variability of the margin of appreciation 
and the concomitant variability of the degree of scrutiny with which the European Court of 
Human Rights will engage in its assessment of the necessity and proportionality of a given 
interference with a covered category of expression. Indeed, that the Court’s categorisation 
of a given expression as being political, artistic or commercial is of fundamental import is 
appreciated by Harris et al. who affirm that: “The nature of speech is crucial for assessing 
the Court’s standard of review.”549 In this connection, it will be remembered that the right 
to freedom of expression under Article 10 is a qualified right; that is to say that, in 
accordance with the limitation clauses of Article 10(2), the State may lawfully restrict an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression.  
 
Accordingly, the lawful restriction of the right to freedom of expression requires, under 
Article 10, that the restriction be prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society 
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in the interest, inter alia, of national security, protection of morals and the protection of the 
rights of others thus enabling the subsequent variability of protection afforded to expression 
by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights within Schauer’s ‘protection’ 
rubric and the proximity argument advanced by Sunstein. In determining whether a given 
State interference with freedom of expression is in fact necessary in a democratic society 
and proportionate in achieving a specific interest, the standards of review and the entailing 
rigour with which the Court will engage in its reasoning is intimately grounded in, and 
dependent upon, the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation principle. Indeed, it 
is the very variability of the margin of appreciation – designed by the European Court of 
Human Rights to defer to the judgment of national authorities – which, when applied to 
freedom of expression, may to a certain extent, account for the variability with which the 
different categories of expression are protected and the creation of a de facto hierarchy of 
expression.  
 
As the case law analysis above sought to establish, at the apex of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ protection of covered expression lies political/public interest expression. 
However, it was not until 1999 and the case of Ceylan v. Turkey550 that the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights confirmed the normative methodology (and indeed 
phraseology) – developed through the lower courts since at least the mid-1980s – by which 
the high level of protection afforded to political expression and, conversely, the relatively 
low degree of protection afforded to artistic and commercial expression was explicated.551 
Thus, it will be remembered that in the case of Ceylan the Grand Chamber affirmed that:  
“there is little scope under Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention for restrictions on 
political speech or on debate of matters of public interest,”552 thereby working to reduce 
the margin of appreciation available to State authorities in limiting such expression.  
 
In narrowing the State’s margin of appreciation vis the mantra of there being ‘little scope’ 
for restrictions on political expression and debate on matters of public interest the Grand 
Chamber directly cited the terminology employed in the case of Wingrove v. UK553 which, 
in turn, developed the articulation of the ‘little scope’ mantra from the underlying positions 
implicit in its early judgments of, inter alia, Lingens and Thorgeirson. That the ‘little scope’ 
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mantra enounced in Wingrove and confirmed in Ceylan emerged from these cases is 
therefore somewhat indicative of an application of the theses provided in the works of 
Blocher, Schauer and Sunstein according to which the perceived values underpinning 
Article 10 are of significant import for the subsequent level of protection afforded to a 
given category of expression. Thus, the European Court of Human Rights’ recognition that 
“freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which 
prevails throughout the Convention,” in Lingens, in conjunction with the “[r]egard 
must…be had to the preeminent role of the press in a State governed by the rule of law”554 
enounced in Thorgeirson were of fundamental significance in the narrowing of the State’s 
margin of appreciation, thereby affording the European Court of Human Rights greater 
scope for actively engaging in an assessment of the proportionality and necessity of the 
interference in question.  
 
Accordingly, whilst it is accepted that political expression is not immune entirely from 
State interference, the general tenor of the Court’s reasoning from Lingens to Ceylan can 
be seen as requiring particularly strong grounds for State interference in the expression of 
what may be considered as broadly political. To paraphrase a synthesis of the theses of 
Schauer and Sunstein, with the close proximity of political expression to the perceived 
underlying purpose of Article 10, particularly onerous justification for its restriction is 
required under the contraction of the margin of appreciation.   
 
As such, the ‘little scope…for restrictions on political speech’ mantra based, in turn, on the 
proximity with which such expression is considered to advance the values underpinning 
Article 10’s freedom of expression, may be considered as providing a benchmark against 
which one can measure the scope of the margin of appreciation to be applied to the various 
forms of expression and the concordant degree of scrutiny with which the European Court 
of Human Rights will assess a given interference with the right to freedom of expression. 
Thus, in the context of commercial expression, the analysis provided above suggests that 
the extent to which the expression is perceived to have the capacity of contributing to public 
discourse is crucial in the determination of the width of the margin of appreciation and 
subsequent de facto protection.  
 
The variability of the margin of appreciation is, as such, most clearly seen in the 
development of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence concerning 
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commercial expression, according to which the extent to which the expression contributes 
to public discourse plays a crucial determinative factor. For instance, the rationale 
employed by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Markt Intern which, 
despite its conceptual novelty at the time, remains a defining case, stipulated that a wide 
margin of appreciation was “essential in commercial matters and, in particular, in an area 
as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition.”555 The wide margin of 
appreciation available to States on questions of what might be described as ‘pure’ 
commercial expression may be contrasted with commercial expression that contains a 
sufficient public interest-ness. Thus, the margin of appreciation was narrowed in such cases 
as Barthold (newspaper article referring to the applicant’s veterinary surgery), Hertel 
(research on the effects of microwave ovens), VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (television 
commercial concerning animal rights) and Stambuk (doctor’s contribution to a newspaper 
article on laser eye surgery) in large part because the public interest aspects in each instance 
were seen to override the expression’s purely advertising or commercial aspects.   
 
Therefore, in advancing a differentiated scale of protection to the varying categories of 
expression, vis-à-vis the expansion and contraction of the margin of appreciation, the Court 
may be seen to have, in general terms, established the framework with which to put 
Schauer’s coverage-protection distinction in to practice: the width of the margin of 
appreciation being intricately linked with the extent to which the expression is regarded as 
advancing the underlying values of Article 10. The impact with which the variability of the 
margin of appreciation may be seen to have on the de facto variability in the protection of 
different categories of expression will next be considered with reference to the variability 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ scrutiny of a given interference with an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
Corresponding with the variable margin of appreciation said to be enjoyed by State 
authorities in the limitation of the various types of freedom of expression is the extent with 
which the European Court of Human Rights feels comfortable in engaging with and 
examining the justifications for limiting Article 10 rights as proffered by the State. Thus, 
with the margin of appreciation narrowed in instances concerning political expression, the 
Court has stressed that there is a requirement of ‘the closest scrutiny’ on its part.556 The 
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‘close scrutiny’ with which the Court is seen to engage in the context of political expression 
is evidenced, as we have seen above, in the case of Ceylan.  
 
Thus, having noted the political nature of the expression with reference to the subject matter 
and specific terms employed by the applicant in his writing and having calibrated the 
margin of appreciation accordingly, in finding there to have been a violation of Article 10 
in Ceylan the degree of vigour with which the European Court of Human Rights engaged 
in its assessment of the State’s interference is considerable. In this regard, despite the 
‘virulent’ and ‘acerbic’ tone of the article with its reference to, inter alia, ‘bloody 
massacres’, ‘State terrorism’ and ‘genocide’ as well as the potential for the margin of 
appreciation to be widened in instances concerning the incitation of violence, the majority’s 
judgment may be seen as ‘reading in’ an interpretation, or proffering an evaluation of, the 
expression in question, so as to align it with the notion that the applicant was contributing 
to a political debate of public interest. Indeed, the majority stipulated that the applicant’s 
use of ‘words with Marxist connotations’ may be considered as an attempt to explain then 
recent upsurges of violence in Turkey before summarising the thrust of Mr Ceylan’s 
argument as imploring the Kurdish movement to join, “a general struggle for freedom and 
democracy […].”557  
 
Accordingly, with the majority of the Grand Chamber reasoning that the expression fell on 
the side of acceptable political critique rather than a call for violence, one begins to sense 
a degree of circularity. By first classifying the expression as political on the basis of the 
speaker’s status (in this instance, a trade union leader) and the specific terms used in the 
article, a narrow margin of appreciation is assumed. With the narrowed margin of 
appreciation comes the dual effect of both limiting State discretion and increasing the 
scrutiny with which the Court feels comfortable in engaging with possible interpretations 
of and, indeed, intentions behind, the expression in question leading, in turn, to the 
acceptance that the expression was a genuine contribution to a political debate and not a 
call to violence so as to find protection within the implicit values of Article 10. 
 
The contrast in the variability with which the European Court of Human Rights is willing 
to engage with its assessment of the necessity of an interference depending on the category 
of expression at hand is again brought in to sharp relief by the Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning commercial expression. Thus, the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the 
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State with regards to the ‘pure’ commercial expression contained in Markt Intern – in which 
no violation of Article 10 was found – led the Court to surmise that it, “must confine its 
review to the question [of] whether the measures taken on the national level were justifiable 
in principle and proportionate,” whilst ensuring that it did not engage in a, “re-examination 
of the facts and…circumstances of the case.”558 Clearly, the Court in Markt Intern did not 
feel as confident as it had in Ceylan in addressing and engaging with the facts of the case: 
after all, in Ceylan, the Court went so far as to, in effect, overrule the national courts’ 
finding that the applicant’s expression had incited people to hatred or hostility.  
 
Indeed, by way of contrast, Harris et al. refer to Markt Intern as a prime example the Court’s 
application of what they call the ‘non-substitution’ principle which, as its name suggests, 
compels the Court to refrain from interfering with domestic decision.559 Thus, 
notwithstanding the recognition that the specialised press promoted transparency in the 
business sector, because of the relatively wide margin of appreciation in instances 
concerning commercial expression the Court was paralysed from as full an assessment of 
the facts as had been the case in, for instance, Ceylan. Indeed, such was the extent of this 
self-imposed paralysis that the majority in Markt Intern was, according to the joint 
dissenting opinion of Judges Martens and Macdonald, failed to appreciate the broader, 
underlying issues of the case including, primarily the necessary tension between freedom 
of expression and unfair competition. The result of Markt Intern therefore would seem to 
suggest, to all intents and purposes, a commercial expression-sized blind spot within the 
Article 10 paradigm.  
 
That the width of the margin of appreciation is seen to affect the level of scrutiny afforded 
to expression is further demonstrated by the jurisprudence emanating from the hybrid cases 
within the commercial expression paradigm such as Barthold, Hertel, VgT Verein gegen 
Tierfabriken, Stambuck and Swiss Raelian Movement. Accordingly, in the case of VgT 
Verein gegen Tierfabriken the restrictions on expression: “must…be construed strictly, and 
the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly, particularly where the nature 
of the speech is political rather than commercial.”560 Despite the prima facie 
commercialesque connotations of the applicant association’s advertisement, by 
determining the expression to be closer in essence to political expression, the margin of 
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appreciation was widened, thus prompting a close judicial analysis of the expression’s 
restriction. A similar process can be seen in the rationale employed by the European Court 
of Human Rights in Swiss Raelian Movement. In setting the field with regards to its 
assessment of the necessity of the interference in question, the Court noted, once more, that 
the margin of appreciation is variable, its width in any given case being dependant on 
various factors, though, of ‘particular importance’, is the type of speech concerned.561 In 
this regard the Court proffered a synthesis of the Ceylan/Wingrove/Markt Intern 
jurisprudence, noting that: 
 
Whilst there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions 
on political speech…a wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the 
Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters 
liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, 
especially, religion…Similarly, States have a broad margin of appreciation in the 
regulation of speech in commercial matters or advertising.562  
 
Given that the type of expression in question is of ‘particular importance’ in determining 
the requisite scope of the margin of appreciation, an examination of the conditions 
considered relevant in leading the Court in its determination of the classification of a given 
expression in concreto is crucial. In summary, the Court deduced that the expression in 
question, whilst neither political nor commercial per se, nevertheless was ‘closer’ to 
commercial expression than its political counterpart. A number of factors led the slim 
majority of the Court to reach this conclusion, with the concomitant result being that the 
margin of appreciation was duly widened. With the margin of appreciation widened, and 
in line with the preceding discussion, the Court surmised that, “only serious reasons could 
lead it to substitute its own assessment for that of the national authorities.”563 Thus, by 
defining and categorising the expression in such a way as to diminish any notion of the 
expression’s capacity to contribute to a discussion of public interest, and by locating the 
particular expression within close proximity to commercial expression and its generally 
wider margin of appreciation, so as to render the Court unable to more comprehensively 
engage in a thorough and critical assessment of the underlying freedom of expression issues 
arising from the circumstances of the case the majority of the Court concluded that there 
had been no violation of Article 10. 
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It will be clear, by now, that the European Court of Human Rights’ methodology in terms 
of the categorisation of expression is not reminiscent of an exact science. However, echoes 
of Schauer’s thesis concerning the importance of recognising the distinction between 
coverage and protection can be heard in the Court’s practice. Accordingly, the Court’s 
attribution of differing levels of protection to the various forms of expression – and the 
supposed creation of a hierarchy of expression – is not of doctrinal concern in and of itself. 
A differentiation in treatment may, as such, be justified, despite the non-differentiated text 
of Article 10, provided that this differentiation is rooted in the value/s considered to be 
enshrined in the right: definition is, as Schauer noted, parasitic on justification. Thus, 
instead of the existence of a binary scenario, in which expression is either protected or not-
protected, a sliding scale is in operation allowing for the variable protection of covered 
expression with reference to the proximity of a given expression to the underlying values 
of Article 10.  
 
To emphasise the point more abstractly, let us suppose that Article 10’s freedom of 
expression is said to encapsulate value ‘y’. A given expression, let’s say ‘expression 
correlating to y minus 1’, will therefore be afforded greater protection than ‘expression 
correlating to y minus 5’ which in turn will be afforded substantially more protection than 
‘expression correlating to y minus 25.’ In short, the more remote the expression in question 
is seen to align with the inherent values pertaining to the right of freedom of expression, 
the less protection that will be afforded by the Court vis-à-vis the widening of the margin 
of appreciation and correlating limited judicial scrutiny of the necessity and proportionality 
of the interference. 
 
With reference to the hybrid expression cases, therefore, the underlying presumption held 
by the European Court of Human Rights is that the value imbued in the freedom of 
expression guaranteed under the auspices of Article 10 relates, most prominently, to the 
information and ideas pertaining to public discourse of a political or public interest nature. 
Thus, in the Swiss Raelian Movement case, by surmising that the expression, made in the 
form of a poster, was closer to commercial expression, a wider margin of appreciation was 
applied and, in turn, proffered in a relatively lower degree of judicial scrutiny as to the 




The implications of the Court’s application of the coverage-protection distinction for 
artistic expression are therefore significant though nuanced. As we have seen in Chapter 
Two, artistic expression does have the capacity to communicate (whether emotions 
simpliciter or knowledge of a more cognitive nature) such that Article 10’s reference to the 
communication of ‘ideas’ and ‘information’ appears, in the abstract, to be applicable.  
 
Indeed, as we have seen above, this general hypothesis has been accepted by the Court, in 
its recognition, since the case of Müller, that artistic expression does fall within Article 
10’s coverage. Nonetheless, there has been little attempt made by the Court to establish 
precisely why artistic expression, as a distinctive category of expression, does in fact fall 
within Article 10’s scope. Moreover, in calibrating the scope of the margin of appreciation 
in any given case, it is not the form in which the expression is made per se that is 
determinative; the Court does not, for instance maintain that a wide margin of appreciation 
is applicable in instances concerning artistic expression. Rather, the width of the margin of 
appreciation is calibrated with reference to factors such as the subject-matter and the 
manner in which that subject-matter is expressed. Thus, artistic expression may be seen to 
subjected to an implicit widening of the margin of appreciation owing to the subjects 
commonly addressed in art (such as religion and morality) and the distinct way in which 
art conveys that expression.  
 
Having established the European Court of Human Rights’ doctrine concerning the 
categorising of expression, set against the backdrop of locating artistic expression within 
the freedom of expression paradigm, the stage is now set for a more thorough assessment 
























Having outlined the issues surrounding the question of categorising expression from both 
a theoretical and practical perspective in Chapter Three – noting, in particular, that under 
the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence the proximity with which expression 
is seen to correlate to expression of a political or public interest nature will profoundly 
affect the level of protection afforded – the discussion in Chapter Four centres on the 
specific treatment of art and artistic expression under Article 10. After a brief overview of 
the drafting process which culminated in the text of Article 10, with which all subsequent 
case law has developed, the remainder of the chapter will focus on an assessment of that 
jurisprudence in light of the opportunities missed within the drafting process. The 
examination of the prevailing case law will be assessed, predominantly, in line with the 
limitation clauses relied on by the State parties to the case: namely, on the grounds of 
protecting the rights of others – which is further subdivided in to cases concerning public 
morality/religion and defamation – as well as the protecting of national security, national 
integrity and the prevention of crime and disorder. Whilst it will emerge that artistic 
expression has, over time, found increasing favour in the Court (at least superficially) the 
particular reasoning employed by the majorities en route is certainly not without potential 
criticism.  
 
4.2 DRAFTING ARTICLE 10: AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED? 
 
It will be recalled that the text of Article 10 makes no explicit reference to art or, indeed, 
to any of the various, specific categories capable of falling within the holistic term of 
‘expression’ and its reference to the right’s inclusion of the communication of ‘ideas and 
information’. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter Three it is this very absence that, when 
coupled with Schauer’s maxim that all that is covered need not necessarily be protected, 
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has acted as the basis from which the European Court of Human Rights has established an, 
albeit largely implicit and nuanced, hierarchy of expression via its application of the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Yet, before turning to a closer examination of the 
specific treatment of the artistic endeavour under the Court’s jurisprudence a brief account 
of the drafting process that culminated in the wording of Article 10 as we know it today is 
instructive in aiding our appreciation, from a contextual and historical perspective, of the 
subsequent decades of arguably unsatisfactory case law pertaining to artistic expression.  
 
As the historian Robert Cowley surmised in his introduction to a collection of essays 
musing over historical ‘what ifs’, there commonly exists in peoples’ minds, “the impression 
that history is inevitable [and] that what happened could not have happened any other 
way.”564 That Article 10 transpired in the precise way that it did was, likewise, not 
inevitable. Indeed, as the narrative concerning Article 10’s drafting process will 
demonstrate below, for much of the drafting process art was incorporated in to the text of 
what would become Article 10. Whilst the explicit incorporation of artistic expression 
within the rubric of Article 10 would not – on account of the coverage-protection distinction 
made by Schauer – necessarily have provided for its greater protection, its inclusion may 
nevertheless, it is suggested, have gone some way to solidify the relationship between 
artistic expression and freedom of expression more generally so as to prompt a more secure 
degree of protection. 
 
Article 10(1), in its final form, defines the right to freedom of expression simply as, 
“includ[ing] [the] freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” Only tacitly (and 
somewhat narrowly) does the Article’s text refer to specific media through which 
‘expression’ may be made: namely with the reference to the State’s continued ability to 
enforce licensing requirements pertaining to broadcasting, television and cinema activities. 
However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, during much of the Council of Europe’s 
negotiations concerning the creation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
between 1949 and 1950 and the ensuing drafts produced therein, the notion of freedom of 
expression was elaborated on before being removed, without fanfare, at one of the final 
meetings. As has been suggested above and will be further developed below, the removal 
of what was in fact only a handful of words from the final text of Article 10 may be 
                                                     
564 Cowley, R. (ed) More What If?, Macmillan Publishing, p. xv 
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considered as a root cause of artistic expression’s relatively low level of protection within 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Article 10 jurisprudence.  
 
4.2.1 From the communication of opinion by word of mouth to the 
communication of ideas and information: the rise and fall of art’s 




In response to the initial suggestion, as put before the Council of Europe’s Committee on 
Legal and Administrative Questions by the French representative Mr Teitgen, that freedom 
of expression be construed as, “[t]he right not to be molested on account of [one’s] opinions 
and the freedom to express them by word of mouth and through the press”565, the Belgian 
representative proposed that the text be altered so as to expressly stipulate that the right to 
freedom of thought and expression be construed “in accordance with Article 19 of the 
Declaration of the United Nations.”566 The Belgian’s amendment was subsequently 
adopted, without dissent, and inserted in to the draft text of September 1949 of what would 
become Article 10.  
 
As such, the text of Article 10 began its gestation period, vis-à-vis Article 19 of the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights, so as to include the “freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”567 This definition, with its explicitly open-ended reference to being 
applicable with regards to any media, was left substantively unchanged by the time the 
Committee of Experts had prepared the preliminary draft of the Convention at its first 
meeting, some six months later, in February 1950.568 Indeed, there appears to have been no 
remarks made concerning the text of the draft article in the accompanying report of the 
Committee of Experts whatsoever.569  
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566 Article 10 Travaux, p. 3 
567 UN Declaration on Human Rights, Article 19 (emphasis added) 
568 Article 10 Travaux, p. 10. Though it should be noted that rather than simply referring to the right 
to freedom of expression “in accordance with Article 19 of the UN Declaration”, the draft 
Convention articulated, almost verbatim, the right as elicited in Article 19 itself.  





During the second meeting of the Committee of Experts the following month, it was 
suggested, at the behest of the United Kingdom’s government, that the phrase “through any 
media” be replaced and expanded upon, such that freedom of expression would be said to 
apply, “either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or by duly licensed visual or 
auditory devices.”570 Thus, faced with two drafts – the first, with regard to outlining the 
scope of the freedom of expression resembling Article 19 of the UN Declaration on Human 
Rights and the second explicitly setting out the scope of the right to include, inter alia, 
artistic expression – the Committee of Experts ceded responsibility to the Conference of 




Whilst the general outcome of the June conference was an amalgamation of the two drafts, 
on the question of the precise explication of the scope of freedom of expression the proposal 
submitted by the UK government held sway. Thus, in the draft text of Article 10 submitted 
to the Committee of Governmental Experts for deliberation by the Committee of Ministers 
in August 1950, freedom of expression was expressly said to apply to the ‘form of art’.571 
However, in a matter of days, by the time the draft text had returned to the Committee of 
Experts for final deliberation the words, “either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of 
art or by duly licensed visual or auditory devices” had been removed, leaving the text to 
resemble the final version of Article 10 that we know today, with no reference to art nor, 




The travaux of the drafting process that culminated in Article 10 provides no indication as 
to why, at the eleventh hour, the text was so abruptly altered by the Committee of 
Governmental Experts. Frustratingly, any opportunity that may have arisen to ascertain or 
query the reasoning or justification behind the text’s alteration during the Consultative 
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571 Article 10 Travaux, p. 15 
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Assembly’s final debates at the end of August 1950 on the Convention was not taken, the 
report on the travaux noting that Article 10 “received no particular mention.”572  
 
4.2.2 The relevance of Article 10’s drafting process to the question of 
categorising expression 
 
Whilst the rationale underpinning the Council of Europe’s deletion of artistic expression 
from the rubric of Article 10 remains unclear it is certainly conceivable to suppose that the 
chosen explication of the right in the simple terms of communicating ideas and information 
may have been intended, in its generality, to afford greater scope and flexibility to the right 
of ‘freedom of expression’. However, as has been demonstrated in Chapter Three, the 
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence concerning the categorisation of 
expression is indicative of a hierarchy of expression based on the proximity with which a 
given category of expression is seen to fall within the underlying values of Article 10.  
 
As such, as best evinced by the hybrid commercial expression cases,573 the closer to 
political expression the expression in question is perceived to be, the greater de facto 
protection it is likely to receive in light of the narrowing of the margin of appreciation and 
subsequent greater judicial scrutiny of the alleged interference that such narrowing entails. 
The absence of an unambiguous reference to artistic expression within the framework of 
Article 10 may therefore be considered as an underlying cause of the precarious positioning 
of artistic expression within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
leaving artistic expression – because of its distinctive relationship with freedom of 
expression doctrine more generally – sitting uneasily within the Article 10 jurisprudence in 
particular.  
 
Such a claim may be regarded as spurious. After all, if one accepts Schauer’s persuasive 
thesis that it is necessary, both doctrinally and practically, to appreciate the distinction 
between the coverage and protection of the right to freedom of expression then it follows 
that a simple textual reference to artistic expression within Article 10 would do little to 
guarantee a given artistic work’s protection per se. Artistic expression could, even under 
such circumstances, quite legitimately be said to be covered whilst simultaneously, in any 
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given instance, remain unprotected. Furthermore, the absence of artistic expression from 
the text of Article 10 may be regarded by some as an irrelevance on account of the fact that 
the Court has, since at least the late 1980s,574 willingly accepted that artistic expression 
does indeed fall within the ambit of Article 10 notwithstanding its absence from the 
Article’s rubric. Accordingly, it may well be reasonably argued that the net result – the 
relatively low level of protection afforded to artistic expression – could be justifiably 
reached irrespective of artistic expression’s inclusion within the text of Article 10 on the 
basis that there is no necessary correlation between coverage and protection.  
 
Yet, despite this seemingly logical conclusion there remains the question of precisely how 
artistic expression has come to be afforded a differing, and generally lower, level of 
protection than other forms of expression. To say that there is no necessary link between 
coverage and protection is not, it is suggested, to say that attributing a lower level of 
protection to certain types of expression is automatically justified. Moreover, without a 
specific point of reference in the rubric of Article 10 with which to guide the Court, the 
development of case law concerning artistic expression has been somewhat inconsistent 
and undermined by the pull of more traditional political/public interest expression.575  
 
By closely critiquing the Court’s case law concerning the specific question of artistic 
expression the remainder of this chapter will seek to demonstrate the general lack of 
doctrinal oversight in the treatment of artistic expression at the hands of the Court that 
leaves artistic expression, almost by default, at a disadvantage when it comes to judicial 
recognition. That there is little in the way of close judicial reasoning behind (or sometimes 
even awareness of) the relatively low, de facto, level of protection afforded to artistic 
expression leads one to ponder the question of whether an opportunity was missed in the 
execution of the text of Article 10.  
 
4.3 ART, ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND ARTICLE 10: A CRITIQUE OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ ARTISTIC 
EXPRESSION CASE LAW  
 
4.3.1 Establishing the framework from which to assess the European Court 
of Human Rights’ artistic expression case law 
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The stage has now been set from which to critique the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence concerning the freedom of artistic expression under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The overview of theoretical considerations 
relating to freedom of expression and the philosophy of art contained within the opening 
two chapters may be regarded as something of a prelude in which it was confirmed that 
artistic expression may indeed be regarded as expression for the purposes of Article 10. 
Establishing that artistic expression has the capacity – in a conceptual sense at least – to 
convey ‘ideas’ and ‘information’ was important in order to bring artistic expression 
squarely within the confines of Article 10.576 In the parlance of Schauer, then, it is suggested 
that there is a sufficient theoretical basis to validate the assumption that Article 10 covers 
artistic expression.  
 
In terms of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law such an assumption is not, 
however, contentious; the Court having expressly accepted Article 10’s applicability to 
artistic expression since 1988 and the case of Müller v. Switzerland. Accordingly, of greater 
interest, is the variability of protection afforded to different categories of expression by the 
Court’s expansion and contraction of the margin of appreciation.  As Chapter Three sought 
to establish, the Court’s approach to the categorisation of expression, through the 
employment of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, can be seen to broadly align with 
the theses advanced by Schauer, Blocher and Sunstein. In this regard, significance is placed 
upon the correlation between the values recognised as underpinning Article 10 and the 
extent to which the expression in question can be regarded as furthering those values: the 
more the expression can be seen to contributing to public discourse the greater de facto 
protection it is likely to receive.  
 
Of course, such variability in protection is not necessarily theoretically unsound. To 
suggest otherwise would be to run the risk of conflating the necessary distinction between 
coverage and protection in order to avoid the rigidity with which the categorical-
absolutists’ credo operates: a position that the Court clearly avoids. Nevertheless, in teasing 
out the rationale employed by European Court of Human Rights in its case law concerning 
                                                     
576 Whilst Article 10 stipulates that the right to freedom of expression, “shall include freedom 
to…receive and impart information and ideas,” such that it may not necessarily be limited to the 
conveyance of information and ideas, one may infer the significance of ‘information’ and ‘ideas’ 
for freedom of expression within Article 10 from the Court’s preference for expression that 
contributes to public discourse. 
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specifically artistic expression, it will be suggested that the category of artistic expression 
sits rather precariously within the framework of Article 10. In part this is because of the 
very nature of artistic expression and its vexatious relationship with freedom of expression 
more generally.  
 
As such, the subject matter to which artists often tend towards and the inherently visceral 
manner in which the chosen subject matter is treated may be seen to leave artistic 
expression in something of a quandary within the operation of Article 10. For instance, as 
we shall see in the cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut, Wingrove and I.A. v. Turkey, there is 
ample scope for the depiction of religion in art to lead to controversy and the offense of 
religious sensitivities. The rationale employed by the Court in finding there to be no 
violation of Article 10 in such instances may in large part, it will be suggested, be based on 
the failure of the Court to actively engage with the specific relationship that exists between 
artistic expression and freedom of expression doctrine more generally. Thus, by bestowing 
the State with a wide margin (on account of the lack of consensus on the issues concerning 
morals and religion) so as to limit the Court’s scrutiny of review, the qualities specifically 
pertaining to artistic expression are overlooked and its very value, as a form of expression 
within Article 10, undermined. It is in this sense, in particular, that it is perhaps regrettable 
that Article 10 does not make explicit reference to artistic expression’s inclusion: its 
absence undermining the relationship artistic expression is seen to have within the broader 
freedom of expression discourse. 
 
Notwithstanding Article 10’s silence on the issue of artistic expression over the course of 
the development of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence there has been a 
certain liberalisation in its approach to artistic expression according to which the qualities 
particular to art and artistic expression have, on occasion, been recognised and incorporated 
in to its assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the State’s interference with the 
applicant’s right to freedom of expression. However, in line with the analysis provided in 
Chapter Three, the Court’s engagement with the qualities pertaining to artistic expression 
is largely dependent upon the perceived ‘politicalness’ of the work in question and not on 
it being artistic expression per se. 
 
Whilst the judicial recognition of the qualities of artistic expression is to be broadly 
welcomed, there remains a certain doctrinal uneasiness with the approach adopted by the 
European Court of Human Rights according to which the extent to which the Court is 
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willing to engage in an assessment of the expression’s artistic qualities is necessarily 
dependent upon its initial recognition of the art work in political terms.  Such an approach, 
it will be suggested, is therefore not indicative of a recognition, on the part of the European 
Court of Human Rights, of the importance of artistic expression as a sui generis category 
of expression on its own terms. 
 
In order to offer a systematic analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ artistic 
expression case law, from which comparisons between the cases are most acutely seen, the 
analysis to follow will be approached in terms of the predominant limitation clause(s) 
within Article 10(2) relied upon by the State in each case. Accordingly, the case law 
analysis will be divided in to three sections: protecting the rights of others in the sphere of 
public morals, protecting the rights of others with regards to defamation and, finally, with 
regards to protecting national security, territorial integrity and the prevention of disorder 
and crime.  
 
Before turning to the substantive review of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence pertaining to specifically artistic expression, in the interest of 
contextualisation, it is first instructive to consider the Court’s seminal judgment in 
Handyside v. UK, a case which predated the Court’s first explicit inclusion of artistic 
expression within the coverage of Article 10 by some twelve years.  
 
4.3.2 Handyside v. UK: Article 10’s applicability to offensive, shocking and 
disturbing expression  
 
No account of freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights 
would be complete without reference to the case of Handyside v. UK.577 Whilst the facts 
pertaining to Handyside and the European Court of Human Rights’ subsequent judgment 
are well known it is worth rehearsing them presently in order to more fully contextualise 
the Court’s developing jurisprudence concerning artistic expression. Indeed, given art’s 
inherent challenging of the status quo, the Court’s infamous declaration that Article 10 
applies “not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the 
State or any sector of the population”578 would appear to offer a prima facie strong 
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protection for artistic expression. However, in finding there to be no violation of Article 10 
in Handyside, the rationale employed by the Court may be seen as informing the 
background against which its subsequent jurisprudence concerning artistic expression’s 
relatively low de facto protection developed.  
 
The case of Handyside concerned the publication of a book entitled The Little Red 
Schoolbook, a reference book intended for adolescents covering a range of issues including 
sections on sex and drugs. In particular, the chapter concerning sex contained further 
sections on, inter alia, masturbation, orgasm, intercourse, contraceptives, menstruation, 
pornography, homosexuality, venereal diseases, and legal and illegal abortion.579  The 
applicant was subsequently prosecuted under the Obscene Publications Act 1964 following 
complaints from members of the public.   
 
In its preliminary assessment of the case, the European Court of Human Rights accepted 
that, in addition to the applicant’s criminal conviction, the State’s seizure and destruction 
of the book amounted to an interference with the applicant publisher’s right to freedom of 
expression.580 Furthermore, in following the framework provided by Article 10, it was 
accepted that the State’s interference was prescribed by law (it not being contested that the 
interference was based on the Obscene Publication Act 1964) and that the interference 
sought to ensure the protection of public morals.581 Accordingly, it was left to the European 
Court of Human Rights to assess whether the States actions were necessary and 
proportionate in meeting the legitimate aim ensued.  
 
In finding that there had in fact been no violation of Article 10 in Handyside the European 
Court of Human Rights was keen to recognise that, “the machinery of protection 
established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human 
rights.”582 Accordingly, it was said that the State enjoys a margin of appreciation within 
which to interpret the necessity of interferences with individuals’ human rights subject to 
a European supervision.583 Therefore, whilst the State’s margin of appreciation was not 
unlimited, the lack of pan-European consensus on the issues concerning morality indicated 
a relatively wide margin of appreciation open to the State.584 Accordingly, the Court limited 
                                                     
579 Handyside, op cit, para. 20 
580 Handyside, op cit, para. 43 
581 Handyside, op cit, paras. 44-46 
582 Handyside, op cit, para. 48 (Citing the ‘Belgian Linguistic’ case (1968) para. 10)  
583 Handyside, op cit, paras. 48-49 
584 See, especially, Handyside, op cit, para. 48 
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its review to the question of “whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify 
the actual measures of ‘interference’ they take are relevant and sufficient.”585 
 
In this regard, in accepting that the measures taken against the applicant the Court placed 
significance on the nature of the book and its intended audience, noting that The Little Red 
Schoolbook, “could [be] interpreted as an encouragement to indulge in precocious activities 
harmful for [adolescents] or even to commit certain criminal offences” such that it was 
accepted that the State had pursued a legitimate aim within the context of Article 10(2).586 
Moreover, and with regards to the necessity of the State’s interference, in refuting the 
argument advanced by the applicant in which it was submitted that the measures taken 
could not be considered as necessary owing to the fact that similar prosecutions in other 
countries in which the book had been published were not forthcoming, the Court again 
relied on the relatively wide margin of appreciation available to the State presently. 
Accordingly, it was determined that, “[t]he Contracting States have each fashioned their 
approach in the light of the situation obtaining in their respective territories; they have had 
regard, inter alia, to the different views prevailing there about the demands of the protection 
of morals in a democratic society.”587 Thus, given the variability of conceptions of morals 
across Europe (notwithstanding the fact that there appeared to be a consensus with regards 
to the morality of The Little Red Schoolbook in particular) the Court maintained that it is 
for each State to determine the most appropriate, domestically sensitive, approach.  
 
There is, as such, a certain juxtaposition to have emerged from within the case of Handyside 
regarding the protection of controversial expression that will be shown to permeate the 
Court’s subsequent case law concerning the freedom of artistic expression within Article 
10. On the one hand, freedom of expression is recognised as constituting “one of the 
essential foundations of…a [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man,” such that the interest of pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness require the protection of expression even capable of 
causing offense.588 On the other hand, however, lies the Court’s application of the doctrine 
of margin of appreciation, the widening of which in cases concerning morality – a subject 
matter to which artistic expression is invariably drawn – through the ceding of 
responsibility to national authorities, prompts a certain distancing of the Court from 
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engaging in a comprehensive analysis of the interference in question. Having noted this 
discrepancy, it is time now to turn to the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence 
concerning specifically artistic expression. 
 
4.3.3 An overview of the early decisions concerning questions of 
admissibility 
 
Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. United Kingdom589 
 
In the summer of 1976, the magazine Gay News published The Love That Dares To Speak 
Its Name, a poem written by Professor James Kirkup. Accompanying the poem’s text was 
an illustration relating to the poem’s subject matter. Described by the critic Philip 
Hobsbaum as one of the 20th century’s ‘genuine masters of verse’590, James Kirkup gained 
a significant degree of prominence for his ‘increasingly risqué’ works, of which The Love 
That Dares To Speak Its Name, and the subsequent controversy surrounding its publication, 
brought especial notoriety.591 In addition to the suggestion that Christ had lived a 
promiscuous life and had engaged in homosexual activities with his disciples, John the 
Baptist and Pontius Pilate, The Love That Dares To Speak Its Name ostensibly concerned 
an explicit, first-hand, account of a Roman centurion’s fantasies of engaging in acts of 
sodomy and fellatio with the body of Jesus Christ following his crucifixion.592 Amid the 
ensuing outcry, the poem was heralded by its supporters as a, “celebrat[ion of] the absolute 
universality of God’s love.”593 For its detractors, The Love That Dares To Speak Its Name 
amounted, in its blasphemy, to the, “re-crucifixion of Christ by 20th-century weapons.”594  
 
Following the failure of the Director of Public Prosecutions to initiate proceedings against 
Gay News, a private prosecution was sought by Mary Whitehouse – founder of the National 
Viewers’ and Listeners’ Association, an organisation devoted to campaigning against the 
broadcasting of supposedly harmful and offensive material. In particular, it was alleged 
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that the applicants had, “unlawfully and wickedly published…a blasphemous libel 
concerning the Christian religion, namely an obscene poem and illustration vilifying Christ 
in His life and in his crucifixion.”595 Before a jury at the court of first instance, the 
magazine’s publisher and its editor were found guilty of the common law offence of 
blasphemous libel and were fined £1000 and £500 respectively.596 In upholding the lower 
court’s decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the trial judge had not erred in 
directing the jury that, firstly, they should find the applicants guilty if they considered that 
the poem vilified Christ and that, secondly,  there was no further need to establish the 
applicants’ intent to do so, beyond the intention of publication simpliciter.597 In its 
assessment of only the latter point of law – namely the strict liability nature of the offence 
of blasphemous libel – the House of Lords again concurred, albeit by a majority of three to 
two.598 However, despite its ultimate confirmation that the offence of blasphemous libel 
was indeed one of strict liability, and with the exception of one law lord, there was 
agreement across the bench that the state of the law on this matter was far from certain.599 
Accordingly, in their submissions to the Commission, the applicants sought to challenge 
their convictions wholesale, arguing that the offence of blasphemous libel was not 
prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10 and 
was not necessary in a democratic society.  
 
The House of Lords’ recognition of a degree of uncertainty surrounding the strict liability 
nature of blasphemous libel notwithstanding, the Commission was not persuaded by the 
applicants’ assertion that the offence was not prescribed by law. In particular, it was 
reasoned that the domestic courts had not deviated from ‘a reasonable interpretation’ of the 
law as it stood. Accordingly, whilst the law regarding whether the offence of blasphemous 
libel was one of strict liability or not was hitherto uncertain, it was not the case, so the 
Commission reasoned, that the English courts had created new law in the sense that it had 
overturned previous decisions in which evidence of intent to blaspheme had been 
welcomed.600 Instead, the Commission concurred with the government’s position that the 
courts had simply clarified the existing law.601 
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With regards to the question of whether their convictions under the offence of blasphemous 
libel pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10, the applicants pointed to 
the fact that their prosecution was brought by a private individual after the state authorities 
themselves decided not to pursue criminal proceedings.602 Accordingly, for the applicants, 
it could not be said that their prosecution was truly necessary in advancing the state’s 
purported goals of preventing public disorder, protecting public morals or protecting the 
rights of others.603 Nonetheless, the Commission maintained that the question be addressed 
from the perspective of the rights of the private prosecutor. Since, it was reasoned, the 
crime of blasphemous libel’s ‘main purpose’ was to protect the citizenry from being 
offended in their religious beliefs, the fact that the prosecution was instigated by such an 
offended citizen worked to confirm that the offence did, indeed, seek to protect the rights 
of others.604 
 
Finally, on the question of the law’s necessity in a democratic society, the Commission 
went on to hold that the blasphemy laws, “could be considered as necessary in the 
circumstances of this case,” and thereby confirming absolutely that the allegation of a 
violation of Article 10 was manifestly unfounded within the meaning of Article 27(2). 605 
In somewhat tortuous reasoning, the Commission held that: 
 
the existence of an offence of blasphemy does not as such raise any doubts as to its 
necessity: If it is accepted that the religious feelings of the citizen may deserve 
protection against indecent attacks on the matters held sacred by him, then it can 
also be considered as necessary in a democratic society to stipulate that such 
attacks, if they attain a certain level of severity, shall constitute a criminal offence 
triable at the request of the offended person.606  
 
Furthermore, it was asserted that, “[i]t is in principle left to the legislation of the State 
concerned how it wishes to define the offence, provided that the principle of 
proportionality…is being respected.”607 On this point, and in light of the fact that, 
throughout the appellate system, a number of courts agreed with the private prosecutor’s 
belief that James Kirkup’s poem was blasphemous, the absence of requiring mens rea in 
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establishing the offence of blasphemous libel could not be said to be disproportionate, such 
that the application was deemed inadmissible.608  
 
Choudhury v. United Kingdom609 
 
The case of Choudhury emerged from the controversy surrounding the publication of 
Salman Rushdie’s Whitbread Award-winning novel, The Satanic Verses. The weeks and 
months following the book’s publication saw, inter alia, demonstrations against the alleged 
blasphemous nature of the work and book burnings in Bolton and Bradford, the deaths of 
at least six people during riots in Islamabad, attacks on the premises of bookshops and 
publishers associated with the novel, the banning of the book in India and South Africa 
and, not least, the imposition of a fatwa by the Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini, 
calling for the death of Salman Rushdie and forcing the author in to hiding.610 
 
In the first instance, the applicant in Choudhury – a British citizen of Islamic faith – sought 
a summons for the criminal prosecution of The Satanic Verses’ author, Salman Rushdie, 
and his publisher on the basis that they had ‘unlawfully and wickedly’ published 
blasphemous libels against Allah, the Prophet Mohammed and, more generally, the religion 
of Islam.611 The original decision – in which the applicant’s claim was dismissed on the 
basis that the offence of blasphemy applied only to Christianity – was upheld during the 
subsequent judicial review proceedings.612 Given the clarity of the law concerning the 
offence of blasphemy and its applicability only to the Christian religion, it was held that it 
was for Parliament alone, and not the courts, to extend the offence’s scope.613 Moreover, 
with regards to the applicant’s argument that the State’s failure to bring a criminal 
prosecution violated his Article 9 right to freedom of religion under the ECHR, whilst it 
was recognised that ‘criticism’ or ‘agitation’ against a religious group may, as a matter of 
degree, prevent its members from manifesting their religious beliefs, “nothing remotely 
like that had been demonstrated by the applicant.”614 
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His remedies exhausted at the domestic level, before the Commission the applicant sought 
first to argue the more general point that his right to freedom of religion under Article 9 
had been violated by the State’s refusal to instigate criminal proceedings against Salman 
Rushdie and his publisher. In particular the applicant maintained that The Satanic Verses 
demonstrated a ‘scurrilous attack’ on the religion of Islam. Given that the State was not 
causally related to the alleged interference with the applicant’s Article 9 right to freedom 
of religion, the question facing the Commission centred on whether Article 9 could be 
interpreted so as to infer the right to bring (criminal) proceedings against those who publish 
expressions deemed offensive to certain individuals or groups. In (obliquely) answering 
this question, the Commission stipulated that no link could be found, on the present facts, 
between the State’s failure to act and an interference with Article 9 such that the application 
was incompatible ratione materiae with the ECHR. Accordingly, since no interference with 
Article 9 could be found, the applicant’s second submission – that the application of the 
UK’s blasphemy laws, in so far as they protected only the Christian faith, were 
discriminatory and therefore in contravention of Article 14 of the ECHR – was also found 
to be incompatible, thus rendering the application inadmissible.615  
 
S. and G. v. United Kingdom616  
 
In the winter of 1987, G – a fine artist and sculptor – intended to display his work, entitled 
Human Earrings, as part of S’s ‘Animals’ exhibition. The sculpture comprised of a plastic 
model’s head with a freeze-dried human foetus of three to four months’ gestation attached 
to each ear by way of a fitting screwed in to the foetus’ skull.617 Shortly after the 
exhibition’s opening G’s sculpture was seized by the police and the artist, as well as the 
gallery owner, were charged and convicted under the common law offence of outraging 
public decency.618  
 
That the prosecution was brought under the common law offence of outraging public 
decency was of particular significance in as much as it did not allow the applicants to put 
forward any defence based on artistic merit.619 Accordingly, at appeal, the applicants 
                                                     
615 Choudhury v. UK, op cit, p. 3 
616 Application No. 17634/91 
617 S and G v. UK, pp. 1-2 
618 S and G v. UK, p. 2 
619 For an overview of the distinction see, for example, Kearns, P. (n 16) at 48-49; and Kearns, P. 
Obscene and Blasphemous Libel: misunderstanding art, (2000) Criminal Law Review 652 
178 
 
maintained that they should have been prosecuted, if at all, under the Obscene Publications 
Act 1959 for which a defence of artistic merit was available.620 In rejecting this argument, 
the Court of Appeal sought to confirm the propriety of the applicants’ prosecution under 
the common, rather than statutory, law by elaborating on the ‘factual and moral’ distinction 
between the two offences. Accordingly, it was deemed that the Obscene Publications Act 
1959 concerned the prohibition of those things that tend to ‘deprave and corrupt public 
morals’ as set against ‘the recognised standards of propriety’ whereas the focus of the 
common law offence of outraging public decency lay in those materials with a tendency to 
provoke ‘revulsion, disgust and outrage’, irrespective of the presence or absence of public 
morals.621 Moreover, despite the applicants’ arguments to the contrary, the Court of Appeal 
held that, since the House of Lords’ confirmation in the 1973 case of Knuller622, the 
common law offence of outraging public decency was indeed well-established in English 
law and required no specific mens rea on the part of the applicants.623  
 
Consequently, during proceedings before the Commission, the applicants sought to 
establish that there had been an unjustified interference with their rights to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 which, as we shall see, since the case of Müller  explicitly 
incorporated both the creation and dissemination of artistic works.624 In substantiating their 
claim, the applicants argued that the offence of outraging public decency was neither 
prescribed by law (in the sense that the offence was not sufficiently accessible or 
foreseeable) nor necessary in democratic society.625 Furthermore, it was alleged that, given 
the unavailability of a defence of artistic merit, the interference was disproportionate in its 
attempt to further its purported aims since it precluded any real possibility of appropriately 
balancing the conflicting interests.626  
 
With regards to the applicants’ first argument – concerning whether the common law 
offence of outraging public decency was prescribed by law – the Commission reached a 
conclusion in the affirmative. In reaching its decision that the offence of outraging public 
decency was, indeed, prescribed by law, the Commission took note of the precedent 
confirmed in The Sunday Times v. UK that, whilst laws must be sufficiently accessible and 
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clear, the foreseeability of the law’s application nevertheless need not be of absolute 
certainty.627 Moreover, the Commission reaffirmed that, “No importance can…be attached 
to the fact that the offence for which the applicants were prosecuted was a creature of the 
common law and not of legislation.”628 Accordingly, it was recognised that the relevant law 
was ‘accessible’ since at least 1973 and the case of Knuller and that, furthermore, the 
distinction made in the Knuller judgment regarding the differences between the common 
law offence of outraging public decency and the statutory offence of obscenity indicated 
that the applicants did have a sufficiently clear indication of the foreseeability of their 
prosecution under the common, rather than statutory, law.629 
 
In response to the applicants’ argument that, in circumventing the availability of a defence 
of artistic merit, as required under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the implementation 
of the common law offence of outraging public decency was disproportionate and would 
produce a chilling effect on artistic expression, the Commission referred to the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation.630 In particular, it was noted that the State has a wide margin of 
appreciation with regards to the protection of morals and that, “[b]y reason of their direct 
and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, States are in principle in a 
better position than the Convention organs to assess the necessity of a restriction on artistic 
freedom…”.631 Accordingly, given the nature of the Human Earrings and the fact that the 
exhibition was open to the public the Commission concluded that it was not unreasonable 
for the English courts to find that the work was an outrage to public decency such that the 
application was deemed to be manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27(2) 
of the ECHR.632  
 
Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark633  
 
In September 2005 a Danish newspaper – Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten – invited 
members of the Danish Newspaper Illustrators’ Union to submit cartoons depicting the 
prophet Muhammad ‘as they saw him’. Subsequently, a dozen such illustrations – of which 
the majority caricatured the prophet Muhammad – were published in Morgenavisen 
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Jyllands-Posten accompanied by an article entitled ‘The face of Muhammad’, in which the 
reasoning behind the newspaper’s decision to publish the responding cartoonists’ works 
was outlined. In particular, under the heading of ‘Freedom of expression’, the article stated: 
 
Some Muslims reject modern secular society. They demand special status, insisting 
on special consideration of their own religious feelings. This is incompatible with 
secular democracy and freedom of expression, where one has to be prepared to put 
up with scorn, mockery and ridicule. While this is not always agreeable or pleasant 
to watch, and does not mean that religious feelings can be made fun of at any price, 
that is a minor consideration in the present context…we are on a slippery slope, 
with no one able to predict where self-censorship will lead. 
 
The ramifications of Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten’s decision to publish the cartoons were 
considerable, sparking violence and sustained international controversy at the highest 
levels. To summarise, in the weeks and months following the cartoons’ initial publication, 
a 5000-strong demonstration was held in Copenhagen, death threats were received by the 
cartoonists involved, Saudi Arabian and Libyan ambassadors were recalled from their 
embassies in Denmark and boycotts of Danish produce were established.634 Against this 
backdrop, nearly half a year after the initial publication, the newspaper’s editor-in-chief 
apologised for the offence caused to Muslims and conceded that the cartoons had given rise 
to ‘serious misunderstandings’.635 The following day saw a number of European 
newspapers reprint the cartoons, the apparent intention being to bolster freedom of 
expression in light of the purportedly appeasing nature of Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten’s 
apology.636  
 
The cartoons’ republication prompted further backlash that was to spread across Asia and 
the Middle East. Protests in Pakistan saw ‘western-linked’ businesses attacked and left 
three people, including an eight-year-old boy, dead whilst, in the Philippines, Danish flags 
were burnt outside the Danish consulate and a boycott of Danish produce was introduced 
by Indonesia's trade association.637 The cartoons’ controversy continued in subsequent 
years, with diplomatic relations being further tested within the military context of NATO 
and leading some to fear that the crisis might destabilise NATO and turn it ‘into the hostage 
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of a clash with Islam’. Only after intense negotiations did Turkey agree to revoke the veto 
it had previously placed on the election of the Danish prime minister to NATO’s head, on 
the grounds of his support for freedom of expression during the cartoons’ initial 
controversy.638 Furthermore, in 2010, four years after his notorious cartoon – in which a 
Muslim figure, alleged by some to be the prophet Muhammad, was depicted with a lit bomb 
concealed within his turban – was published, Kurt Westergaard was the subject of an 
assassination attempt when a man broke in to Westergaard’s premises yielding a knife and 
an axe.639 
 
The implications of what has become to be known as the ‘Danish cartoon crisis’ were, as 
such, of profound significance. What began with the intention of ‘provok[ing] a debate 
about the extent to which we self-censor in our coverage of Muslim issues’640 – an issue 
that was itself prompted by the revelation that illustrators had sought anonymity for their 
association with the publication of a children’s book – soon manifested itself as a truly 
global crisis in which the ensuing debate centred on the appropriate limitations on freedom 
of expression. In light of the subsequent controversies surrounding, for instance, The 
Innocence of Muslims and the fateful events following Charlie Hebdo’s decision to publish 
similar cartoons, it is therefore unfortunate – albeit understandable – that the European 
Court of Human Rights declared the application in Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark to 
be inadmissible, thereby denying the Court with the opportunity to further examine the 
relationship between freedom of expression, blasphemy and offence in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
In short, the application was deemed to be inadmissible on the basis that no jurisdictional 
link could be established between the applicants – who were Moroccan nationals and 
organisations based exclusively in Morocco – and the state of Denmark.641 Under Article 1 
of the ECHR, contracting states are obliged to secure convention rights “to everyone within 
their jurisdiction” – a term that has, with reference to the travaux préparatoires, been 
primarily interpreted with reference to a State’s territorial jurisdiction with specific 
exceptions relating to overseas military actions that were not relevant in the present 
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instance.642 Accordingly, the applicants’ allegations of discrimination, with respect to 
Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 14 (freedom from discrimination), as well as the 
complaint that Denmark had ‘allowed’ the publication of offensive cartoons, contrary to 
Article 17 in conjunction with Article 10, could not be further examined by the Court.   
 
From the perspective of seeking to identify a comprehensive rationale underpinning the 
Court’s approach to artistic expression it is therefore unfortunate that the case of Ben El 
Mahi and others v. Denmark could not be heard on its merits. Given that the application 
emerged from the Danish Director of Prosecutions’ refusal to initiate legal proceedings 
against Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten for the offence caused to Muslims – and thereby, as 
we shall see, distinguishing the present case from the Court’s earlier otherwise comparable 
case law of Otto-Preminger and Wingrove – Ben El Mahi and others would have afforded 
the Court with the opportunity to clarify its position with regards to the extent of freedom 
of (artistic) expression’s protection when religious sensitivities are involved.  
 
In particular, given width of the margin of appreciation normally afforded to states 
responding to matters of religion and morality it would have been interesting to see the 
extent to which the Court accepted the rationale employed by the Danish Director of 
Prosecutions in deciding not to launch legal proceedings. Were it not for matters of 
jurisdiction, Ben El Mahi and others would therefore have offered the opportunity to 
explore the extent to which the state is imbued with a positive duty to minimise or prevent 
the causing of offence and, in turn, proffer a rationale more explicit and comprehensive in 
its scope than is currently the case.  
 
For instance, crucial to the Director of Prosecutions’ determination was its assessment of 
whether, in line with Article 140 of the Danish Criminal Code, the cartoons amounted to 
‘mockery’ or ‘scorn’ of Islam’s religious doctrines or acts of worship.643 Accordingly, in 
its assessment of Danish law, the Director of Prosecutions sought to define ‘mockery’ in 
terms of a lack of respect for, and the ridiculing or derision of, the object of mockery whilst 
‘scorn’ was defined as an “expression of contempt for the object that is scorned.”644 
Moreover, in reserving Article 140’s application for the most serious of cases, it was 
                                                     
642 Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark, pp. 7-8. Citing Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others 
(dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, §§ 59-65, ECHR 2001-XII, and Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 
§§ 65-71, 16 November 2004 
643 Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark, p.4 
644 Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark, p.4 
183 
 
asserted that, in order for Article 140 to be successfully invoked, there needed to be ‘a 
certain element of abuse’.645 In light of the fact that there was considered to exist no 
consensus as to the (im)propriety of depicting the prophet Muhammed – such that the 
depiction of Muhammad could not, per se, be considered to violate Article 140 of the 
Danish Criminal Code, the Director of Prosecutions moved on to consider whether the 
twelve cartoons, individually, demonstrated sufficient levels of ‘mockery’ or ‘scorn’.646 
 
Accordingly, eight of the twelve cartoons were deemed by the Director of Prosecutions to 
be either ‘neutral in their expression’ or otherwise lacking in the requisite degree of derision 
or spite.647 Again, given that the Director of Prosecutions provided no elaboration as to 
which cartoons were deemed to be neutral and which, although not neutral, did not amount 
to ‘mockery’ or ‘scorn’ the Court’s assessment of the facts would have been instructive. 
Whilst certain of the cartoons were relatively benign (one, for instance, depicted the face 
of a man whose beard and turban were stylised in the form of a crescent moon and star) 
others were, arguably, less so. One might, with relative ease, maintain that the now 
infamous cartoon depicting a cloud scene with a bearded man wearing a turban exclaiming, 
“Stop, stop, we’ve run out of virgins!”, to a group of other, similarly bearded and attired, 
men seeking to enter heaven after having been, one presumes, involved in a suicide 
bombing, was capable of amounting to ‘scorn’.  
 
A further two of the remaining cartoons were considered an attempt to portray women in 
Islamic society. One contained heavily stylised images of Islamic women with the caption, 
“Prophet! You crazy bloke! Keeping women under the yoke!” whilst the second depicted 
a bearded man, his eyes blanked out, wearing a turban and carrying a sword whilst standing 
in front of two women wearing niqabs such that only their eyes could be seen. As such, the 
Director of Prosecution considered that the cartoons related to social conditions and did 
not, therefore, touch on religious doctrine or acts of worship.648 Potentially more 
problematic, in as much as it may be construed as insinuating a relationship between Islam 
or Muslims and violence, was the cartoon in which two turban-wearing, bearded men 
armed with an array of weaponry are running towards a third, also bearded, man who is 
saying, “Relax folks! It’s just a sketch done by a non-believer from southern Denmark.” 
That the third man, who is seen to be deploring violence in a calming manner, might 
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feasibly be Muhammad led the Director of Prosecutions to surmise that the cartoon could 
therefore not be said to be an expression of mockery or scorn of Islamic doctrine.649 
 
Finally, with regards what was perhaps the most notorious of the twelve cartoons – that 
depicting a bearded man whose turban contains a lit bomb – it is recognised that the 
depiction, “could be understood in several ways.”650 Accordingly, given the nuances often 
inherent in expression of an artistic nature, it is submitted that it is the absence of further 
judicial inquiry in to this cartoon that is most frustrating from the point of view of 
discerning a comprehensive jurisprudence of artistic expression under the Court’s Article 
10 case law. Two possible interpretations are proffered by the Director of Prosecutions, 
both of which take as its starting point, the assumption that the depicted figure is in fact 
Muhammad. Firstly, it is asserted that if Muhammad is understood as a symbol of Islam 
then the cartoon could be seen as suggestive of violence being carried out in the name of 
Islam. Understood in this way, the Director of prosecutions continued, the cartoon could 
be seen as expressing the view that religious fanaticism has produced terrorism. Thus, the 
cartoon may be considered as a contribution to contemporary discussions on terrorism. 
Importantly, under this construction, the Director of Prosecutions asserted that the cartoon 
was not an expression of ‘mockery’ or ‘scorn’ directed at the prophet Muhammad or Islam 
more generally but, rather, a criticism of those individuals and groups involved in terrorist 
activities of a religious nature and therefore did not satisfy the criteria required under 
Article 140 of the Danish Criminal Code.  
 
Secondly, the Director of Prosecutions accepted that the cartoon might feasibly be 
understood as suggesting that the prophet Muhammad himself was a violent person. 
Notwithstanding historical accounts in which Muhammad was indeed shown to have 
adopted violent methods in seeking to establish Islam, the Director of Prosecutions 
maintained that the cartoonists’ use of a bomb – an image that, today, is readily associable 
with terrorism – might well be considered as insulting. Nonetheless, whilst possibly 
‘insulting’ the expression did not, according to the Director of Prosecutions, meet the 
threshold of ‘mockery’ or ‘ridicule’ and “almost certainly” did not amount to ‘scorn’.651  
 
                                                     
649 Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark, p.5 
650 Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark, p.5 




Lying at the crux of the Director of Prosecutions’ decision not to pursue an investigation 
in to the cartoons published by Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten was its assessment that the 
cartoons were not sufficiently mocking or scornful of either the religion of Islam or its 
religious practices to trigger Article 140 of the Danish Criminal Code. Thus, whilst in the 
present instance the newspaper was deemed to have acted lawfully, the Director of 
Prosecutions sought to clarify Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten’s assertion that, in a secular 
democracy founded on freedom of expression, religious believers, “ha[ve] to be prepared 
to put up with scorn, mockery and ridicule.” Given that the Danish Criminal Code does 
indeed protect religious feelings from expressions of scorn and mockery, albeit only in the 
most serious of cases, Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten’s assertion did not, for the Director 
of Prosecutions, provide an accurate interpretation of the law.  
 
Accordingly, it was unfortunate that the case of Ben El Mahi and others v. Denmark could 
not proceed to be heard on its merits. Had the application been brought by Danish, rather 
than Moroccan, Muslims or organisations the case might have afforded the Court with the 
opportunity to test the degree of offence required under Article 140 of the Danish Criminal 
Code vis notions of ‘scorn’ and ‘mockery’ against its Article 10 case law pertaining to 
‘gratuitous offence’. Moreover, given that the present instance differs from the cases of 
Otto-Preminger and Wingrove – in that it concerns the failure of the state to act to protect 
religious sensitivities – the case of Ben El Mahi and others would also have forced the 
Court to offer an insight as to the extent to which the state has a duty to prevent (artistic) 
expression that offends, inter alia, those of a religious persuasion. In so doing, the Court’s 
margin of appreciation doctrine would have been further developed and thereby offering a 
more comprehensive understanding of the elusive principle.  
 
4.3.4 Protecting the ‘rights of others’ as a basis for limiting the right to 
freedom of artistic expression: Public morals and the rights of others 
 
Of the Court’s Article 10 case law pertaining to artistic expression, perhaps the most well-
known and commented upon are those in which, as was the case with Handyside, the 
protection of public morality (generally vis-à-vis the rights of others652) was cited as 
justification for the interference in question. Much ink has been spilled in analysing and 
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critiquing the (relatively) early cases of Müller, Otto-Preminger and Wingrove from the 
perspective of ascertaining, in light of the infamous Handyside dictum, the extent to which 
Article 10 generally protects a right to offend (or conversely, a right to be offended). Such 
a discussion is clearly of crucial importance for freedom of expression generally, yet the 
specific implications of this discourse for specifically artistic expression have, to a certain 
extent and somewhat counter-intuitively, been overlooked. Indeed, as we have seen with 
regards to the categorisation of expression, the reasoning and outcomes produced by this 
triumvirate of cases may account for the presumption that artistic expression enjoys lower 
degree of protection, relative to political expression.  
 
Simultaneously, the fate of the specific artworks in Müller, Otto-Preminger and Wingrove 
may go some way towards explaining the subsequent paucity of cases concerning 
controversial artworks being brought before the Court whilst, for the relatively few cases 
that have been heard, one may see, through the rationale employed by the Court in these 
early cases, the emergence of a framework that inherently discriminates against artistic 
expression. An examination of these early cases is therefore crucial in order to contextualise 
and critique the Court’s subsequent artistic expression case law.    
 
Müller and others v. Switzerland (1988)653 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS 
 
The case of Müller concerned the exhibiting of three Josef Müller paintings – collectively 
entitled Three Nights, Three Pictures – in a Swiss art exhibition. Following a complaint 
from the father of an adolescent girl who was alleged to have ‘reacted violently’ to Müller’s 
exhibit, the paintings were removed and seized by the Swiss authorities on the basis, it was 
later accepted by the European Court of Human Rights, of pursuing the legitimate aims of 
protecting morals as well as the rights of others.654 The paintings in question were certainly 
striking. Indeed, some of the applicants themselves, including the exhibition’s curators, 
conceded that they too had been shocked by the exhibit. From the domestic courts’ vivid 
portrayal of the works such feelings are certainly understandable: 
 
…one of the paintings contains no fewer than eight erect members. All the persons 
depicted are entirely naked and one of them is engaging simultaneously in various 
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sexual practices with two other males and an animal. He is kneeling down and not 
only sodomising the animal but holding its erect penis in another animal’s mouth. 
At the same time he is having the lower part of his back – his buttocks, even – 
fondled by another male, whose erect penis a third male is holding towards the first 
male’s mouth. The animal being sodomised has its tongue extended towards the 
buttocks of a fourth male, whose penis is likewise erect. Even the animals’ tongues 
(especially in the smallest painting) are more suggestive, in shape and aspect, of 
erect male organs than of tongues.655 
 
In accordance with the relevant obscenity laws under the Swiss Criminal Code,656 the 
applicants were fined and the paintings ordered to be deposited with the Art and History 
Museum for ‘safekeeping’.657 In reaching its conclusion, the domestic court placed 
emphasis on the paintings being, “obviously morally offensive to the vast majority of the 
population,” before going on to assert that, “[e]ven with an artistic aim, crude sexuality is 
not worthy of protection.”658 Moreover, the domestic court reasoned that: 
 
a person of ordinary sensitivity [cannot] be expected to go behind what is actually 
depicted and make a second assessment of the picture independently of what he 
can actually see. To do that he would have to be accompanied to exhibitions by a 
procession of sexologists, psychologists, art theorists or ethnologists in order to 
have explained to him that what he saw was in reality what he wrongly thought he 
saw.659  
 
Indeed, that consideration ought to be given to nothing other than the paintings’ facial 
depictions was further confirmed on appeal, with the appeal court’s categorical stipulation 
that: 
 
The court is likewise unconvinced by the appellants’ contention that the paintings 
are symbolical. What counts is their face value, their effect on the observer, not 
some abstraction utterly unconnected with the visible image or which glosses over 
it. Furthermore, the important thing is not the artist’s meaning or purported 
meaning but the objective effect of the image on the observer.660 
 
Despite the applicants’ further appeals, in which aesthetic elements of the paintings were 
purportedly given some consideration, the Cantonal Court nevertheless held that the 
paintings’ emphasis was on ‘sexuality in its offensive forms’ such that, “[t]he overall 
                                                     
655 Müller, op cit, para. 16  
656 Swiss Criminal Code, Article 204 
657 Müller, op cit, para. 14 
658 Müller, op cit, para. 14 
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impression…is such as to be morally offensive to a person of normal sensitivity.”661 The 
original court’s decision concerning the imposition of a fine and the confiscation of the 
paintings stood, leading to the applicants to pursue their case, under Article 10, before the 
European Court of Human Rights.662  
 
DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The European Court of Human Rights’ confirmation of Article 10’s inclusion of artistic 
expression  
 
With the earlier case of Gay News deemed inadmissible, the facts pertaining to Müller 
offered the European Court of Human Rights with its first opportunity to address the 
question of specifically artistic expression. Ascertaining the rationale employed by the 
Court in finding that there was no violation of Article 10 in Müller is therefore crucial in 
order to trace the developments of the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence. In this regard, and 
in line with the thesis put forward by Schauer concerning the coverage-protection 
distinction, the first question to be addressed by the Court was whether Article 10 covered 
artistic expression in the first place; a matter of import given, as it will be remembered, 
Article 10’s silence on the issue.  
 
In confirming that the guarantees of Article 10 do, in fact, extend to the inclusion of artistic 
expression, in Müller the European Court of Human Rights maintained that: 
 
[Article 10] includes freedom of artistic expression – notably within freedom to 
receive and impart information and ideas – which affords the opportunity to take 
part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas 
of all kinds.663  
 
Moreover, and in addition to citing the express inclusion of artistic expression within the 
rubric of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ freedom of expression 
protections, it was asserted that: 
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[c]onfirmation, if any were needed, that this interpretation is correct, is provided 
by the second sentence [of Article 10(1)], which refers to ‘broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises’, media whose activities extend to the field of art.664  
 
Thus, with relative conceptual ease and little in the way of further explanation, the category 
of artistic expression was brought squarely within the parameters of Article 10, 
notwithstanding its silence on the issue. Indeed, to emphasise the point, it was noted by the 
Court that there was no contention, between the parties present to the dispute, regarding 
Article 10’s inclusion of artistic expression.665   
 
Having proffered a holistic interpretation of Article 10 – according to which no distinction 
was made between the various forms that expression might take and thus enabling artistic 
expression’s tacit inclusion within Article 10’s guarantees666 – the Court’s subsequent 
assessment in Müller followed its established practice.667 Accordingly, after confirming 
that the imposition of a fine and the confiscation of Three Nights, Three Pictures ‘clearly’ 
amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10,668 the Court moved on to assess whether that interference was prescribed by 
law,669 pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10(2)670 and, ultimately, 
whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society.671 As we shall see below, 
and in common with much of the case law concerning Article 10 more generally, it was the 
issue of the interference’s necessity in a democratic society that instigated most of the 
discussion, both in the opinions of the majority and dissentients as well as in the academic 
commentary.   
 
Prescribed by law 
 
In questioning whether the obscenity laws, under which they were convicted, could be said 
to be prescribed by law, the applicants sought to argue that the vagueness of the term 
‘obscenity’ and its lack of definition in the legislation meant that they could not forsee that 
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the exhibiting of Müller’s paintings would have constituted an offence.672 Moreover, with 
regards to the paintings’ confiscation, it was maintained that since the relevant legislation 
explicitly required that obscene material be destroyed, the artworks’ confiscation could not 
be said to be prescribed by law.673 In line with the Gay News rationale, the Court disagreed 
on both points. On the question of the foreseeability of the fine imposed on the applicants, 
the Court recalled its earlier judgments in which the ‘impossibility of attaining absolute 
precision in the framing of laws’ was noted, such that, in the interests of preventing 
excessive rigidity, a degree of uncertainty would be inevitable.674  
 
Indeed, allowing a certain degree of flexibility was considered to be particularly useful in 
the context of obscenity laws in as much as it allows for the law to develop alongside 
‘changing circumstances’.675 Even so, given the development of a consistent body of case 
law in the domestic courts on the question of publishing obscene materials, the Court 
concluded that the Swiss obscenity laws were accessible to the applicants within the 
meaning of Article 10(2).676 
 
With regards to the second question – of whether the paintings’ confiscation was prescribed 
by law, given the legislation’s stipulation that obscene materials be destroyed – the Court 
again pointed to developments in Switzerland’s case law.677 Thus, since the early 1960s, in 
instances concerning material that is culturally significant or irreplaceable, its confiscation 
has been considered an appropriate and more tempered response in discharging the 
requirements of the criminal law, namely to ensure that the item is withheld from the 
public.678 Again, since these developments were consistently developed and applied in the 
domestic courts, the paintings’ confiscation was sufficiently deemed to be prescribed by 
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Legitimacy of the aim pursued 
 
The Court accepted that the imposition of a fine vis the obscenity laws applied in the present 
case were designed to protect public morals and that, through their application, no other 
ulterior motives capable of infringing the Convention could be attributed to the Swiss 
authorities.680 In addition to protecting morals, the government had also maintained that the 
interference’s aim lay in protecting the rights of others; an aim that was purportedly 
demonstrable in light of the girl’s reaction to seeing the paintings. On this point, and with 
no further elaboration, the Court simply asserted that, “there is a natural link between [the] 
protection of morals and [the] protection of the rights of others.”681 With regards to the 
question of whether the confiscation of the paintings pursued a legitimate aim, it was 
accepted that the confiscation was intended as a means of safeguarding public morals by 
preventing the repetition of the offence for which the applicants had been convicted.682  
 
Necessity of the interference in a democratic society 
 
Having established that the State’s interference with the applicants’ Article 10 rights was 
both prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10(2), 
the final substantive question to be addressed by the Court was whether the interference 
was nevertheless necessary in a democratic society. In so doing, the Court confirmed that 
it understood ‘necessary’ to mean that there existed a ‘pressing social need’ for the 
interference683 and that, whilst the State enjoyed a ‘certain margin of appreciation’ in 
determining whether a ‘pressing social need’ in fact existed, this margin of appreciation 
remained subject to the supervision of the European Court of Human Rights.684 In assessing 
whether the interference may be reconciled with Article 10’s freedom of expression 
guarantees, the Court’s ‘supervisory jurisdiction’ may be seen as adopting a contextual 
approach according to which the focus of its inquiry is directed at whether, in light of the 
case as a whole, the interference was proportionate in meeting the legitimate aim being 
pursued and whether the reasons put forward by the domestic authorities were, in this 
regard, ‘relevant and sufficient’.685 
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The importance of freedom of expression notwithstanding – it being recognised as crucial 
to democracy’s progress as well as to the development of the individual686 – the Court went 
on to further explicate the potential for its limitation. Accordingly, whilst offensive, 
shocking and disturbing expression was included within the parameters of Article 10’s 
overall coverage, such expression remained subject to the limitation clauses of Article 
10(2).687 As such, notwithstanding the recognition that, “those who create, perform, 
distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is 
essential for a democratic society,”688 in exercising one’s right to freedom of expression 
consideration must be made of the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon the 
speaker.689 Of particular significance in this regard is the Court’s recognition of the 
variability of these duties and responsibilities, the scope of which is said to, “depend on 
[the speaker’s] situation and the means he uses.”690 
 
Finalising the framework from which it would assess the necessity of both the fine and the 
paintings’ confiscation was the Court’s reference to the lack of a uniform, pan-European 
conception of morality, as highlighted in the Handyside case.691 Accordingly, in light of 
the State authorities’ ‘direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries’ 
the Court surmised that domestic authorities are, in principle, better placed to respond to 
matters concerning morals.692  
 
In finding that neither the fine nor the paintings’ confiscation amounted to a violation of 
Article 10 the Court’s reasoning was derived, in large part, from the significant emphasis 
placed on the State’s margin of appreciation. Despite not explicitly giving an indication of 
the width of the margin of appreciation to be applied in the present case,693 the absence of 
a close scrutiny of the domestic courts’ decisions would, it is suggested, indicate that a 
wide margin of appreciation was, in fact, in place. Thus, underpinning the majority’s 
conclusion was its prima facie acceptance of the domestic courts’ assessment of the crudity 
with which the paintings depicted sexual scenes such that, “the Court does not find 
unreasonable the view taken by the Swiss courts that those paintings […] were ‘liable 
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grossly to offend the sense of sexual propriety of persons of ordinary sensitivity.’”694 
Moreover, given the (implicitly) wide margin of appreciation available to State, the 
domestic courts were, according to the Court, ‘entitled’ to consider both the imposition of 
a fine and the confiscation of the paintings to be necessary for the protection of public 
morality.695 That the interference was not unreasonable and could be seen as meeting a 
pressing social need was further justified, for the Court, with reference to the context from 
which the facts of Müller emerged; particularly with regards to the fact that there had been 
no entrance fee nor age restriction in place.696   
 
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994)697  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS 
 
The subject of Otto-Preminger-Institut was Werner Schroeter’s film Das Liebeskonzil 
(‘Council in Heaven’) which was, in turn, based on Oskar Panizza’s 19th century play of 
the same title, the publication of which led to Panizza’s imprisonment for crimes against 
religion in 1895.698 With Das Liebeskonzil again becoming the subject of legal proceedings 
a century later, the play has become, in the words of one leading authority on Panizza’s 
work, “a…prime litmus test for freedom of artistic expression in Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, and beyond.”699 The implications of the developments made in Otto-
Preminger-Insitut – especially with regards to the Court’s understanding of ‘the rights of 
others’ and the ‘duties and responsibilities’ of those wishing to exercise their right to 
freedom of expression – are therefore of profound significance for the freedom of 
specifically artistic expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. 
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Schroeter’s film, whilst perhaps less provocative than the original play,700 certainly 
remained controversial. God is said to be portrayed as an ‘apparently senile old man’, whilst 
Jesus Christ is seen to be a ‘low grade mental defective’ and the Virgin Mary an 
‘unprincipled wanton’.701 The film’s plot, in line with that of the play, sees the Virgin Mary 
leading God and Jesus Christ to the decision that mankind must be punished for its 
immorality; prompting, to this end, a conspiracy with the Devil to infect mankind with 
syphilis.702 Furthermore, Schroeter’s film depicts, inter alia, God engaging in a ‘deep kiss’ 
with the Devil, whom He calls His friend; a ‘degree of erotic tension’ between the Virgin 
Mary and the Devil in addition to Jesus Christ ‘lasciviously attempting to fondle his 
mother’s breasts, which she is shown as permitting.’703 Finally, “God, the Virgin Mary and 
Christ are shown in the film applauding the Devil.”704 Yet, in looking beyond this 
immediate portrayal of the characters involved, the film’s promotional materials stipulated 
that, “[t]rivial imagery and absurdities of the Christian creed are targeted in a caricatural 
[sic] mode and the relationship between religious beliefs and worldly mechanisms of 
oppression is investigated.”705 It will be noted, from the outset, that Werner Schroeter’s 
Das Liebeskonzil can therefore, at least on its surface, be considered as an attempt to 
engage, albeit satirically, with matters of general public interest.  
 
Nonetheless, the day before the film was due to be shown in the film house owned by the 
applicant association the public prosecutor instigated criminal proceedings against the 
cinema’s manager on the basis that Das Liebeskonzil ‘disparag[ed] religious doctrines’, 
contrary to the Austrian Penal Code. The film was subsequently seized.706 In dismissing 
the applicant’s appeal concerning the initial seizure of the film, the Court of Appeal 
maintained that, “artistic freedom was necessarily limited by the rights of others to freedom 
of religion and by the duty of the State to safeguard a society based on order and tolerance,” 
before going on to assert that,  “[t]he wholesale derision of religious feeling outweighed 
any interest the general public might have in information or the financial interests of 
persons wishing to show the film.”707 Moreover, and notwithstanding the express protection 
of artistic expression within the Austrian Basic Law – according to which “limitations of 
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artistic freedom are [not] possible by way of an express legal provision but may only follow 
from the limitations inherent in this freedom – in ordering the forfeiture of the film (thereby 
precluding any future showing of the film anywhere in Austria) the Regional Court 
accepted that the film’s depiction of the Roman Catholic religions central figures was “an 
attack on Christian religion.”708 
 
DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Prescribed by law 
 
Having established that the seizure and forfeiture of Schroeter’s Das Liebeskonzil 
amounted to an interference with the applicant film-house’s Article 10 rights, the first 
substantive issue to be addressed by the Court concerned whether the interference was 
prescribed by law. On this question, the applicant sought to raise three points concerning 
the domestic courts’ application of the relevant legislation.709 Firstly, it was questioned 
whether artistic expression, as a matter of fundamental principle, could be capable of either 
disparaging or insulting persons or objects of religious veneration. Secondly, it was argued 
that even if indignation could arise from artistic expression, such indignation ought not be 
considered to be justified in those who freely chose to watch the film. Finally, in light of 
the above, the applicant maintained that the right to freedom of artistic expression had not 
been given sufficient consideration by the domestic courts despite its explicit protection 
under Article 17a of the Austrian Basic Law. However, in failing to recognise any grounds 
to suppose that Austrian law had been misapplied, the Court maintained that, “it is primarily 
for the national authorities…to interpret and apply national law.”710 The seizure and 




Moving on to the question of whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim under 
Article 10(2) the present judgment of the European Court of Human Rights can be seen to 
proffer more substantiated reasoning than was evident in the previous case of Müller. 
Whereas in Müller  the State maintained that the interference sought to protect morals as 
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well as the rights of others – leading the Court to suggest, without further explanation, that 
there was a ‘natural link’ between these two aims711 – in Otto-Preminger-Institut, the Court 
placed its examination solely within the parameters of the ‘protection of the rights of 
others’.712 More specifically, the Austrian government sought to assert that the interference 
was, “particularly [aimed at protecting] the right to respect for one’s religious feelings.”713 
 
In confirming that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others, the majority’s judgment in Otto-Preminger-Insitut sought to employ a holistic 
interpretation of the Convention, according to which the ‘protection of the rights of others’ 
was understood with reference to its Article 9 jurisprudence. In this regard, of particular 
significance for the Court in Otto-Preminger-Insitut was the seminal case of Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, according to which expression may, under certain circumstances, be seen to 
undermine others’ Article 9 rights.714 Thus, whilst religious adherents cannot be said to 
enjoy total immunity from criticism, the majority reasoned in Otto-Preminger-Insitut that:  
 
the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a 
matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility 
to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right [to freedom of thought, conscience 
and belief] guaranteed under Article 9 (art. 9) to the holders of those beliefs and 
doctrines.715  
 
Moreover, the Court went on to assert that, “in extreme cases the effect of particular 
methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold 
such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.”716 
 
Thus, the Court surmised, since ‘provocative portrayals of religious veneration’ are capable 
of violating the rights of believers in respect of their religious feelings, by seeking to 
suppress expression deemed likely to cause ‘justified indignation’ amongst certain sections 
of Austrian society, the State authorities’ interference with the applicant’s Article 10 rights 
was, indeed, in the pursuance of the legitimate aim of ‘protecting the rights of others.’717 
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Necessity in a democratic society 
  
After establishing that there had been an interference with the applicant’s Article 10 rights 
and that such interference was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate interest, the 
European Court of Human Rights next set out the general principles informing its 
assessment of the necessity of the interference. As has become customary in its Article 10 
jurisprudence, the Handyside mantra signalling, in addition to confirming the applicability 
of article 10 to even offensive expression’s inclusion within Article 10, the significance of 
freedom of expression in terms of instilling the pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
necessary for a democratic society was recited by the Court.718 Given that the facts 
pertaining to Otto-Preminger-Institut afforded the Court with its first opportunity to 
develop its fledgling jurisprudence on specifically artistic expression since its explicit 
incorporation within Article 10 in Müller it is somewhat curious that the majority failed to 
reaffirm artistic expression’s explicit location within the broader context of Article 10. In 
particular, no reference was made to the observation in Müller that artistic expression, 
“…affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and 
social information and ideas of all kinds.”719  
 
The failure to explicitly affirm artistic expression’s location within Article 10 aside, the 
Court did develop upon the assertion, made in Müller, that the scope of the duties and 
responsibilities inherent in the exercise of one’s Article 10 rights is dependent upon the 
context and the means employed.720 In particular, the Grand Chamber in Otto-Preminger-
Institut stipulated that there may legitimately be, in the context of religious beliefs: 
 
an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously offensive 
to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore do not 
contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human 
affairs.721  
 
In light of its discussion pertaining the legitimacy of pursuing the aim of protecting the 
rights of others, vis-à-vis the Kokkinakis case, the Court went on to surmise that it may, 
therefore, be necessary in democratic society for the State to seek to suppress ‘improper 
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attacks’ on objects of religious veneration, provided that the interference was proportionate 
to the legitimate aim in question.722 
 
On the question of the margin of appreciation, Müller was cited; it being said that, as with 
morals, there was no uniform, European conception concerning the significance of religion 
in society such that a ‘certain’ margin of appreciation was left to the State in determining 
both the existence and extent of the necessity of any interference required to protect the 
religious feelings of the faithful.723 Significantly, the Court added that, “even within a 
single country such conceptions [as to the significance of religion in society] may vary.”724 
The scope of European supervision was therefore again confirmed to vary depending on 
circumstances of the case. Nonetheless, given the purported ‘importance of the freedoms 
in question’ in Otto-Preminger-Institut, a ‘strict’ supervision was required, according to 
which the necessity of the interference needed to be ‘convincingly established’.725  
 
In applying these general principles to the specific question of the State’s initial seizure of 
the film, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that there had not been a violation 
of Article 10. Informing the Court’s rationale in addressing the question of the 
interference’s necessity was its view that the facts of Otto-Preminger-Institut required the 
‘weighing up [of two] conflicting interests’.726 In short, the right to express (and receive) 
controversial expression needed to be weighed against the right to ‘proper respect’ for 
others’ freedom of religion, whilst simultaneously recognising the State’s margin of 
appreciation.  
 
The applicant attempted to distinguish the present case from that of Müller in which, it will 
be remembered, access to the gallery was free to the general public and no age restriction 
was in place. In this regard, the applicant argued that it had taken reasonable precautions 
to avoid causing unwitting offence such as to render the film’s initial seizure unnecessary. 
For instance, in addition to having an age restriction in place prohibiting those under the 
age of seventeen from viewing the showing, an admission fee was required to be paid in 
order to watch the film. Moreover, it was asserted that since the film had been widely 
publicised and given that the cinema’s clientele generally had ‘an interest in progressive 
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culture’, there was little threat of anyone being offended by the film’s contents against their 
wishes.727  
 
Notwithstanding the implementation of such measures, the majority judgment of Court 
took a contrary view to that advanced by the applicant, maintaining instead that the 
expression was ‘sufficiently public’, on account of the publicity that the film had received, 
for it to have caused offence.728 Seeming to inform the Court’s rationale in this regard was 
its recognition that the Tyrol area of Austria in which the film was due to be shown 
contained a significant population of Roman Catholics. That some 87% of the local 
population were of Roman Catholic faith thus led the Court to surmise that there was, 
indeed, a ‘pressing social need for the preservation of religious peace’.  
 
In seeking to prevent ‘unwarranted and offensive’ attacks on religious beliefs and thereby 
preserve religious peace in the Tyrol region of Austria, the Court confirmed that the 
Austrian authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation.729 Of particular 
significance in reaching this decision was the Court’s recognition that it is for the national 
authorities, in the first instance, to assess the necessity of any required measures in light of 
local conditions. Furthermore, the Court emphasised that sufficient consideration had been 
given to the freedom of (artistic) expression by the domestic courts. Thus, it was recognised 
that the national courts simply: 
 
did not consider that [Das Liebeskonzil’s] merit as a work of art or its contribution 
to public debate in Austrian society outweighed those features which made it 
essentially offensive to the general public within their jurisdiction.730 
 
In light of the State’s margin of appreciation, therefore, the Court went on to assert that, in 
the majority’s opinion, “the content of the film…cannot be said to be incapable of 
grounding the conclusions arrived at by the Austrian courts.”731 Through the application of 
a double-negative, the film’s seizure and, under the same reasoning, forfeiture were deemed 
necessary within a democratic society for the purposes of Article 10(2) and thus no 
violation was found. 
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Wingrove v. UK (1996)732 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS 
 
Decided, on the same day that representatives of the UK government visited the Strasbourg 
court to insist that member States be given more reign in the management of their own 
affairs,733 the case of Wingrove v. UK afforded the Court with another opportunity to 
develop its jurisprudence on the relationship between controversial artworks, gratuitous 
offence and the rights of others within the meaning of Article 10(2).  
 
The alleged violation of Article 10 in the case of Wingrove centred around the British Board 
of Film Classification’s (BBFC) refusal to certify Mr Wingrove’s eighteen minute film 
Visions of Ecstasy, a prerequisite for the legal sale and distribution of films in the United 
Kingdom.734  The film, although containing no dialogue, was said to have been inspired by 
the historical figure of St Teresa of Avila, a sixteenth century Carmelite nun who 
experienced ‘powerful ecstatic visions of Jesus Christ’.735 The film itself contains nudity 
and sexual scenes, including a lesbian encounter between the actor playing the part of St 
Teresa and another woman (said to be St Teresa’s psyche) as well as with the crucified 
form of Christ, who appears to be suggestively aroused by the experience.736  
 
In refusing to award the film with a classification certificate, the BBFC was mindful of its 
duty to avoid classifying films whose content fell within the remit of the Obscene 
Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964 in addition to those films that contravene any other 
provision of the criminal law.737 As such, the offence of blasphemy, defined by the House 
of Lords in the then recent domestic case of R v. Lemon as, “any contemptuous, reviling, 
scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible” was considered of 
particular relevance to the BBFC’s considerations.738 Accordingly, whilst it was accepted 
that questions of religious ecstasy and sexual passion may be matters of “legitimate concern 
                                                     
732 Wingrove v. UK 24 EHRR 1 (1996) 
733 Kearns (n 16) at 63 
734 Wingrove, op cit, paras. 23 and 32 
735 Wingrove, op cit, para. 8 
736 See Wingrove, op cit, para. 9 for greater detail of the film’s contents. 
737 Wingrove, op cit, para. 13 
738 Wingrove, op cit, para. 13 The purportedly blasphemous poem that prompted the case of R v. 
Lemon was subsequently the subject of admissibility proceedings before the European Commission 
of Human Rights Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. United Kingdom where the applicants’ claim, under 
Article 10, was declared inadmissible. 
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to the artist,” the determinative factor to be considered was, according to the BBFC, the 
manner (described as the ‘tone, style and spirit’) in which such subjects are addressed, such 
that it would be deemed blasphemous if, “the manner of its presentation is bound to give 
rise to outrage at the unacceptable treatment of a sacred subject.”739 There was therefore 
deemed to be sufficient grounds to suppose that the film would be found blasphemous at 
trial because there was, “no attempt to explore the meaning of the imagery [in which the 
sole focus of St Teresa’s erotic desires was the figure of Christ] beyond engaging the viewer 
in an erotic experience.”740 Accordingly, it was not the sexual imagery per se that led the 
BBFC to refuse to grant the film with certification but, rather, that the sexual imagery 
pertained to the figure of Christ.741 
 
Moreover, in upholding the BBFC’s original decision, the Video Appeals Committee 
(VAC) concluded that the film did not, as the applicant sought to assert, explore St Teresa’s 
inherent struggles with her visions but, rather, “exploited a devotion to Christ in purely 
carnal terms.”742 Informing the VAC’s conclusion was its assessment of the way in which 
the applicant depicted the subject matter. Much was made, therefore, of the applicant 
having exceeded his artistic licence: it being said, for instance, that there was an age 
discrepancy between the actual, historical figure of St Teresa and the actor depicting her 
and that there was no historical basis for the interpretation of her ecstasy taking the form 
of being in bodily contact with Christ.743  
 
DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Prescribed by law 
 
Since there was no disputing that the BBFC’s refusal to grant a certificate for the 
distribution of Visions of Ecstasy amounted to an interference with Mr Wingrove’s right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10,744 the first substantive issue to be addressed by the 
Court was, again, whether the interference was prescribed by law. In particular, the 
applicant sought to argue that the offence of blasphemy was too uncertain, and thereby 
afforded him with insufficient foresight as to whether or not his film would subsequently 
                                                     
739 Wingrove, op cit, para. 13 
740 Wingrove, para. 13 
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be deemed blasphemous.745 However, in common with its assessment of obscenity laws in 
the case of Müller as well as that offered by the Commission in Gay News, the Court 
recalled that, “the offence of blasphemy cannot by its very nature lend itself to precise legal 
definition.”746 Given that there was no uncertainty regarding the definition of blasphemy 
as provided in the case of R v. Lemon  per se, the Court was satisfied that the offence of 
blasphemy was prescribed by law to a sufficient degree and that, in light of the content of 
Mr Wingrove’s film, the applicant ought therefore to have been reasonably aware of the 




The aim of the interference, according to the government’s submission, was to: 
 
protect against the treatment of a religious subject in such a manner as to…outrage 
those who have an understanding of, sympathy towards and support for the 
Christian story and ethic, because of the contemptuous, reviling, insulting, 
scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style and spirit in which the subject is presented.748 
 
That protecting religious believers from offence was indeed considered to be a legitimate 
aim within the meaning of Article 10(2) was, in line with Müller and Otto-Preminger-
Institut, confirmed with the Court’s assertion that such an aim ‘undoubtedly corresponds 
to…the protection of ‘the rights of others’.749 Moreover, protecting the rights of others, in 
this regard, was said to be ‘fully consonant with the aim of the protections afforded by 
Article 9.750 
 
Necessity in a democratic society 
 
In line with the Court’s approach to the categorisation of expression outlined in Chapter 
Three of this thesis, and in contrast to the earlier cases of Müller and Otto-Preminger-
Institut, the Court in Wingrove referred explicitly to the notion that, “there is little scope 
under Article 10(2) for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public 
interest,” before going on to explain that a wider margin of appreciation is available to 
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national authorities on matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions in the realm 
of morals and religion.751 The Court’s subsequent assessment of the interference with the 
applicant’s right to freedom of expression therefore hinged on the balancing of, on the one 
hand, the film’s perceived capacity to contribute to a debate on questions of public interest 
and, on the other, its potential to cause offence to religious sensitivities.  
 
Accordingly, after recognising that there exists a duty within Article 10 to avoid causing 
gratuitous offence, underpinning much of the Court’s reasoning leading to the finding that 
there had been no violation of Article 10 was its (necessarily limited) assessment of the 
manner in which the expression was made. Whilst the majority’s judgment did not make 
the further assertion, as it had in Otto-Preminger-Institut, that gratuitously offensive 
expression is inherently incapable of contributing to public discourse, artistic expression 
was similarly, and indeed further, undermined by the Court’s acceptance and reiteration, 
on account of the wide margin of appreciation, of the rationale employed by the BBFC in 
refusing to grant a certificate in the initial instance. Thus, a crucial factor in, firstly, the 
BBFC and VAC’s grounds for refusing a certificate for the film’s release and, secondly, 
the Court’s finding that there had been no violation of Article 10 in so doing, was that it 
was the manner in which the subject matter was presented and not the subject matter per 
se that was at issue.752 Again, in light of the limited scrutiny afforded to the European Court 
of Human Rights stemming from the widening of the margin of appreciation, no specific 
account could be given to the notion that, for instance, the manner in which the expression 
was made is inherently bound up in the form that the expression was made. 
 
That it was the manner in which Mr Wingrove had chosen to pursue his chosen subject 
matter that was of crucial significance in reaching the conclusion that there had been no 
violation of Article 10 again may be considered to be a further demonstration of the 
inherently discriminated position enjoyed by artistic expression under Article 10. Again, 
without recognising or engaging with the unique qualities pertaining to artistic expression 
and their relationship within the freedom of expression discourse more generally (and a 
seeming dependence upon a need for the expression’s perceived ability to contribute, in a 
traditional ‘politically’ minded sense, to public discourse) artistic expression is implicitly, 
and somewhat inevitably, undermined.  
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I.A. v. Turkey (2005)753 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS 
 
The case of I. A. v. Turkey concerned the publication of the book Yasak Tümceler (The 
Forbidden Phrases) in which the author’s philosophical and theological views were 
presented, according to the European Court of Human Rights, in a ‘novelistic style’.754 In 
initiating criminal proceedings against the applicant publisher, the public prosecutor cited 
the evidence provided by an academic theologian who considered that the book’s 
theological passages, “imprisons readers within the limits of [the author’s] own views, 
which are devoid of all academic rigour” such that the book was deemed blasphemous 
within the terms of the relevant section of the Turkish Criminal Code.755 
 
Of particular relevance, then, in the subsequent criminal proceedings that were brought 
against the applicant publisher was the following passage: 
 
Look at the triangle of fear, inequality and inconsistency in the Koran; it reminds 
me of an earthworm. God says that all the words are those of his messenger. Some 
of these words, moreover, were inspired in a surge of exultation, in Aisha's arms. 
[…] God's messenger broke his fast through sexual intercourse, after dinner and 
before prayer. Muhammad did not forbid sexual relations with a dead person or a 
live animal.756 
 
That the book was indeed blasphemous, contrary to the Turkish Criminal Code’s 
prohibition of the vilification or insulting of religion and religious beliefs, was thus 
confirmed in the domestic courts and a fine imposed on the applicant.757 
 
DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Given the European Court of Human Rights’ preceding case law pertaining to Müller, Otto-
Preminger-Institut and Wingrove it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court held there to be 
no violation of Article 10. Following from its previous case law, by widening the margin 
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of appreciation on account of the religious aspect of the book and recognising the duty 
incumbent upon the exercise of the right to freedom of expression to avoid conveying 
gratuitously offensive expression, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the 
domestic courts had acted within the margin of appreciation bestowed upon it in awarding 
the applicant with a fine. Accordingly, notwithstanding the applicant’s assertion that the 
book, by taking the form of a novel, should be considered in terms of its literary qualities, 
the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the expression at issue in I.A. v. Turkey 
went beyond the merely shocking or offensive and was, as such, an ‘abusive attack on the 
Prophet of Islam’.758 Again, the application of the margin of appreciation necessarily 
worked to paralyse any independent assessment, on the part of the European Court of 
Human Rights, as to the specific qualities pertaining to artistic expression and its 
relationship with freedom of expression more generally. 
 
Whilst the conclusion reached in I.A v. Turkey is not surprising, it is curious to note that 
the case was decided by a slim majority of four votes to three. When compared to the 
overwhelming majorities enjoyed in the judgments of Müller, Otto-Preminger-Institut and 
Wingrove such a shift is perhaps indicative of the beginnings of a paradigmatic change in 
the Court’s jurisprudence: the extent to which such a shift is currently underfoot will, 
accordingly, be addressed in the overview of the Court’s later case law to follow. Crucially, 
there is a degree of recognition, within the reasoning employed in the joint dissenting 
opinion in I.A. v. Turkey, of the nature of artistic expression and its relationship to freedom 
of expression. Thus, in noting the limited number of copies of the book that had been 
produced, the dissenting opinion asserted that impact that the book’s distribution would 
have would likely be minimal, the dissenting opinion was therefore critical of the national 
authority’s approach, in which they confined themselves solely to an abstract assessment 
of the impugned statements.759 Accordingly, according to the dissenting opinion, the 
promotion of conformism in the European Court of Human Rights’ earlier triumvirate case 
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4.3.5  Protecting the ‘rights of others’ as a basis for limiting the right to 
freedom of artistic expression: Defamation 
 
In addition to public morality, and its relationship with the rights of others, another crucial 
strand of the ‘rights of others’ limitation clause of Article 10 (2) relates to the treatment of 
artistic expression in two cases in which defamation was specifically raised as a ground for 
restricting the expression.  As such, the cases of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. 
Austria761 and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France762 offer an invaluable 
insight in to the contrasting schools of thought within the Court as to the treatment of artistic 
expression more generally (by way of contrast with the public morality cases) as well as 
the relationship between art and defamation more specifically. Not only are the cases 
factually similar, in that they both concern the alleged infringement of the personality rights 
of politicians, but, with the cases decided only months apart in 2007, a considerable number 
of personnel were present on the bench on each occasion. That the outcome of the cases 
differed – with the finding of a violation of Article 10 found in the earlier case of 
Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria contrasting with the non-violation held, by a 
majority in the Grand Chamber, in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France – is 
therefore, at least on the surface, peculiar and worthy of further investigation.  
 
Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria (2007)763 
 
In Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria a slender majority of four to three in the First 
Section of the Court held that the injunction preventing the further display of the artist Otto 
Muhl’s Apocalypse constituted a violation of freedom of expression. The painting in 
question had featured, as part of the applicant’s centenary celebrations, in an exhibition 
entitled, somewhat ironically, The Century of Artistic Expression and depicted, in a collage 
style, a number of public figures engaging in sexual acts; their faces being portrayed using 
blown-up photos obtained from newspapers, whilst the adjoining, naked, bodies were 
painted by Otto Muhl himself.764 The exhibition was held on the applicant’s own premises 
and, in contrast with the earlier case of Müller , entrance was subject to an admission 
charge.765 
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One of those depicted in the scene, Mr Meischberger (former general secretary of the 
Austrian Freedom Party and who was, at the time, a member of the National Assembly) 
sought an injunction preventing the applicant from exhibiting and the publishing the 
painting, which showed him, “gripping the ejaculating penis of [the former head of the 
Austrian Freedom Party] whilst at the same time being touched by two other [Austrian 
Freedom Party] politicians and ejaculating on Mother Teresa.”766 In particular, Mr 
Meischberger claimed that the painting, “debased him and his political activities and made 
statements as to his allegedly loose sexual life,” an argument that he maintained despite his 
depiction being partially covered by red paint, following the painting’s vandalism towards 
the end of the exhibition’s run.767 
 
The reasoning underlying the Court’s finding that there had been a violation of Article 10 
in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria may be considered as a further example 
suggestive of a trend in the Court’s increasing, if gradual, awareness of the specific qualities 
of artistic works and of artistic expression’s relationship to, and location within, the 
freedom of expression discourse more generally the emergence of which may be traced 
back to the dissenting opinion in I.A. v. Turkey. In particular, in noting the form in which 
the expression in Otto Muhl’s Apocalypse had taken, the majority in Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler v. Austria stipulated that there had never been any suggestion to the contrary that 
the work “obviously did not aim to reflect or even to suggest reality.”768 As such, the Court, 
in accepting Muhl’s work to be a piece of satire, went on to assert that, “satire is a form of 
artistic expression and social commentary and, by its inherent features of exaggeration and 
distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate.”769 
 
It would be understandable, therefore, to consider the Court’s judgment in Vereinigung 
Bildender Künstler v. Austria as a bastion for freedom of artistic expression. By affirming 
that the imposition of an injunction in the present case violated Article 10 of the ECHR the 
Court, at first glance at least, appeared to be upholding the right to produce and disseminate 
controversial art, thus finally delivering on the oft-quoted but little acted upon maxim that 
first entered the vocabulary of human rights law pertaining to freedom of expression some 
thirty years previously: namely that Article 10 applies even to shocking and offensive 
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expression. Moreover, given the religious connotations prevailing throughout much of 
Apocalypse (Mr Meischberger was, after all, depicted as engaging in a sexual act with 
Mother Teresa and, elsewhere in the scene, other religious leaders featured in similarly 
explicit activities) one may see certain similarities with Wingrove and, to a slightly lesser 
extent, Otto-Preminger. That a violation of Article 10 was found in Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler v. Austria and not the earlier cases of Wingrove and Otto-Preminger – cases 
where, it will be recalled, the Court’s recognition of the ‘gratuitous’ nature of the 
expression necessarily, it was supposed, rendered the expression as being incapable of 
contributing to public discourse – may, for the optimist at least, offer some suggestion of 
the development of the kernels of a seismic shift in the Court’s Article 10 jurisprudence. 
Rather than looking at an artwork superficially and one-dimensionally – with the binary 
effect of equating gratuitous expression with, what is in practice, through the blurring of 
the coverage-protection distinction, effectively non-protection – a small, but growing, case 
law is emerging, indicating a more contextual approach in which qualities specific to the 
artistic endeavour are recognised and applied to the Court’s reasoning such that one may 
see the beginnings for a greater scope in the protection for artistic expression.  
 
Indeed, that there were certain facial similarities between the artworks in Vereinigung 
Bildender Künstler v. Austria and the earlier ‘public morality’ cases concerning artistic 
expression is to a certain extent confirmed by considering the strategy adopted by the 
Austrian government’s legal counsel. In attempting to dismiss the applicant’s claim as 
inadmissible, the government first submitted that there had in fact been no interference with 
the applicant’s right to freedom of expression on the grounds that, “Article 10 [does] not 
protect artistic freedom as such but only provide[s] protection to artists who intended to 
contribute through their work to a public discussion of political or cultural matters.”770 By 
implicitly mirroring the reasoning underpinning the attributing of the label ‘gratuitous 
offence’ to the artworks in Wingrove and Otto-Preminger, the government went on to 
stipulate that the, “reproduction of public figures in ‘group sexual situations’ could […] 
hardly be regarded as a statement of opinion contributing to a cultural or political 
debate.”771 Similarly, in the alternative – supposing that the Court accepted that there had 
been an interference – the government sought to maintain that the interference, by way of 
injunction, was nevertheless a proportionate reaction to the situation given the impact on 
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Mr Meischberger’s personality rights when counterbalanced against the artwork’s lack of 
contribution to public discussion.772  
 
In finding there to have been a violation of Article 10, the majority of the Court dismissed 
both strands of the government’s argument. Yet the line of reasoning employed in reaching 
that decision cannot be said to promote the protection of artistic expression to the extent 
that one might initially presume. Whilst the majority, in essence, rejected the government’s 
submission that the particular artwork in question did not contribute to a public discussion 
and, in doing so, referred to the specific artistic/satirical qualities of Otto Muhl’s work – 
such as distortion and exaggeration – the net result of the Court’s reasoning may be seen 
as an attempt to subtly locate the issue within the parameters of ‘political expression’. Thus, 
much was made of the fact that Mr Meischberger was a politician, and a lesser well-known 
one at that773, and thus ought to display a greater degree of tolerance towards criticism in 
line with the well-established Lingens principles concerning the strict protection of political 
expression. As such, and in light of the fact that Otto Muhl had himself been the subject of 
criticism from some of politicians featured in Apocalypse, the artwork in question was 
considered as “some sort of counter-attack.”774 That the work featured politicians in 
addition to the initial complainant himself being a politician may be considered as 
significant in giving a majority of the judges of the Court the confidence to recognise the 
artwork’s contribution to public discourse and society/culture more generally, in turn 
leading to the conclusion that the granting of an injunction was disproportionate and thus 
in violation of Article 10. 
 
Herein lies something of a paradox. It is submitted that on slightly different facts a rather 
different outcome would likely have occurred. In finding that Apocalypse did contribute to 
a public discussion – such that any interference with it had to be assessed with ‘particular 
care’ and thus paving the way for the finding of a violation – the Court rejected the 
government’s argument that, in addition to consideration of the ‘rights of others’, the 
injunction was justified on the grounds that it also sought to protect public morality. The 
government’s submission was rejected on the basis that throughout the domestic 
proceedings the case against the applicant was based entirely on copyright legislation, 
which made no reference to the protection of public morality.775 However, it is certainly 
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not inconceivable to imagine a scenario in which, say, a practicing Catholic who, upon 
seeing the depiction of Mother Teresa in Apocalypse, was grossly offended to the extent 
that he complains to the authorities who subsequently seize the artwork on the grounds that 
it ‘disparaged religious doctrines’. It would be difficult, under such circumstances, for the 
Court to convincingly distinguish between this, hypothetical, Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler v. Austria case and that of Wingrove or Otto-Preminger such that it would be very 
likely, it is suggested, that the Court would find no violation of Article 10. Yet, such a 
position is clearly unsatisfactory, if not plainly undesirable, for the simple reason that the 
very same artwork could be subject to differing levels of protection, depending solely on 
what limitation clause under Article 10(2) the government in question sought to pursue. 
Moreover, as the Apocalypse paradox highlights, one may further infer that the Court is 
concerned less with the specific artistic qualities of a work per se, or indeed the artistic 
endeavour in general, than it is with its own confidence in recognising the potential 
contribution of a given work of art to public discourse. In particular, the level of confidence 
can be seen as heightened by an ability to ‘understand’ the artwork in a conventional, 
political discourse.  After all, the artist’s claim in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria 
to be exploring the relationship between sexuality and power would be seen as holding 
greater sway when applied to the politician than when applied to the religious actor, thus 
exemplifying the failure to fully acknowledge the artistic qualities.   
 
Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France (2007)776 
 
In turning our attention to the case of Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 
one may see a distinct contrast in the attitude of the Court towards the limitation of artistic 
expression in respect of protecting the rights of others. Published in 1998, the novel Jean-
Marie Le Pen on Trial tells the story of a fictional Front National militant named Ronald 
Blistier who is convicted for killing a North African man in what he admits was a racist 
crime. Although a work of fiction, Jean-Marie Le Pen On Trial drew heavily on the actual 
murders of two individuals of African descent, by militants of the right wing Front 
National. In reality, the murderers of the two incidents were duly convicted in trials 
described by Le Pen as “a provocation and a put-up job through which the party's enemies 
sought to harm it.”777 
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The plot of the novel centres on the moral dilemmas facing the accused’s lawyer – a left 
wing Jewish homosexual – who seeks to find some way to hold the Chairman of the Front 
National, Mr Le Pen, to account. Near the beginning of the novel the thought is pondered, 
“isn't the chairman of the Front National responsible for the murder committed by one of 
his teenage militants inflamed by his rhetoric?”778 In response, Le Pen and the Front 
National brought proceedings before the domestic courts for public defamation against a 
private individual, specifically with regard to six passages within the novel, amounting to 
no more than three per cent of the book taken as a whole.779 Moreover, of the six passages 
that were the subject of the original complaint, only three were ultimately found to be 
defamatory. Thus, the passages deemed by the domestic courts to be defamatory read as 
follows: 
 
.... an effective way to fight Le Pen is to call for him to be put in the dock and show 
that he isn't the leader of a political party but the chief of a gang of killers – after 
all, people would have voted for Al Capone too.780; 
 
Read the papers, listen to the radio and television, every statement by Jean-Marie 
Le Pen is bedecked – or rather bespotted and bespattered, with racist overtones that 
are barely concealed at best. Each of his words is a veil for others and from behind 
each of his assertions looms the spectre of the worst abominations of the history of 
mankind. Everyone knows it, everyone says it. What Ronald Blistier did was 
precisely what Jean-Marie Le Pen advocates. Perhaps not explicitly – he tries to 
abide by the law, even though he does not always manage to do so. But when you 
consider the situations in which he speaks, the innuendos he makes and the figures 
he supports, there can be no doubt.781; 
 
How can Jean-Marie Le Pen be allowed to play the victim after Ronald Blistier's 
suicide? Isn't the Front National chairman a vampire who thrives on the bitterness 
of his electorate, but sometimes also on their blood, like the blood of his enemies? 
Why does Le Pen accuse democrats of the alleged murder of Ronald Blistier? 
Because he isn't afraid of lies – because engaging in defamation against his 
opponents always appears useful for him, of course, but it is also quite simply a 
means to deflect suspicion; he's the one who shouts the loudest in the hope that his 
ranting will drown out the accusations against himself.782 
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Perhaps the greatest distinction that can be made between Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens 
and July v. France and Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, other than the outcome 
itself, is the relationship between the artworks in question and perceived reality. As we 
shall see below, the reason for these differing results lies, in part, on the majority’s failure, 
whether intentional or otherwise, to attribute sufficient weight to specific artistic qualities 
inherent in the work. In particular, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, this failure 
of the Grand Chamber in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France may be traced 
to its setting out a narrow margin of appreciation. By recalling that there is, “little scope 
under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions on freedom of expression in the area 
of political speech or debate – where freedom of expression is of the utmost importance 
[…] – or in matters of public interest […]”783 there was clearly a more explicit attempt to 
locate the present case within the ‘political expression’ paradigm than was the case in 
Vereinigung Bildender Künstler.784 That the subject matter of the novel was based on the 
semi-factual events surrounding the trial of a Front National militant was evidence enough 
for the Court that, “[t]he work therefore unquestionably relates to a debate on a matter of 
general concern and constitutes political and militant expression, hence this is a case where 
a high level of protection of the right to freedom of expression is required under Article 
10.”785  
 
Nevertheless, the majority of the Grand Chamber did give some credence to the medium 
through which the expression was made, albeit not with to the same extent as the First 
Section had in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler. In particular it was noted that: 
 
A novel is a form of artistic expression, which falls within the scope of Article 10 
in that it affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, 
political and social information and ideas of all kinds. Those who create or 
distribute a work, for example of a literary nature, contribute to the exchange of 
ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic society.786  
 
However, whilst the Court went on to accept the ‘limited audience’ argument pertaining to 
the limited impact artistic expression as a form of expression generally is considered to 
have, as developed through cases like Alinak, to be considered below, there is a distinct 
                                                     
783 Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, op cit, para. 46 (citations removed) 
784 Though, as I have attempted to argue above, there remained, in the case of Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler, a sense that the philosophy of the ‘political expression’ paradigm underlined, albeit subtly, 
much of the majority’s reasoning.   
785 Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, op cit, para. 48 
786 Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, op cit, para. 47  
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absence in the majority’s reasoning of any reference to the relevant stylistic devices 
employed by literary writers. For instance, it will be recalled that in Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler the Court recognised that distortion and exaggeration played an integral part in 
the satirical nature of Otto Muhl’s Apocalypse such that it was accepted as obvious that the 
painting did not, and did not even attempt to, explain or reflect reality – at least not in the 
literal or surface sense. By way of contrast, in Lindon, the Court’s approval of the domestic 
courts’ finding that passages in which Mr le Pen is, for example, described as “the chief of 
a gang of killers” or “a vampire who thrives on the bitterness of his electorate, but 
sometimes also on their blood” were defamatory contained no reference to artistic qualities 
that may have been of relevance given the medium in question. For instance, it would not 
be unreasonable to assume that, as part of the author’s artistic endeavour, he had employed 
such qualities as hyperbole (‘chief of a gang of killers’) or metaphor (‘vampire’).  
 
Whilst it is accepted that such qualities alone might not preclude a finding of no violation 
– the Court has, after all, stipulated on several occasions that everyone, in exercising their 
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 is subject to certain duties and 
responsibilities such that to nobody is automatically immune from the limitations espoused 
under Article 10(2) – there remains a degree of inconsistency in the manner in which the 
Court approaches expression that it readily admits is artistic in its nature. 
 
Returning briefly to the speculative opening section of the present paper – in which it was 
tentatively suggested that an opportunity to afford greater protection to artistic expression 
may have been missed during the drafting process of Article 10 – one may argue that, had 
artistic expression been explicitly mentioned, a greater impetus would have been instilled 
in the Court’s reasoning in so far as the taking in to account of the specific qualities of art 
within the freedom of expression paradigm more generally. As it stands, without the 
express provision relating to art, Article 10, in its generality, may be considered as 
affording too wide a scope in the manner in which the Court may approach the issue of 
artistic expression in any given instance. For instance, despite the finding of a violation in 
Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, the manner in which the Court reached the decision could, 
it is suggested, have been improved upon, had express reference to art been made within 
the rubric of Article 10. Although, greater weight was, admittedly, given to the artistic 
qualities present in the work in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler than in Lindon, it has been 
suggested that the underlying rationale employed by the Court was influenced by a rather 
traditional and ‘political’ (in the sense of argument/counter-argument) understanding of 
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how Apocalypse was considered to contribute to public discourse so as to subtly counteract 
any consideration of specific artistic qualities. In short, it is suggested that it was not the 
artwork in and of itself that was being protected in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler (as 
evinced by the hypothetical case concerning a Catholic complainant) but, rather, the more 
abstract notion of enabling a contribution to public discourse – a finding that was only 
capable of being achieved owing to the case’s specific circumstances and subsequent 
application of a quasi-political expression approach to the matter at hand.  
 
Similarly, in Lindon, by locating the expression within the context of the political 
expression paradigm – owing to the surface, or literal, subject matter of the text – any 
assessment of the artistic qualities of the work were, perhaps necessarily, overlooked. In 
particular, as a direct consequence of the recognition of Jean-Marie Le Pen On Trial as 
falling within the ambit of political expression, the Court relied heavily on its existing case 
law concerning the distinction made by the Court in Lingens between, on the one hand, 
statements of fact and, on the other, value-judgments. In that case the Austrian courts found 
that the accusations made by Mr Lingens in a political magazine – namely that the plaintiff 
question was “immoral” and “undignified” in addition to describing comments made by 
the plaintiff as demonstrating “the basest opportunism” – were criminally defamatory.787 
Subsequently, Mr Lingens was convicted of criminal defamation, essentially on the 
grounds that he had failed to establish the veracity of his statements.788  
 
In unanimously finding that Mr Lingen’s conviction amounted to a violation of Article 10, 
the Court asserted that a distinction needs to be made between facts and value-judgments 
for the seemingly simple reason that, “[t]he existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas 
the truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of proof.”789 Moreover, the Court proceeded 
to stipulate that the essentially illogical requirement under the Austrian Criminal Code, to 
establish the truth of value-judgments, amounted to an infringement of freedom of thought 
which in turn is a fundamental part of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court seemed to 
place a great deal of significance on the fact that assertions of value or opinion, though 
based on some particular set of facts (for instance, the presence of former Nazis in 
prominent political positions in Austria) but are, nevertheless, in and of themselves not 
susceptible to proof in the conventional sense, are still to be given considerable protection. 
                                                     
787 Case of Lingens v. Austria (1986) (HUDOC), paras. 9-19 
788 Lingens, op cit, para. 46 
789 Lingens, op cit, para. 46 
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To rule otherwise would be to deprive the public of the opportunity of “discovering and 
forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders.”790  
 
Transferring the fact-value dichotomy to the case of Lindon, a failure to appreciate any 
specific artistic qualities of the novel in question would clearly tend to skew the subsequent 
reasoning process. The problem is exacerbated in Lindon by the inconsistency with which 
the Court identifies the ‘voice’ with which the defamatory statements were made. As the 
dissenting judges point out, it is unclear from the domestic courts’ rationale why certain 
statements (for instance, “they’ll feel morally entitled to beat you up – to come after you, 
ten against one, with metal bars, truncheons and steel-capped boots…Nobody leaves the 
Front National with impunity”) were not found to be defamatory on the basis that the author 
was considered to have sufficiently distanced himself from them whilst, conversely, other 
statements were deemed to be sufficiently close to the author to amount to defamation. 
Indeed, the applicants had argued before the Court that such an approach seeking to 
ascertain the author’s thoughts from the words and actions of fictional characters, had the 
effect of, “imprison[ing]…literature in a set of rigid rules at odds with the freedom of 
artistic creation and expression.”791 Again, without the ability (or indeed willingness) to set 
the particular expression within its proper context – ie. with reference to the particular 
qualities inherent of artworks – artistic expression is inevitably, perhaps even necessarily, 
put at a disadvantage. To put it another way, Vereinigung Bildender Künstler and Lindon 
demonstrate the difficulties in calibrating the different types of expression within the 
‘catch-all’ rubric of Article 10: a process that would, arguably, have been less contrived 
had ‘art’ been expressly mentioned in Article 10’s text. 
 
4.3.6 Protecting national security, territorial integrity and the prevention of 
disorder and crime as bases for limiting the right to freedom of artistic 
expression 
 
Interestingly, the two cases to date in which the limitation of expression was grounded on 
either the protection of national security and territorial integrity and/or the prevention of 
disorder and crime are similar, not only in that both emanated from Turkey but, of more 
relevance for present purposes, both were found in favour of the applicant in producing a 
finding that Article 10 had, in fact, been violated. More interesting still is consideration of 
                                                     
790 Lingens, op cit, para. 42 
791 Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, op cit, para. 51 
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the differing approaches taken by the Court in each case in reaching that the same 
conclusion, an acknowledgment of which will show the facially paradoxical stance that has 
been adopted and developed through the Court’s latter cases pertaining to artistic 
expression.  
 
The first of these two cases, that of Karatas, concerned an anthology of poems penned by 
the applicant and entitled The Song of a Rebellion – Dersim.792 Two months after the 
anthology was published, the public prosecutor initiated proceedings under terrorism laws 
against both Mr Karatas and his publisher, accusing them of having disseminated 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the State.793 By a majority of twelve votes to five, 
the Grand Chamber of the Court held that the subsequent conviction and confiscation of 
the work amounted to a violation of Article 10, having concluded that the measures taken 
against the applicant were disproportionate in securing the sought after legitimate aims, 
such that they could not be considered to have been necessary in a democratic society.794 
 
In light of the preceding discussion regarding the categorisation of expression and given 
the nature the nature of poetry in question, there exists an underlying tension in Karatas 
between two competing, though on the present facts, interrelated, widths of the margin of 
appreciation considered applicable to the national authorities in the discharge of their 
responsibilities under Article 10(2). Firstly, it was noted by the Court that the poems in 
question contained an, “obvious political dimension,” the result being that the Court’s case 
law to the effect that, “there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for 
restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest” was considered 
to be of relevance.795 Secondly, whilst acknowledging that the limits of criticism levelled 
at the government is generally wider than that aimed at private citizens or even politicians, 
the Court went on to note that, “where such remarks incite to violence against an individual 
or a public official or a sector of the population, the State authorities enjoy a wider margin 
of appreciation when examining the need for an interference with freedom of 
expression.”796  
 
                                                     
792 Karatas v. Turkey (1999) (HUDOC), para. 9 
793 Karatas, op cit, para. 10 
794 Karatas, op cit, para. 54 
795 Karatas, op cit, para. 50 (referring, in particular, to Wingrove, op cit, para. 58) (emphasis added) 
796 Karatas, op cit, para. 50 (emphasis added) 
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Whilst no direct reference was made to the expression being of an artistic nature in the 
setting out of the Court’s initial margin of appreciation dichotomy noted above – thereby 
supporting the notion made previously that the categorisation and hierarchy of expression, 
as achieved through the variability of the margin of appreciation doctrine itself, is largely 
implicit with the Court being either unwilling or unaware of art’s differential treatment 
unwilling – reference to the work’s artistic nature was, perhaps somewhat counter-
intuitively, relied upon in the subsequent process of justifying the narrowing of the margin 
of appreciation and thus leading to a finding of a violation of Article 10. In particular, this 
narrowing was achieved with a sense of negative reasoning in as much that it was the 
artistic nature of the expression that was considered to nullify the wide margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by the State with regard to the incitation of violence. Thus, the Court 
noted that the means through which the applicant had made his expression – ie. poetry – 
would necessarily, and ‘by definition’, reach only a small audience, thereby reducing any 
impact that the expression would have with regards to national security, public order or 
territorial integrity.     
 
Additionally, in confirming that the anthology would likely have a limited impact in terms 
of national security etc, the majority, for the first time in a case concerning artistic 
expression, went on to make a glancing reference to, and consideration of, the implications 
of the artistic qualities of the expression, noting in particular that: 
 
even though some of the passages from the poems seem very aggressive in tone 
and to call for the use of violence, the Court considers that the fact that they were 
artistic in nature and of limited impact made them less a call to an uprising than 
an expression of deep distress in the face of a difficult political situation.797 
 
The implication that one may draw from the above quotation is that, despite the poetry’s 
facial statements, that may well have been construed as calling for an uprising, the artistic 
nature of the expression in question requires one to look deeper, and further, ‘beyond’ the 
words and the phrases used in order to see the ‘expression of deep distress’ as opposed to 
a direct incitation to violence.  
 
Indeed, the recognition and sympathetic application of the particular qualities and 
characteristics of art, was further developed, six years later, in the case of Alinak. The case 
concerned a novel, said to have incited hatred and hostility on the grounds of ethnic or 
                                                     
797 Karatas, op cit, para. 52 
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regional identity, such that the seizure of the novel was maintained by the government to 
have been necessary in order to prevent disorder and crime.798 Again, as with Karatas, the 
tone of the novel which – though fiction, was said to have been based on real events, 
centring on the ill-treatment of a village at the hands of the State security forces – could be 
described as virulent, with the Court noting that, “[t]aken literally, certain passages might 
be construed as inciting readers to hatred, revolt and the use of violence.”799 Yet, the Court 
went on to stipulate that recognition must be made of the fact that the expression in question 
took the form of a novel, a form of artistic expression.800 Moreover, and in developing on 
the rationale employed in Karatas, the Court went on to cite the case of De Haes and Gisels 
which, though not concerning artistic expression, stipulated that Article 10 protects both 
the substance of the ideas and information that are expressed, as well as the form in which 
they are conveyed.801 
 
Accordingly, and in line with Karatas, despite the statements contained within the novel 
which, taken literally, might be construed as a call for violence, the Court considered that 
the expression in question would necessarily reach a small audience on account of it being 
a novel, such that its potential impact would necessarily be reduced.802 Furthermore, in 
addition to the limited impact the novel would likely make, and with a nod towards the 
Karatas judgment, reference was made to the artistic nature of the expression, rendering it 
more an ‘expression of deep distress in the face of tragic events…than a call to violence.”803 
The seizure of the novel was therefore considered to be disproportionate to the ends 
pursued, rendering a violation of Article 10.  
 
As such, parallels may be drawn between, on the one hand, the cases of Karatas and Alinak 
and, on the other, the Millian conception – espoused through his ‘corn-dealer’ analogy804 – 
that freedom of expression ought only be restricted when there exists a very real and present 
danger that harm will occur as a direct consequence of a given expression. Thus, reference 
was made to the qualities of artistic expression solely as a means of narrowing an otherwise 
wide margin of appreciation (ie. in relation to inciting violence) on the specific grounds 
that the artwork in question would, almost by definition, be of limited impact thereby 
                                                     
798 Alinak v. Turkey (2005) (HUDOC), paras. 11 and 27 
799 Alinak, op cit, para. 41 
800 Alinak, op cit, paras 41 and 43 
801 Alinak, op cit, para. 43: citing De Haes v. Belgium (1994) (HUDOC), see especially, para. 48 
802 Alinak, op cit, para. 45 
803 Alinak, op cit, para. 45 
804 For more detail see Chapter One infra. 
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offering an indication that the State’s interference was disproportionate. In other words, 
from the Millian perspective, it could not be demonstrated that the (artistic) expression 
would directly induce the perceived harm. Such an approach must be commended for 
promoting a greater understanding and appreciation of the artistic endeavour and qualities 
perhaps peculiar to artistic works more generally, in as much as the Court has managed, to 
a certain extent, to ‘distance’ the expression from any prima facie harm. Accordingly, 
applying the same rationale to a future Wingrove-type case may yield an approach which 
is further conducive to the protection of artistic expression by ‘distancing’ the gratuity of 
the perceived offence from the supposed infringement of the rights of others vis-à-vis the 
recognition of any artistic qualities inherent in the work. At the very least, in light of 
Karatas and Alinak the Court ought, it is suggested, explain, in a depth that has been 
hitherto lacking, precisely how an artwork, even if controversial, can be said to directly – 
in the Millian sense – cause the harm with which it is alleged to have caused.805  
 
Yet, the specific approach taken by the Court in Karatas and Alinak is something of a 
double-edged sword: offering both hope and trepidation with regard to the future protection 
of artistic expression. By ‘distancing’ the expression from the alleged harm by way of the 
recognition of the limited audience which will be exposed to the artwork and the therefore 
necessarily limited impact that the (artistic) expression will have with regards to the feared 
harm, the net result in Karatas and Alinak, and in ironic contrast with the blasphemy cases, 
is that the works have been protected precisely because of their supposed inability to 
contribute to (widespread, at least) public discourse. Such an approach, when looked at 
from such a perspective does little to suggest that the value of artistic expression, within 
the paradigm of freedom of expression more generally, is being appreciated. 
 
Moreover, and in relation to the seeming irony outlined above, despite the recognition in 
Karatas and Alinak that specific artistic qualities ought to be acknowledged, there remains 
a sense – that was indeed later developed in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler – that the 
artwork, rather than being protected solely because of its inherent value as a work of art, 
was implicitly protected because of its proximity to more ‘traditional’ expression or, more 
broadly speaking, to ‘political’ expression. As we have seen with Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler, and the Court’s recognition that the painting offered a ‘counter-attack’ to 
                                                     
805 The Court will, it is suggested, have the opportunity to address this issue in the case of Samodurov 
and Vasilovskaya v. Russia. (At the time of writing elements of the case have been declared 
inadmissible. A final decision regarding the freedom of artistic is still waiting.) 
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criticism received by the artist in the past, so too in Karatas and Alinak can we see a certain, 
albeit implicit, ‘locating’ of the expression within more well-trodden ground. In particular, 
the reference to the expressions being an exclamation of deep distress in light of particular 
circumstances, suggests more of a recognition of the cognitive and rational side of 
expression than is necessarily associated with the artistic endeavour more specifically.  
 
4.4 Artistic expression’s precarious position within Article 10: A 
discussion 
 
That the restriction of controversial art was continually held not to have violated Article 10 
in the Court’s fledgling jurisprudence concerning specifically artistic expression is 
demonstrative of the prima facie recognition that there is, within Article 10, an implicit 
hierarchy of expression, according to which artistic expression has been afforded a lesser 
degree of protection than other forms of expression.806 Extrapolating a coherent rationale 
justifying the relatively low level of protection afforded to artistic expression is, however, 
an inherently vexatious task. For, as Leigh points out, the reasoning underpinning the 
Court’s assessment of whether the interference was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate 
aim or was necessary in a democratic society is obscured by the application of a wide 
margin appreciation.807 Nevertheless, an attempt must be made to distil from the Court’s 
case law a rationale explaining the precarious positioning of artistic expression within 
Article 10. In so doing the following discussion of the Court’s early case law concerning 
controversial art in the context of morals and religion will focus on some of the key 
criticisms to have emerged from the Court’s application of its margin of appreciation and 
its specific impact on artistic expression. The discussion will then move on to address the 
Court’s more recent case law in which the protection of morals and religious sensitivities 
did not form the basis of the legitimate aim pursued by the state. Whilst these cases are 
demonstrative of a facial shift towards the better protection of artistic expression the 
underlying reasoning employed by the Court has, nevertheless, left artistic expression 
remaining in an inherently precarious position within Article 10.   
 
                                                     
806 See, for instance, Foster, S. Artistic Expression, Public Morality and Article 10 of the European 
Convention, 171 JPN 620 (2007); Leigh, I. Damned if they do, Damned if they don’t: the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religion from Attack 17 Res Publica 55 (2011); Lewis, 
T. Human Earrings, Human Rights and Public Decency, 1 Entertainment Law 50 (2002); Kearns (n 
16)  
807 Leigh (n 806) at 56 
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It was recognised, in Chapter Three’s overview, that the margin of appreciation – that is to 
say, the degree of discretion afforded to the State in fulfilling its Convention obligations808 
– is variable, contracting or expanding depending on both the form of expression in 
question as well the limitation clause relied upon by the State in seeking to restrict a given 
expression under Article 10(2).809 In particular, the developments made in the Court’s early 
jurisprudence of Müller, Otto-Preminger-Institut and Wingrove demonstrate the 
solidification of the Court’s recognition that, in cases concerning religion or morals, there 
exists the presumptive need to apply a wide margin of appreciation. In this regard, it is of 
interest that the language employed by the Court in defining the margin of appreciation’s 
scope developed from the ambiguity of a ‘certain’ margin of appreciation in Müller and 
Otto-Preminger-Institut, to that of an explicitly ‘wide’ margin of appreciation in the case 
of Wingrove.  
 
Whether ‘certain’ or ‘wide’, key to appreciating the relatively low level of protection 
afforded to artistic expression under Article 10 is the recognition that the Court’s 
application of the margin of appreciation profoundly affects the degree of scrutiny with 
which it assesses any given interference with freedom of expression. Thus, as Mahoney 
asserts, it is the Court’s policy to, “give priority to the universality of the standard of 
freedom of expression laid down in Article 10 in regards to political and public-concern 
speech.”810 The implication being that controversial artistic expression dealing with matters 
concerning religion and morals does not sufficiently contribute to – or, more pertinently, is 
not considered to be sufficiently valuable in light of – the European Court of Human 
Rights’ appreciation of the central values of Article 10.  
 
Whilst such a position may in principle align with the protection-coverage distinction 
highlighted in the previous chapter, the Court’s failure to proffer a meaningful assessment 
of the state’s limitation of freedom of artistic expression in its early jurisprudence (vis-à-
vis the application of wide margin of appreciation) necessarily means that the Court has 
overlooked the specific, arguably unique, value(s) that embody artistic expression’s 
contribution to the underlying values of Article 10. There is, it is argued, a failure on the 
part of the Court to engage adequately with the question of why artistic expression is, in 
                                                     
808 See, for instance, Barendt (n 27) at 44 
809 On the margin of appreciation’s scope being affected by both the expression’s form and the 
specific limitation clause relied upon by the State under Article 10(2) see, for example, Leigh (n 
806) at 57 
810 Mahoney (n 381) at 379 
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fact, included within Article 10’s coverage; the result being that the unique way in which 
artistic expression does contribute to the core values of Article 10 are overlooked and 
artistic expression’s subsequent protection necessarily undermined.  
 
As such, by self-imposing a limit on the depth with which it is confident in assessing the 
necessity of an interference with artistic expression, the Court cannot, in any given instance, 
sufficiently incorporate an appreciation of the essential questions pertaining to art’s unique 
position in a democratic society when balancing the right to artistic expression against other 
societal interests under Article 10(2). Thus, with reference to the academic commentary 
pertaining to the pivotal aspects of the case law and its impact on specifically artistic 
expression, it will be demonstrated below that, through the application of the margin of 
appreciation has, as Kearns posits, acted, “in dereliction of its duty.”811 For in deferring to 
the state authorities’ assessments of the purported necessity, in a democratic society, of the 
interferences with a given expression, the Court’s supervision is necessarily limited to a 
tacit acceptance of the State’s position. As such, and as demonstrated in the case law 
overview above, there was little in the way of meaningful examinations of whether the 
interference was either necessary (which is taken to imply the existence of a ‘pressing social 
need’ for the expression’s restriction812), proportionate in pursuing the legitimate aim,813 or 
that the reasons provided by the State are relevant and sufficient.814 The Court’s failure to 
do so has, as we shall see, had a profound impact on the freedom of artistic expression. 
 
Thus, the Müller judgment has been the subject of considerable criticism for its 
unquestioning reliance on the position advanced by the state. Indeed, Fenwick and 
Phillipson describe the Court’s adoption of such a degree of deference and the degree of 
reasoning that such deference entails as, “disingenuous.”815 Underlying Fenwick and 
Phillipson’s concerns with the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation in Müller 
was the impact that the doctrine had on the Court’s ability to recognise that the Swiss courts 
were concerned only with whether the expression fell within the relevant legislation’s 
definition of ‘obscene’ – which the authors go on to assert was, on the facts, undoubtedly 
                                                     
811 Kearns (n 16) at 26. See, also, Fenwick and Phillipson (n 396) at 421: “Whilst there is, 
theoretically, European ‘supervision’…the extraordinary laxness of the proportionality reading in 
Müller, replicated in Otto, amounts in practice to the virtual abnegation of this responsibility.” 
(emphasis added) 
812 See, for instance, Lingens v. Austria, 8 EHRR 407 (1981), para. 39 
813 See, for instance, Lingens v. Austria, 8 EHRR 407 (1981), para. 40 
814 See, for instance, Lingens v. Austria, 8 EHRR 407 (1981), para. 40 
815 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 396) at 58 
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the case – and not with whether there was a ‘pressing social need’ for restricting the 
paintings’ future exhibition.816 Equating the Swiss court’s assessment that the paintings 
were obscene under the relevant Swiss law with the supposition that there was a ‘pressing 
social need’ for interfering with the expression demonstrates, as Fenwick and Phillipson 
proclaim, “an extraordinarily flawed mode of analysis,” in as much as it forestalls any 
attempt by the Court to address whether there was genuinely a ‘pressing social need’ or, 
more fundamentally still, whether the obscenity law itself was compatible with the right to 
freedom of expression.817  
 
A related point is raised by Lewis in respect to the limited degree of reasoning employed 
in the Commission’s determination that the case of S and G v. UK was inadmissible. The 
case, it will be remembered, concerned the conviction of both the artist and gallery owner 
for the common law offence of outraging public decency following the exhibition of 
Human Earrings – a sculpture adorned with earrings made from freeze-dried, human 
foetuses. Whilst Human Earrings is clearly a shocking work of art, the facts of which are, 
as Kearns acknowledges, “gruesome,”818 the extent to which the specific offence of 
outraging public decency may be seen to align with the state’s assertion of that its 
application pursued the legitimate aim of protecting morals within Article 10(2) is, for 
Lewis, questionable nonetheless.819 Thus, underlying Lewis’s scepticism is the notion that 
the protection of morals does not form an inherent aspect of the offence of outraging public 
decency; the common law offence’s principal concern being that of protecting the public 
from shock, disgust and outrage.820 Since, properly understood, the offence of outraging 
public decency concerned simply the protection of, inter alia, ‘shocking’ expression (and 
not the protection of morals per se), according to Lewis the Handyside dictum therefore 
ought to have been applied.821 That the Commission could not, on account of the deference 
afforded to the national authorities under the application of a wide margin of appreciation, 
                                                     
816 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 396) at 58 
817 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 396) at 58 
818 Kearns (n 16) at 72 
819 Lewis (n 806) at 60-61 
820 Lewis (n 806) at 60-61. Moreover, Lewis argues that there is significance in the fact that the 
prosecution was brought under the common law of outraging public decency and not the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959. Whereas the outraging of public decency is an offence of strict liability, the 
OPA 1959 – with its emphasis on limiting, inter alia, expression capable of ‘depraving’ and 
‘corrupting’ individuals – whilst lending itself more favourably to the notion of protecting morals 
within Article 10(2), contains a defence of artistic merit. The Court’s failure to investigate the 
genuine relationship between the offence and the legitimate aim of protecting morals was, as such, 
a tacit acceptance of the prosecution, as Lewis points out, having both its cake and eating it. On the 
implications of the prosecution’s strategy in S and G see also Kearns (n 16) at 33-36, 51-52, 72-74 
821 Lewis (n 806) at 61 
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adequately investigate this issue is a significant concern for the freedom of expression 
generally and artistic expression in particular. 
 
Accordingly, given the breadth with which the legitimate aims of Article 10(2) have been 
construed, it has been noted that only very rarely has the Court found there to have been a 
violation of Article 10 on the basis that the interference did not, in fact, pursue a legitimate 
aim.822 Yet the ease with which the state can stipulate that the interference pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting morals, when coupled with the wide margin of appreciation 
and associated lack of scrutiny is of profound detriment to artistic expression. Thus, it is 
submitted that in light of the wide margin of appreciation, the methodology employed by 
the Court in accepting that the protection of moral and religious sensitivities constitutes a 
sound basis for the restriction of controversial artistic expression is unconvincing in its 
failure to appropriately recognise the value of artistic expression for the purposes of its 
Article 10 protection. 
 
In light of its early case law concerning the interplay between artistic expression and morals 
or religion, Evans has surmised that the Court’s approach is suggestive of a move away 
from the protection of an individual’s right to freedom of artistic expression and is, instead, 
indicative of the Court’s implicit acceptance of the state’s role in protecting people from 
offensive expression.823 Thus, in Müller the Court accepted that the application of the 
obscenity laws under which the prosecution was brought evidently pursued the objective 
of protecting public morals and that, furthermore, there was, “a natural link between [the] 
protection of morals and [the] protection of the rights of others.”824 Similarly, in the cases 
of Otto-Preminger-Institut and Wingrove the protection of the rights of others was 
considered to incorporate a right to respect for one’s religious feelings825 and a protection 
against the treatment of a religious subject in such a manner that outrages believers.826 Yet 
the Court’s summation that there exists a right to be protected from offence capable of 
restricting expression within the rubric of Article 10(2)’s ‘rights of others’ somewhat begs 
the question of whether the protection of religious and moral sensitivities are, in fact, 
suitable bases for curtailing particularly artistic expression.  
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On the question of the relationship between freedom of expression and the protection of 
morals, Nowlin  
insists that, “the only moral question at stake in cases such as Handyside…should be the 
critical moral question, ‘why should the state be entitled to restrict a socially accepted civil 
right or freedom?’”827 According to the quintessentially Millian position adopted in 
Nowlin’s thesis, such restrictions ought only be applied on the basis that the expression 
undermines others’ dignity and equality of autonomy.828  
 
In highlighting this point, Nowlin cites favourably the Canadian case of Butler829 and the 
rationale employed by the court in confirming the constitutionality of anti-obscenity 
legislation with regards to hardcore pornography.830 Crucial to the court’s judgment in 
Butler was the emphasis placed on hardcore pornography’s potential to harm women, 
whether in terms of physical injury, degradation, exploitation, servility or subordination. 
In short, the potential of such harm was deemed to, “run against the principles of equality 
and dignity of all human beings.”831 However, according to Nowlin’s thesis, the real 
significance of the Butler judgment lies in its recognition that the anti-obscenity legislation 
could only be considered constitutional to the extent that its ‘overriding objective’ was the 
prevention of harm to society and did not confer on the government the power to limit 
citizens’ rights to express themselves on the basis that the expression contravened, “a 
certain standard of public and sexual morality.”832  
 
As such, under Dyzenhaus’ reading of Butler, whilst ‘obscenity’ and ‘offensiveness’ were 
indeed factors considered by the court, the constitutionality of Canada’s anti-obscenity law 
was rooted in the notion that the cause of offence stemmed from hardcore pornography’s 
capacity to harm the autonomy and equality of others.833 In other words, the restriction on 
freedom of expression in Butler was grounded, not on an individual’s taste or sensitivities 
– what might be labelled ‘offence simpliciter’ – but on offence of a more fundamental 
nature, deriving from the expression’s capacity to cause harm.  
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Returning to the ECtHR, the requirement under Nowlin’s thesis – namely that the 
protection of morality be understood along Millian lines with regards to the prevention of 
harm – may be evidenced in certain (albeit, non-freedom of expression) cases concerning 
sexual activity. Thus, Nowlin notes that in the case of Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United 
Kingdom834 it was the severity of the injuries obtained through sadomasochistic practices 
and not considerations of the sexual morality of sadomasochism per se that was, in that 
instance, the cause of legal concern.835 Similarly, in A.D.T. v. The United Kingdom836 – 
concerning the applicant’s conviction of gross indecency for engaging in homosexual 
group sex – the Court, “clearly implied that consensual, nonviolent sexual activities 
involving more than two participants were not inherently immoral.”837  
 
Such instances may therefore be construed as confirming Nowlin’s position that there is 
nothing immoral about sex per se such that, “an act can only be sexually immoral if it is an 
immoral act involving a sexual circumstance.”838 Thus, in the case of Laskey, Jaggard and 
Brown the immorality stemmed, not from the sexual activity in and of itself or its deviation 
from common public standards of sexual practice but, rather, from some identifiable harm 
caused by that sexual activity. Put another way, in seeking to protect morals, the state needs 
to establish something more than potential offence arising from, for instance, the portrayal 
of sex per se. As Nowlin points out, if offence were to be derived simply from the depiction 
of sex per se, the protection of morality would, in essence, equate to the protection of 
feelings and thereby work to reinforce majoritarian susceptibilities.839 Indeed, such a 
position would have the effect of giving credence to the ‘eccentric’840 proposition put 
forward by Devlin, when he stated that: 
 
There is…a general abhorrence of homosexuality. We should ask ourselves in the 
first instance whether, looking at it calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a 
vice so abominable that its mere presence is an offence. If that is the genuine feeling 
of the society in which we live, I do not see how society can be denied the right to 
eradicate it.841 
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In order to avoid such a tyranny of the majority it is therefore crucial that the state, in 
seeking to protect morals, establishes something more than offence simpliciter. Under 
Nowlin’s Millian-inspired account, this required ‘something’ is ‘harm’. Moreover, whilst 
‘harm’ may encompass offence, this offence must be specifically derived from the 
activity’s undermining of others’ dignity, equality or autonomy, as most clearly 
demonstrated in the case of Butler. Viewed in such a way, the protection of morals, 
according to Nowlin’s ‘constitutional meaning’ of morals, can be seen to closely resemble 
the protection of the rights of others.    
 
Accordingly, the emphasis placed by Nowlin on the need to make a principled distinction 
between protecting society’s moral status quo and the protection of morality vis the 
protection of the actual rights of others is of acute significance when considering the 
Court’s protection of artistic expression. Not only does it provide a means of engaging 
more thoroughly with its jurisprudence but it prompts us to focus our minds on the question 
of art’s capacity to inflict harm of the sort capable of violating the rights of others. Rather 
than restricting the scope of artistic expression on the basis of protecting the majority’s 
supposed sensitivities, the Court should, as Nowlin goes on to assert, “inquire further, [and 
ask] will [the] public display of the impugned paintings violate anyone's moral rights?”842 
 
To reiterate, the only justifiable ground for the expression’s restriction, under the Millian 
approach favoured by Nowlin, is that identifiable harm would ensue from the expression 
in question and not that in order to preserve some favoured notion of morality.843 Turning 
to the question of specifically artistic expression, the Court’s stance on the question of 
protecting morality in the case of Müller is particularly susceptible to criticism under 
Nowlin’s persuasive thesis. The applicants in Müller, it will be remembered, were 
convicted under Switzerland’s obscenity laws for the public exhibition of an artwork 
depicting sexual activities between men and animals. As we have seen, in failing to ask the 
more fundamental question of whether the obscenity law itself was compatible with the 
right to freedom of expression, a significant aspect of the Court’s reasoning towards the 
decision that there had been no violation of Article 10 was the recognition, in lieu of the 
wide margin of appreciation afforded to the State, that the paintings depicted ‘unnatural 
practices’ and were ‘liable grossly to offend the sense of sexual propriety of persons of 
ordinary sensitivity.’ Fundamental to Nowlin’s criticism of Müller, therefore, was the 
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Court’s unsubstantiated confirmation of the assertion that there exists, “a natural link 
between protection of morals and protection of the rights of others.”844  
 
Whilst there is indeed a relationship between the protection of morals and the protection of 
the rights of others under Nowlin’s thesis, it is of fundamental importance to remember 
that, in order to justify its restriction, it needs to be established that the expression 
undermines, or at least has the potential to undermine, the specific (whether moral or 
Convention) rights of others. Moreover, in light of the Handyside dictum – in which Article 
10’s guarantees are said to apply to disturbing, shocking and offensive expression – in 
limiting the freedom of expression it ought not be enough to maintain, in and of itself, that 
individuals were offended by the material. Rather, it needs to be established that the 
offended person(s) were, for instance, denigrated or that the artwork undermined their 
dignity.845 Accordingly, by failing to convincingly establish any such violation resulting 
from the applicants’ displaying of the artwork, “the scope of artistic freedom under the 
Convention [was, in Müller] circumscribed by majoritarian proclivities and tastes.”846  
 
The basis of artistic expression’s circumscription in favour of majoritarian moral values in 
Müller was developed upon in the cases Otto-Preminger and Wingrove and expanded to 
incorporate the protection of religious sensitivities. It will be remembered that, whereas in 
Müller there was said to be ‘a natural link’ between the protection of morals and the rights 
of others, the majority judgment in Otto-Preminger-Institut went further, asserting that: 
 
the manner in which religious doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which 
may engage the responsibility of the State…to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of 
the right [to, inter alia, freedom of belief] guaranteed under Article 9.847 
 
The implication to be drawn from the Court’s assertion, then, is that the showing of the 
film in Otto-Preminger-Institut had the capacity, in some way, to undermine the enjoyment 
of others’ freedom of religion, such that the state was duty bound to restrict the applicant’s 
freedom of expression in order to prevent a violation of Article 9.     
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For Barendt, the assertion that the film’s showing could violate the right of religious 
believers to have their religious sensitivities respected under Article 9 is ‘controversial’.848 
Indeed, for Leigh, the majority’s assertion in Otto-Preminger-Institut, “lends an entirely 
different colour to how religious debate should be conducted [than is evident in the Court’s 
Article 9 case law] by suggesting that there is [a] protective perimeter around religious 
beliefs where the state has a duty to police the conduct of third parties.”849 That the assertion 
made in Otto-Preminger-Institut was misguided is, for a number of reasons, clear. As Leigh 
asserts, the text of Article 9 guarantees neither the ‘peaceful enjoyment’ of one’s religious 
convictions nor does it confer the right to ‘respect’ of one’s beliefs.850 Such a position is 
palpably clear in light of the Choudhury decision wherein, it will be recalled, it was 
concluded that the applicant’s right to freedom of religion had not been violated by the 
state’s failure to bring blasphemy proceedings following the publication of Salman 
Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses on the basis that the offence of blasphemy under UK law 
applied only to the Christian faith. Put another way, Article 9 does not necessitate the 
protection of religion by way of blasphemy laws concerning the disparaging of religious 
doctrines. To imply that the state has a positive duty to protect religious sensitivities from 
purportedly offensive expression is, as such, misleading.  
 
Furthermore, Leigh is sceptical of the suggestion, made by the Court in Otto-Preminger-
Institut, that expression is, in fact, capable of undermining religious liberty noting that there 
is, “quite a high threshold to overcome before expression can be seen to impair one’s ability 
to manifest one’s religion.”851 That the violation of someone’s ability to manifest their 
religion for the purposes of Article 9 requires that a particularly high threshold be met is 
evidenced, by Leigh, in the fact that there have been no instances in which, “verbal, written 
or artistic attacks alone on religion have been found…to violate Article 9.”852 Accordingly, 
there is no evidence from the case law that, without the existence of additional elements – 
such as coercive proselytising techniques853 or physical attacks and intimidation854 –  
expression is capable of violating Article 9. It is therefore significant that the Court’s 
assessment in Wingrove centred solely on the ‘rights of others’ mantra of Article 10(2) and 
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did not attempt to incorporate Article 9 in to its reasoning, a move that was to be welcomed 
in the concurring judgment of Judge Pettiti.855 
 
Leigh’s criticisms of the Court’s approach to incorporating Article 9 within its reasoning 
notwithstanding, following from Nowlin’s thesis, the implication to be drawn from the 
Court’s assertion in Otto-Preminger-Institut regarding the manner in which an expression 
is made, is that the film was perceived to have had the capacity, in some way, to undermine 
the enjoyment of others’ freedom of religion. Whereas the Court in Müller made no attempt 
to demonstrate precisely how the recognisably offensive artwork violated the rights of 
others beyond the causing of offence simpliciter, the majority in Otto-Preminger-Institut 
went further, suggesting that there existed, within the duties and responsibilities of Article 
10: 
an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously offensive 
to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore do not 
contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human 
affairs.856 
 
A new category of offence – presumed to go beyond that of merely offence simpliciter – 
was thus established in Otto-Preminger-Institut, according to which an expression’s 
restriction is justified on the basis that it is capable of violating the rights of others and is, 
as such, of no social utility. Were it therefore to be adequately established that gratuitously 
offensive expression is indeed capable of undermining the rights of others, the 
developments made by the Court in Otto-Preminger would, it is presumed, neatly align 
with the thesis submitted by Nowlin. However, the gratuitous offence doctrine is 
controversial, not least for the, “wide and vaguely defined powers,” that it confers on the 
state to prescribe the manner in which expression is made.857  
 
Moreover, it is suggested that the controversial nature of the rationale as employed by the 
Court in Otto-Preminger-Institut, and its specific impact on artistic expression, may be best 
considered in light of the observation, made in Chapter Three, that the Article 10 threshold 
question has, in general, elicited two responses by the Court. In this regard, it will be 
recalled that the Court, during the admissibility proceedings of certain cases, has on rare 
occasions refused to consider a given expression as even potentially falling within the ambit 
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of Article 10 either ‘internally’ (in the sense that a given act is not considered as being 
‘expression’ for the purpose of Article 10) or ‘externally’ (with reference to Article 17 and 
on the grounds that the expression in question conflicted with, and undermined, Convention 
rights more generally).  
 
Whilst the Court in Otto-Preminger-Institut accepted that the expression in question did 
indeed fall within the scope of Article 10’s coverage, the subsequent reasoning adopted by 
the majority of the Court in reaching the conclusion that the seizure and forfeiture of the 
film did not amount to a violation of Article 10 verges, implicitly, on the acceptance that 
the film’s expression was not expression for the purposes of Article 10. In so doing, the 
Court has stumbled upon the unsatisfactory position of recognising Article 10’s coverage 
of controversial art whilst simultaneously finding that such expression is not, in essence, 
‘expression’ for the purposes of Article 10. That employing the term ‘gratuitous 
expression’ has led to the de facto exclusion of a category of expression from protection is 
particularly troublesome when applied to the unique nature within which art and artistic 
expression is seen to operate.   
 
Turning to the dictionary, ‘gratuitous’ is defined as, ‘without any good ground or reason; 
not required or warranted by the circumstances of the case.’858 Accordingly, with regards 
to offensive expression, Cram identifies two distinct interpretations of the term ‘gratuitous.’ 
Firstly, gratuitously offensive expression might refer to expression that is, “groundless, 
lacking an objective basis in fact or reason,” whilst, alternatively, expression might be 
considered gratuitous in that it, “involves some form of unnecessary or needless expression 
that offends members of the audience.”859 Both interpretations have the potential to 
significantly impair the right to freedom of artistic expression and place its protection at a 
distinct disadvantage under Article 10. 
 
For instance, Cram notes that in the case of I.A. the basis of the book’s censure seems to 
have been that the expression was ‘groundless’ or ‘unwarranted’, yet such a definition does 
not lend itself well to the fact that the expression was made in the context of a novel.860 
Thus, the ‘gratuitous’ nature of assertions made regarding Mohammad having sex with 
dead people and animals – the ‘abusive attack’ – was seen to be rooted in the lack of 
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historical basis for the assertion. However, for Cram, that the expression was made in the 
form of a novel is of significance. In permitting the prosecution to ‘cherry-pick’ the most 
controversial and facially offensive elements of the work on the basis of the groundlessness 
of the assertions, the overall context in which the expression was made was overlooked.861 
As such, for Cram, ‘gratuitous offence’ offence ought best to be considered in terms of its 
needless cause of offence, such that, in the case of I.A. it was open to the author to choose 
less offensive terms, perhaps by employing the use of metaphor in order to allude to the 
point he was trying to establish.862 
 
Yet such an understanding runs counter to the very essence of artistic expression and places 
it at a distinct disadvantage especially when compared with traditionally recognised 
political or public interest expression. Indeed, as Foster points out, in the case of Jersild863 
– in which the interference with the freedom of expression of a journalist who broadcast 
the openly racist views of the ‘Greenjackets’ group was held to be a violation of Article 10 
– it was asserted that, in the context of political expression, individuals and the press have 
a discretion in choosing the methods that they wish to employ in formulating their 
expression.864 Moreover, the Court recited the principle – asserted in Oberschlick865 –  that, 
“Article 10…protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but 
also the form in which they are conveyed.”866 
 
However, as Trispiotis points out, with the introduction, in Otto-Preminger-Institut, of the 
notion of gratuitous offence came the Court’s recognition that the style (and not the content 
per se) may be a cause for the restriction of expression.867 Such a recognition may go some 
way towards identifying a distinction between the case of Giniewski v. France868 in which 
a violation of Article 10 was found, and the cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut, Wingrove 
and I.A. in which no such violation was found. In Giniewski, the applicant alleged that his 
Article 10 right had been breached by the French authorities’ imposition of a fine as 
punishment for the publication of an article written in a newspaper. The article maintained 
that, “Many Christians have acknowledged that scriptural anti-Judaism and the doctrine of 
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the ‘fulfilment’ of the Old Covenant in the New led to anti-Semitism and prepared the 
ground in which the idea and implementation of Auschwitz took seed.”869 Not surprisingly, 
many Christians took offence at the assertion that Christianity, and in particular, the Roman 
Catholic Church, was in some way linked to the Holocaust. Indeed, the General Alliance 
Against Racism and for the Respect for the French and Christian Identity stressed that such 
statements amounted to “racially defamatory statements against the Christian 
community.”870 That the offensive expression was made by an historian, in an historical 
treatise therefore played heavily on the Court’s mind in finding there to have been no 
violation, it being asserted that, “such views do not in themselves preclude the enjoyment 
of freedom of expression.”871 
 
What therefore distinguishes Giniewski from the cases concerning the protection of the 
moral and religious sensitivities from controversial art is the style and manner with which 
such expression is conveyed. Yet, it remains doubtful that artistic expression, properly 
construed, is inherently capable of being offensive (be it gratuitous or otherwise) or 
blasphemous or of instilling the type of harm identified by Nowlin as being a prerequisite 
for restricting expression, that is to say the undermining of another’s dignity. Thus, for 
Kearns, the application of a wide margin of appreciation precludes the Court from engaging 
appropriately with the unique ontology of art in light of which, “a meta-standard of artistic 
and moral insight,” might be applied that is, “consonant with its supra-national 
foundational role.”872 
 
Crucial to Kearns’ thesis, then, is the recognition that obscenity or blasphemy:  
 
…[s]imply cannot inhere in art because art’s ontology and cultural distinctiveness 
require a contemplative engagement with it that negates…even the remotest 
possibility of literal harm: a harm that could arguably only occur in an art-absent 
context…or through audience ignorance of art.873  
 
Yet, under a wide margin of appreciation, the Court is incapable of taking note of art’s 
distinctive qualities as a form of expression within its assessment of the proportionality of 
the State’s interference with the expression. Nonetheless, the Court’s assessment of 
proportionality may be criticised without specific reference to artistic expression. For 
                                                     
869 Giniewski, op cit, para 14 
870 Giniewski, op cit, para. 14 
871 Giniewski, op cit, paras. 51-52 
872 Kearns (n 16) at 26  
873 Kearns (n 16) at 155 
234 
 
instance, with regards to Müller, Warbrick notes that, “the result was that the application 
of the standards prevailing in a small part of Switzerland had an erga omnes effect of 
universal proportion,”874 which cannot but be described as, “a grave interference with 
freedom of expression”875 that does not instinctively feel proportionate. Similarly, in Otto-
Preminger-Institut the lack of assessment as to the proportionality of the interference is 
exemplified in light of the efforts made by the film-house to limit the potential for offence 
by introducing an admission fee and age restriction – a point that was raised in the 
dissenting opinion.876  
 
Nevertheless, the more pertinent and fundamental effect that the application of a wide 
margin of appreciation has on the protection of artistic expression lies in it disabling the 
Court from recognising that, as Kearns asserts, “any perceived ‘transgressions’ of 
acceptable moral boundaries by [art] in a social context are understood to be taking place 
within the artistic order, ie within art’s normal internal canons of operation.”877 Thus, the 
very fact that the expression is made in the form of art necessitates a unique judicial 
approach in which it is appreciated that, “art can incite no ‘real life’ action other than the 
reader's psychic reaction to it in that aestheticised psychic personal environment.”878 As 
such, in limiting the degree of scrutiny available to the Court in making its assessment, the 
margin of appreciation necessitates the failure of the Court to recognise what can be drawn 
from artworks, be they ‘offensive’ or otherwise, and their contribution to what may loosely 
be defined as public discourse. Thus, in S and G, for instance, the implicitly wide margin 
of appreciation necessarily precluded the Court from incorporating, as Kearns highlights, 
the artist’s ‘message’ that, “life is now so cheap that aborted foetuses can even be used as 
mere ornamentation in the superficial world of postmodernism.”879 Accordingly, whilst the 
social utility of controversial art is difficult to comprehend, when understood in the context 
in which it was intended to be understood, it nevertheless plays a valuable role in a 
democratic society. It is unfortunate, therefore, that through the application of a wide 
margin of appreciation the Court has failed to recognise the extent to which art and artistic 
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expression contribute to the values underpinning Article 10, albeit it a distinctly unique 
manner. 
 
Writing shortly after the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 10 in the Vereinigung 
Blidender Künstler case, Sharland suggested that there may be emerging in the Court’s 
jurisprudence a “more sophisticated analysis,” before acknowledging that, “[i]t is too early 
to say whether th[is] recent development herald[s] a significant shift in the Court’s 
approach [to the protection of artistic expression].”880 Yet, the reasoning employed by the 
Court in cases in which a violation of Article 10 is found – such as Vereinigung Blidender 
Künstler and Karatas – do little more than confirm, as Kearns suggests, “the Court’s 
informal but definitive decision to prize political expression as the expression most in need 
of protecting.”881 Similarly, under Foster’s assessment, the decision in Vereinigung 
Blidender Künstler simply, “reaffirms the value of political speech and the right to oppose 
and attack political figures…[and] does little to resolve the recent dilemmas about whether 
free speech includes the right to cause shock and offence.”882  
 
Accordingly, such an approach – in which the more that artistic expression is seen to 
display political connotations, the greater its protection vis-à-vis a narrowing of the margin 
of appreciation – still fails to give credence to the unique ontology of art and the recognition 
that the form in which art’s expression is made of considerable significance and underlines 
the special relationship that art plays in a democratic society. Moreover, as Kearns submits, 
“to protect artistic expression primarily because of its political content creates conceptual 
difficulties because ‘art’ is then equated with ‘opinion’.”883 Yet, as we discovered in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, the relationship between art and the conveyance of opinions is 
a complicated one and not well-suited to incorporation within the traditional political 
expression paradigm. It is for this reason, then, that artistic expression ought to be 
considered on its own terms, without reference to its political nature. As Kearns surmises, 
in order to achieve a more consistent and principled jurisprudence concerning artistic 
expression, “[t]he Court must register and understand art’s peculiar societal recognition 
and status, and concomitant singular methods of operation, in order to render it true justice 
when it enters the legal arena.”884 
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It has been suggested over the course of the preceding discussion that artistic expression 
within the Court has found increasing favour, predominantly in terms of an increasing 
willingness on the part of the majorities within the Court to accept, and apply the unique 
qualities pertaining to art when considering the proportionality of a given State 
interference. From the early cases concerning public morality in which artistic qualities 
were given no credence, towards the defamation and prevention of disorder cases one 
begins to see a certain willingness to accept that the distinct nature of art as expression 
requires a particularly distinct approach in resolving the particular issues that have arisen.  
 
Yet there still remains a lack of real cohesiveness in the Court’s approach to artistic 
expression that, whilst seeming to advance the artistic cause, can simultaneously be 
considered to be reinforcing the status quo, through ingrained perceptions of the requisite 
qualities of the expression to be entitled to protection under Article 10. To some extent this 
ambiguity may be traced back to the early cases of Müller, Otto-Preminger and Wingrove 
and the development of the gratuitous offence doctrine that worked, at least in a de facto 
sense, to preclude challenging art from protection under Article 10. As such it is perhaps 
of little surprise that, despite the Court’s increasing reference to the artistic qualities of an 
artwork the spectre of the notion of a protected artwork’s relationship with ‘political’ 
expression has remained. Indeed, it is this juxtaposition that goes some way to explaining 
the almost paradoxical positions that have emerged in light of cases like Vereinigung 
Bildender Künstler and Karatas/Alinak, again bringing in to focus the lack of genuine 
cohesion with which artistic expression is dealt with by the Court under Article 10.  
 
Resolving the largely dissatisfactory treatment of artistic expression within Article 10 
requires, as Rosenberg suggests, that the Court refrains from employing a wide margin of 
appreciation when considering instances concerning art.885 Indeed, the presumption 
underlying the Court’s reasoning in applying a wide margin of appreciation – ie. that a lack 
of consensus demands deference to the state authority’s reasoning – is, itself, unsound and 
gives rise to contradictions in the Court’s jurisprudence. In this regard, Cram stresses the 
importance of the need for methodological clarity when looking for consensus, noting that 
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in the Handyside case the lack of consensus was simply asserted, whilst in Müller886 the 
Court took, on trust, the Swiss authorities’ claims that the people of a particular area were 
particularly sensitive to the sexually explicit artwork concerned.887 Moreover, as Leigh 
points out, the presumption evident in cases such as Müller, “do[es] not explain…why on 
some questions (the growing recognition of gay rights being the outstanding modern 
example) more morally conservative states have not been permitted to invoke the margin 
of appreciation while on matters of religious expression this discretion remains largely 
untouched.”888  
 
Accordingly, refraining from implementing a wide margin of appreciation would proffer 
artistic expression greater equality of protection by enabling the Court to critically assess 
whether the legitimate aim being pursued was, in actuality, grounded in a law that was itself 
consonant with the right to freedom of expression.889 More fundamentally still, removing 
the wide margin of appreciation would allow for the inclusion of explicit reference to 
artistic expression’s value as a sui generis form of expression within an assessment of the 
necessity of the interference in a democratic society, according to which the extent to which 
(and manner in which) artistic expression’s alignment with the values of Article 10 could 
begin to emerge.  
 
With the case of Samodurov and Vasilovskaya v. Russia, which concerns a controversial 
art exhibition with religion as its theme, still to be decided the Court has the opportunity of 
squaring the circle it has, perhaps unwittingly, found itself in. By applying more rigorously 
the principles that have begun to develop through Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, 
Karatas, and Alinak the Court has the chance to secure the protection of artistic expression 
wholly within the realm of art and the artistic endeavour without any need, either implicitly 
or explicitly, rely on the proximity of the artwork’s perceived ability to contribute to 
political discourse as traditionally understood. Until then, it is perhaps unfortunate that the 
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Inquiring in to the law pertaining to the freedom of artistic expression under the European 
Convention on Human Rights is an inherently vexatious challenge, not least because of 
Article 10’s silence on the issue of what, exactly, constitutes as ‘expression’ for the 
purposes of Article 10. Whilst earlier drafts of Article 10 made specific reference to the 
inclusion of artistic expression the final rubric explicated the right to freedom of expression 
simply in terms of the right to receive and impart ‘information’ and ‘ideas’.  
 
Accordingly, the thesis’ first challenge was to confirm that artistic expression, broadly 
constued, could, at the level of abstraction, be regarded in such terms. In this regard the 
overview provided in Chapters One and Two sought to outline and, to a certain extent, 
synthesise the academic thought concerning the two distinct fields of freedom of expression 
and the theory of art. In so doing it was maintained that, whilst the conveyance of ‘ideas’ 
is not a necessary precondition of art – those ascribing to the formalist school of thought 
would, for instance insist that the value of art lies purely in its internal, formal qualities – 
it nevertheless remained possible for art to do so. Moreover, it was noted that the way in 
which art is considered to convey ideas is quite distinct, with the expression containing 
both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. Disentwining these two interrelated and, to some 
extent, interdependent aspects of art’s expression is, as such, conceptually difficult: indeed, 
with regards to the Kantian notions of beauty and the sublime, it is this very relationship in 
which the value of art is bestowed.  
 
The extent to which the sui generis nature of artistic expression is recognised is therefore 
of particular significance in the task of locating artistic expression within the well-
established discourse pertaining to the right to freedom of expression more generally. For 
instance, locating artistic expression within the distinction made by Mill between 
‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation’ is largely dependent upon one’s understanding of 
art’s capacity to contribute to a ‘collision of adverse opinions’ in the pursuit of truth. 
Similarly, under the Meiklejohnian defence of freedom of expression, artistic expression 
may only find protection to the extent that it may be considered to advance the democratic 
process. Whilst Meiklejohn himself insisted that the arts were required in order to ensure a 
citizenry with the requisite intelligence and sensibility to make informed, political choices, 
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such a rationale does little, in and of itself, to guarantee freedom of artistic expression in 
actual cases. Instead, in building on the argument from democracy provided by Meiklejohn, 
the thesis proffered by Weinstein may be considered as implicitly informing the European 
Court of Human Rights’ approach to the question of artistic expression. Accordingly, and 
sharing certain similarities with the Millian approach, it is the extent to which artistic 
expression is considered to contribute to public discourse that is of fundamental concern.  
 
That the European Court of Human Rights can be seen to have adopted a quasi-
Weinsteinian approach to the protection of freedom of expression in general, and freedom 
of artistic expression in particular – according to which emphasis is placed on the 
expression’s contribution to public discourse – was evinced in Chapter Three’s discussion 
of the categorisation of expression. There it was established that there is a sound theoretical 
basis for the categorisation of expression and the variability with which those categories 
may be protected. As such, by focusing predominantly on the thesis provided by Schauer, 
in conjunction with those of Blocher and Sunstein, it was maintained that a distinction need 
be recognised between issues concerning the coverage of the right to freedom of expression 
and the protection subsequently afforded to it. In so doing, the value attributed to a given 
expression is of fundamental import. 
 
According to Schauer’s thesis, therefore, the determination of the right to freedom of 
expression’s scope and the level of protection to be afforded to a given expression within 
its scope is largely to be based on the extent to which the underlying value of the expression 
is seen to align with or advance the value(s) inherent in the right’s constituting document. 
Whilst there are a few cases in which, at the admissibility stages, the expression in question 
was deemed to not be covered by the guarantees of Article 10 it was noted that the 
overwhelming majority of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law concerns issues 
pertaining to the, to use Schauer’s terminology, protection of the right to freedom of 
expression. Thus, by assessing a sample of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law 
concerning political and commercial expression in light of the exposition of Schauer’s 
thesis regarding the coverage-protection distinction it was hoped that a greater appreciation 
of the core values underpinning Article 10 would emerge from which to base Chapter 
Four’s analysis of the European Court of Human Rights artistic expression jurisprudence.  
 
In this regard it was noted that there exists an inherent, though in some sense implicit, 
hierarchy of expression according to which political expression was awarded with a 
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privileged status of protection. Moreover, it was seen that the privileged status of political 
expression was achieved through the European Court of Human Rights’ application of the 
margin of appreciation. Accordingly, in cases concerning political expression the European 
Court of Human Rights tends to narrow the national authorities margin of appreciation so 
as to both restrict the extent to which the State may limit freedom of expression and proffer 
the European Court of Human Rights with a greater scope with which to scrutinise the 
State’s actions. 
 
On the other hand, in cases concerning ‘pure’ commercial expression the margin of 
appreciation afforded to national authorities is, generally, wider such that the vigour with 
which the European Court of Human Rights may assess the States interference with the 
applicant’s freedom of expression is necessarily reduced. The significance of the margin 
of appreciation in the determination of the de facto level of protection to be afforded to a 
given act of expression is brought in to sharp relief when one considers the hybrid cases in 
which there are elements of both commercial expression and political (or public interest) 
expression. Thus, in cases where it could be established that the expression in question 
contained a sufficient degree of ‘public-interestedness’, such that it was perceived to 
contribute to public discourse, the margin of appreciation was narrowed, therefore enabling 
a greater scrutiny on the part of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
Accordingly, in light of Weinstein’s thesis concerning the underlying value of freedom of 
expression to be a contribution to public discourse and the notion put forward by Schauer 
that definition is parasitic on justification, Chapter Three can be seen to demonstrate the 
view that, under the non-differentiated rubric of Article 10, an expression’s perceived 
capacity to contribute to public discourse is crucial in ensuring a de facto robust level of 
protection. From this premise, the extent to which the European Court of Human Rights 
can be seen to demonstrate an appreciation of the sui generis nature of artistic expression 
within the broader context of freedom of expression and the unique way in which art is 
perceived to be socially valuable – a notion that, from the Court’s case law, is largely 
entwined with ‘ideas and information’ that contribute to some form of public discourse – 
would therefore prove determinative in Chapter Four’s analysis of the European Court of 
Human Rights artistic expression jurisprudence.  
 
In opening Chapter Four’s case law analysis with an overview of the infamous Handyside 
case it was note that the guarantees enshrined in Article 10 are said to apply to shocking, 
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offensive and disturbing expression. Such a mantra ought, on its face, to provide ample 
protection for artistic expression, given its almost inherent tendency to challenge and 
provoke. Yet, with the application of a wide margin of appreciation in the sphere of religion 
and morals came a certain obscuring in the European Court of Human Rights’ reasoning 
that tended towards a de facto lower level of protection being afforded to artistic 
expression. 
 
Accordingly, in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut, for example, the national authorities 
were afforded a wide margin of appreciation owing to religious nature of the film in 
question. The width of the margin of appreciation thus worked, it was maintained in 
Chapter Four, to obfuscate the European Court of Human Rights assessment of the 
necessity of the film’s seizure and forfeiture. Thus, despite having recognised in the earlier 
case of Müller that artistic expression, “contribute[s] to the exchange of ideas and opinions 
which is essential for a democratic society”, by attributing the national authorities with a 
wide margin of appreciation the European Court of Human Rights ceded any opportunity 
to engage in an assessment of how artistic expression may be said to make it contribution 
to the exchange of ideas. Instead, a new doctrine – that of gratuitous offence – was 
established, according to which the offence emanating from the film’s very existence was 
deemed so great as to be capable of undermining the rights of others and, as such, was 
regarded as being incapable of contributing to public discourse. 
 
The early cases concerning artistic expression thus confirmed the conclusion reached in 
Chapter Three that contribution to public discourse is of fundamental import for the 
purposes of Article 10. Moreover, through the application of a wide margin of appreciation 
in cases concerning religion and morals – subject matter often drawn upon by artists in their 
works – the European Court of Human Rights failed to actively engage in determining the 
precise nature of artistic expression within the confines of the freedom of expression 
discourse more generally.  
 
However, there has, since the early triumvirate of cases of Müller, Otto-Preminger-Institut, 
and Wingrove, been a certain liberalisation evident in the reasoning employed by the 
European Court of Human Rights when faced with matters concerning the freedom of 
artistic expression. Indeed, that I.A. v. Turkey – a case also concerning artistic expression 
and religious offence – was decided by the slimmest of majorities is perhaps evidence of 
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such a liberalisation. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has, since the early 
triumvirate of cases, held there to have been violations in the context of artistic expression.  
However, such findings are necessitated on the expression being of a sufficiently prima 
facie ‘political’ nature. Thus, in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, the collage 
depicting the aggrieved politician was considered in terms of the artist offering a ‘counter-
attack’, there having been something of an ongoing dispute between the artist and the 
political party to which the politician in question belonged. Similarly, it was noted that, 
given the political context against which the poetry in the case of Karatas v. Turkey rested, 
despite the aggressive tone of the expression and the facial call to arms a violation of Article 
10 was found.   
 
Inherent in such findings was the narrowing of the national authorities’ margin of 
appreciation thereby enabling a greater scrutiny on the part of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Whereas in the early cases concerning the protection of morals the 
European Court of Human Rights could not, by necessity of the State’s wide margin of 
appreciation, engage in an examination of the precise nature of artistic expression; by 
narrowing the margin of appreciation in cases such as Karatas and Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler the European Court of Human Rights was able to recognise some of the distinctive 
qualities pertaining to artistic expression. Accordingly, in Karatas, the artistic nature of the 
expression – with its use of such techniques as hyperbole and metaphor – led the European 
Court of Human Rights to surmise that the expression was, “less a call to an uprising than 
an expression of deep distress in the face of a difficult political situation.”  
 
In so doing, and in addition to recognising the distinct way in which artistic expression can 
be said to contribute, in the Weinsteinian sense, to public discourse, the European Court of 
Human Rights can be seen to be incorporating the distinction made by Mill between 
‘discussion’ and ‘positive instigation’. By recognising the way in which artistic expression 
operates within the freedom of expression paradigm, the European Court of Human Rights 
thus looked beyond the expression’s facial meaning – which, if taken literally might be said 
to amount to a ‘positive instigation’ – and towards its ability to contribute to an exchange 
of ideas necessary to achieve what Mill would describe as a progressive, democratic 
society.  
 
However, that such an engagement with the conceptual capacity of artistic expression to 
contribute to public discourse is dependent upon the European Court of Human Rights 
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initial determination of the expression being facially sufficiently political remains of some 
concern. Accordingly, whilst the European Court of Human Rights’ calibration of the 
margin of appreciation is not based on the expression being categorised as artistic 
expression per se, that a wide margin of appreciation is conferred on national authorities in 
the pursuing the protection of the rights of others vis-à-vis the protection of morals and 
religious sensitivities creates a de facto widening of the margin of appreciation with regards 
to artistic expression precisely because religion and morals inform much of the artists’ 
work.  
 
It is therefore suggested that, had Article 10 retained the explicit inclusion of artistic 
expression within its rubric, a more concrete protection of artistic expression might have 
ensued, according to which an engagement with the unique nature of art as a form of 
expression could more readily be availed by the European Court of Human Rights 
irrespective of the limitation clause pursued by the national authorities. Whilst artistic 
expression’s express inclusion within the rubric of Article 10 would not, according to the 
thesis advanced by Schauer, guarantee its protection it would, nevertheless have solidified 
artistic expression’s location within the freedom of expression paradigm and confirm, more 
directly than is currently the case, the value of artistic expression as a sui generis category 
of expression.   
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